【杰森视角】 “表演式愤怒”时代结束：美对中共策略换轨！美防长谈亚洲安全，只字不提台湾？规则时代终结，世界更硬、更冷? 中美联手断供联合国？美上将“匕首论”让中共破防！深度解读香格里拉交锋！

0:00 Hello everyone, welcome to The Jason Angle. The U.S. Secretary of War has straightforwardly discussed the new U.S.-China and U.S. -Asia relationships, but why is there no mention of Taiwan? Will the United Nations go bankrupt in two and a half months? The Shangri-La Defense Forum is set to take place in Singapore in May 2026. On the morning of the 30th, U.S. Secretary of War Hegseth delivered a speech at the meeting and engaged in a public Q&A with military representatives from various countries. There was a wealth of information! I have created two interpretation programs based on his speech and the Q&A, which are available on my Jason News Express channel. I encourage everyone to check it out. In the first part of today’s program, we will delve deeply into his speech. If you view Hegseth's remarks as just another

0:48 ordinary U.S. Indo-Pacific security statement, you are likely to misinterpret it. He is not here to repeat the old adage of “the U.S. values Asia.” The core messages from his speech and the subsequent Q&A can be summarized in three key points. First, the U.S. will not withdraw from the Indo-Pacific, nor will it accept the CCP's dominance in the Pacific. Second, the U.S. strategy towards the CCP is no longer about simply raising the volume, but about developing a more specific, concrete, and executable deterrent capability. Third, the U.S. attitude towards its allies has clearly shifted, moving away from “I will carry the burden for you” to “you must first prove that you are a true partner.”

1:34 Hegseth's original words may sound harsh to many, but they are crucial: What we need are partners, not protectorates. He also highlighted a new three-word principle for U.S. Asia-Pacific policy: strong calm clear! In his own words: Strong quiet clear. He also stated bluntly: Those who seek peace must prepare for war. This statement encapsulates a new strategic notification from Hegseth, representing the Trump administration, directed at the entire Asia-Pacific region. In essence, the notification conveys one key message: The United States is not planning to withdraw from Asia; on the contrary, it is ready to reintegrate Asia into a tougher, colder, and more cost-effective security framework.

2:22 Hegseth is redefining what peace, partnership, and stability truly mean. This represents a reorganization of security logic. Historically, when discussing Asian security, the United States favored terms like rules, order, values, freedom of navigation, and regional stability; these terms sound respectable and reflect the ideals of the free world. However, this time, Hegseth, whether in his keynote address or during the Q&A session, has prioritized not these traditional terms, but rather military spending, production capacity, naval vessels, ammunition, deterrence, deployment, industrial base, joint production, supply chain resilience, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence.

3:08 This marks a complete shift in the language of security. In other words, the United States is beginning to openly materialize and engineer global security issues. First, why has the United States transitioned to this narrative? Many would naturally say, this reflects the style of the Trump administration: more hardline, more realistic, more transactional. While this assessment has some truth, stopping here offers a superficial view. The Trump administration's style did not emerge in a vacuum. The rise of the Trump political phenomenon is a result of over 30 years of evolving world and American political realities. The fundamental cause of the current situation is the long-term erosion of the international order by the Communist Party of China over the past few decades,

3:56 which has undermined the free world’s original belief in "rules sufficient to restrain ambition." Confidence has gradually eroded. For a long time after World War II, the mainstream world believed in one thing: that by integrating more countries into global trade, international systems, and market cooperation, interests would tame ambitions, economic development would eventually mitigate geopolitical risks. This idea was very appealing at the time, but the issue is, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has never followed the rules since its initial engagement with the world: It benefits from openness in trade, yet refuses to provide reciprocal openness; It enforces technology transfers, which is essentially theft; It continuously expands militarily, including its ongoing encroachment in the South China Sea;

4:42 It operates with two sets of narratives regarding information; and exploits the loopholes of the free world at the institutional level. What the CCP has demonstrated to the world over the past few decades is a mindset of: 'Whoever first manipulates the rules to their advantage, whoever takes all the benefits first, wins.' Consequently, countries that genuinely respect the rules are increasingly realizing that, without hard power backing the rules, even the most appealing rules can ultimately be worthless. Hegseth's original statement is: 'You can have all the rules you want; rules are certainly beneficial. But if you cannot support them with hard power, then these rules are meaningless.' It is clear now that the United States needs to focus on strength.

5:28 Following this logic, you will notice that Hegseth's approach to the CCP this time is different from the familiar 'loud confrontations' that many are accustomed to. In the past, when the topic of the U.S. being tough on the CCP arose, many envisioned escalating verbal condemnations, public pressure, as if the more severe the rhetoric, the greater the determination. Hegseth was very straightforward this time, his original words were: 'We are changing our strategy.' The era of performative anger has ended. We will first lead with action. Strong and calm. Holding a big stick, speaking softly. In summary, it can be expressed as: 'High pressure with guardrails.'

6:14 Why do I say this? He has made it very clear in his keynote speech that the goal of the United States in the Indo-Pacific is to maintain a power balance that is beneficial and sustainable for itself, which means, the United States will not accept the CCP establishing hegemony in this region. To achieve this, Hegges has highlighted a key concept in his speech, which is to establish 'deterrence by denial' along the first island chain. In simpler terms: The United States does not want to wait until the CCP takes action to retaliate, but aims to shape the battlefield environment before the CCP decides whether to act, using his own words:

6:59 'Ensure that aggression is unfeasible, escalation is unattractive, and war is seen as irrational.' This is why Hegges continues to advance with ships, submarines, ammunition, distributed deployment, and industrial capacity. To make the CCP clearly understand that any attempt to change the status quo will encounter a system it cannot easily breach. However, this is not the latest information conveyed in this speech. More importantly, in the subsequent Q&A, Hegges continues to discuss deterrence in practical terms, while also emphasizing 'constructive strategic stability,' communication between the two militaries, avoiding conflicts at sea and in the air,

7:46 reducing misjudgments, goodwill contacts, and so on. Especially in response to provocative questions from CCP military representatives, he did not escalate the tone, but instead conveyed a clear message: that the United States enhancing its forward deployment does not mean it wants to escalate the situation now. Confrontation is imminent. In other words, the U.S. is sharpening its knife, and it will be sharpened faster than before, but sharpening does not mean it will be used immediately. What the U.S. aims to do now is, first, to let the CCP see that its hard power is being reinforced, and that its denial system against the CCP in East Asia is accelerating into formation; second, to inform the CCP that the U.S. does not seek loss of control, misjudgment,

8:33 or escalation of competition into war. This reflects what I mentioned earlier: The Trump administration's new strategy towards the CCP, "high pressure with guardrails." The high pressure is real, the first island chain denial is real, military-industrial expansion is real, and alliance restructuring is also real; but the guardrails are also real, military communication is real, strategic stability is real, and misjudgment control is also real. The Trump administration did not intentionally soften its hardline stance towards the CCP, but it is transitioning its hardline approach from the previous emotional, slogan-driven state of the U.S. government to a more institutionalized, engineered, and controllable long-term competitive mechanism. On the surface, the tension may not seem as strong, but underneath, it is deepening, solidifying,

9:21 and prolonging the competition. The U.S. government's strategy of "high pressure with guardrails" was vividly illustrated during the Q&A phase in response to a question from a CCP official. The question from that CCP official was quite aggressive, and the context of his question was an interesting news event. On May 22, U.S. Forces Korea Commander, U.S. Army General Brunsen, stated very directly in a podcast at the U.S. Army War College, that he believes, for the CCP, the U.S. military deployment in Korea is a dagger pointed at the CCP in the heart of Asia. His statement actually continued his previous metaphor of Korea's strategic position as a ship closely aligned with the CCP's mainland.

10:09 The term 'fixed aircraft carrier' However, the Chinese Communist Party's reaction to this statement was extremely strong. On May 29, the Chinese Embassy in South Korea fiercely countered, accusing Brunson's remarks of being highly aggressive and having seriously crossed the line. Many experts analyze that a key reason for the CCP's strong reaction this time is that Brunson spoke directly to the point, accurately hitting one of the CCP's deepest geopolitical anxieties. Regarding this incident, the Chinese official directly named General Brunson on the spot, repeating his dagger theory. He then asked Hegseth: 'Does General Brunson's statement represent the official position of the Trump administration? Did the Pentagon authorize or endorse the characterization of South Korea as a

10:55 dagger pointed at China?' This question from the Chinese side was very sharp. Brunson's statement completely aligns with reality, even possibly being a strategic action by the U.S. military to exert psychological pressure on the CCP. However, Hegseth cannot truthfully say: 'Yes, this reflects reality; you CCP should face reality!' If Hegseth diplomatically responds simply by saying: 'This is not the official position of the Trump administration!' it would immediately put the Trump administration and General Brunson at odds. Both responses would lead the CCP and the leftist media in the U.S. to make a big deal out of it. Thus, Hegseth cleverly chose to let General Brunson himself respond to the question. The process of Hegseth handing the microphone to General Brunson

11:42 was equivalent to downgrading the question from the official declaration of the Trump administration to a professional military context explanation. When Brunson explained, he did not retreat in content, nor did he say anything like 'You misunderstood my meaning.' Bru nson only emphasized that the context of his statement at that time was 'in a learning environment... was trying to... Discuss with the military academy students how we can change our perspective and reflect on our position. Additionally, we hope the Chinese side understands that statement in its full context. Brunson then actively shifted the topic to the 'logic of communication and dialogue' within the guardrails framework. Throughout the discussion, both Hegses and General Brunson maintained

12:28 the core message of that statement, ensuring its 'deterrent' impact remained intact. They simply reframed that statement, transitioning from a political slogan to a military academic discussion. The facts remain unchanged, but the tone has softened, accurately reflecting the Trump administration's 'low posture, high clarity, strong deployment' principles, and achieving the previously mentioned 'high-pressure with guardrails' strategy against the Chinese Communist Party. This also leads to another key point in Hegses's speech: since the United States is ready to establish a long-term operational capability structure in its competition with the Chinese Communist Party, it can no longer bear the primary costs alone as it did in the past. Consequently, the focus quickly shifts to the allies. If Hegses addresses the Chinese Communist Party with

13:15 'high pressure with guardrails', then his message to the allies is about 'commitment with a ledger'. He has made this very clear in his keynote speech. He emphasized repeatedly that the United States seeks partners, not protectorates. He effectively announced that America's expectations of its allies have evolved. The old model of 'you support me politically, and I will ensure your security' is being replaced by new standards: you must provide tangible contributions in budget, production capacity, readiness, and system integration. This is why Hegses is pushing the defense spending standard for allies to 3.5%. GDP is being pushed up. The 3.5% figure is a line drawn by the

14:01 Trump administration. This line becomes clearer in the later Q&A section. Someone asked on behalf of New Zealand, stating that New Zealand plans to increase military spending from 1% of GDP to 2%, showing such efforts. Is this still considered free-riding? Hegseth's response was very direct: 2% is not enough; 2% is free-riding. Hegseth's statement carries significant weight, indicating that the Trump administration's requirements for allies are no longer just “willingness to improve” but rather “you must meet the standards I define; otherwise, this alliance will become increasingly hollow.” Joining the U.S. security system is no longer just an invitation, but has transformed into a comprehensive assessment system.

14:48 Do you have funding? Have you expanded your military? Do you have the capability to integrate into the entire defense system? Have you truly taken on your own security responsibilities? These factors will become hard indicators for measuring alliance qualifications in the future. This is a crucial point in Hegseth's speech, but many may not fully grasp it on the first listen. The Trump administration is not looking to withdraw from the alliance, but to shift it from an emotionally colored protective relationship to a partnership with performance pressure. If you interpret Hegseth's speech as “the U.S. is just pressuring allies to increase military spending,” then that view is too narrow. What the U.S. truly aims to build now is not just a traditional military alliance,

15:36 but a larger “capability ecosystem.” He discusses how the entire war machine can expand, how to replenish resources, and how to maintain operations. Hegseth specifically highlighted the four pillars of U.S. national security proposed by the Trump administration last year: The first pillar is the security of the U.S. homeland and the Western Hemisphere, and the second pillar is to contain the Communist Party of China in the Indo-Pacific. The third pillar is the shared responsibility of allies. The fourth pillar is the massive expansion of the U.S. military-industrial base. The first three points are still strategic in nature, but the fourth point Directly addresses industrial mobilization. In this context, hegses spoke very candidly: The U.S. aims to increase ammunition production capacity by two,

16:22 three, or even four times, and to break the long-standing monopoly of a few military-industrial giants By creating a competitive environment with fifteen or twenty companies; The U.S. is willing to offer long-term contracts of five to seven years In exchange for companies investing their own funds to build new factories And production lines. This shows that the U.S. is preparing for Not just short-term statements from various companies or countries, but a long-term competition for capabilities that can be sustained, maintained, and organized. Because of this, hegses clarified how the U.S. envisions integrating allies in his speech. He did not encourage diplomatic statements Or public alignment between China and the U.S. What the U.S. seeks is more practical: To gradually incorporate more countries into its

17:10 Military-industrial chain, supply chain, data chain, technology chain, and logistics chain. For instance, during the Q&A session, when Japan's Defense Minister Kono Shinjiro mentioned equipment and technology transfer, regional cooperation, and resilient supply chains, hegses immediately affirmed his points. When discussing cybersecurity And artificial intelligence, he emphasized the need to connect the technological advantages of the U.S. private sector With empowering allies. Today, the U.S. is striving for more than just 'Who can articulate better ideologically,' But rather 'Who can draw more countries into their capability system.' In the future Indo-Pacific security competition, while it may appear to revolve around warships, missiles, and bases—traditional hardware—

17:56 The deeper competition Is already at the systemic level. Who can make more countries in normal production, maintenance, supply, data compatibility, cooperative training, and technology transfer gradually become dependent on themselves, is closer to achieving true strategic ally status, and holds a real advantage in terms of strategic alliances. He mentioned 'interoperability' three times in his speech, which means interoperability. What the United States wants now is for industries to 'enter the chain', technologically to 'align', logistically to 'be compatible', and to seamlessly integrate into the entire defense system during wartime. This is deeper than traditional alliances, and also harder to reverse. Many small and medium-sized Asian countries may not vocally express their stance,

18:43 even may not be willing to take the lead in public, choosing sides between China and the United States. Everyone knows that once they publicly take sides, their maneuvering space as small countries will shrink, the costs will also rise immediately. However, this does not mean they are inactive. What is more likely to happen is that more and more Asian countries will gradually align with the United States in a low-key, more technical, and less headline-grabbing manner, step by step. For instance, is equipment procurement prioritizing compatibility with the U.S. system? Is supply chain collaboration starting to align with U.S. standards? Is training cooperation deepening ties with the U.S.? Is cybersecurity and data systems gradually integrating with the U.S.? Are ports, maintenance,

19:29 and logistical infrastructure starting to create interfaces for the U. S. military system? These issues are generally hard to make headlines because they are too detailed, not as lively as 'who opposes whom, who supports whom', but what truly determines future regional positioning often lies in these very details. The United States is actually offering many Asian countries a new path: You don't have to shout anti-Communist every day, However, you need to consider how to gradually integrate into the various systems and chains of the United States. Whoever grasps this first, is more likely to secure greater leverage in this round of geopolitical restructuring. Several media outlets have noted, that Hegseth, in his speech addressing the Chinese Communist Party

20:15 and the Asia-Pacific, surprisingly did not mention Taiwan at all, which is historically unusual. From a strategic standpoint, Taiwan is undoubtedly extremely important to the United States; it remains the most critical point on the first island chain against the Chinese Communist Party, and is the most sensitive position in the U.S. “denial” strategy towards the CCP, one that cannot afford to fail. Yet, at the same time, Hegseth, in both his keynote speech and during the Q&A session, did not elevate Taiwan as a prominent issue. Particularly during the Q&A, someone directly asked if the recent suspension of the 14 billion dollar arms sale to Taiwan was related to U.S. military actions in the Middle East.

21:01 Hegseth's response was quite measured; he did not publicly commit to expediting the arms sale, only stating that the Middle East conflict should not be linked to the suspension of arms sales to Taiwan, and that U.S. inventory is not a concern, with future decisions to be made by President Trump. At that moment, Hegseth added a remark, clearly stating that the U.S. position on Taiwan remains unchanged. Hegseth's response is quite intriguing, as it underscores Taiwan's significance to the U.S., while also suggesting that the Taiwan issue is being framed within the broader context of U.S.-China competition, returning to Trump's personal discretion and the overall negotiation structure. In other words, the Taiwan issue has not been sidelined, but it has not been emphasized separately, and Hegseth seems intentionally not to present it as

21:47 the sole focus of U.S.-China relations. This approach to handling the issue, The new strategies of the United States towards the CCP we mentioned earlier are completely consistent: After establishing that the CCP is under 'high pressure with guardrails' And that there is a 'commitment with accounts' to allies, it seems the U.S. strategy towards Taiwan has shifted to Maintaining Taiwan's strategic importance while Making public statements more restrained And more compliant with Trump's overall approach. Many people are quite displeased with the Trump administration's Attitude towards Taiwan, feeling that Trump is betraying Taiwan. Many members of Trump's cabinet, including Hegseth, should also be aware of this sentiment. I noticed that Hegseth specifically highlighted the following segment in his speech, which left an impression on me.

22:33 He said: 'President Trump believes in helping those countries that help themselves. The U.S. Department of War shares this view. This is the essence of burden sharing. ... Today's world is ruthless. That is why this bold path is a strategic necessity. We have a responsibility to shape the future world for our people.' Setting aside emotions, to be fair, the U.S. president prioritizes American interests, which is not great, but it can't be deemed despicable or evil. The new principles Hegseth conveyed at the Shangri-La Forum, while understood in terms of their realistic origins, also present a brutal reality to the world.

23:19 As the U.S. integrates more Asian allies Into its capability system, the CCP will quickly enhance its own chain And expand its military; This military expansion by the CCP Will further prompt the U.S. to increase deployments, continue expanding production, and incorporate allies into the system. Consequently, the underlying reality has become: Everyone is preparing for conflict more seriously. The past issue was that the mainstream world focused too much on rules And theories. There's been too little discussion about power; However, the new risks now may be that the entire world is starting to elevate power too high, while undermining the credibility of rules, commitments, values, and systems. Without strength, rules will inevitably become meaningless;

24:06 but if only strength remains, then rules will also be gradually eroded, and peace will increasingly resemble a fragile balance sustained by high pressure. Nonetheless, it is the CCP that first dragged the reality of international competition into the mud of disregarding rules, and the current response from the United States is to enter the arena in military boots. What Heggesse emphasized at Shangri-La, on the surface, focuses on Asia-Pacific security, but it actually reflects a new global reality: People's confidence in "rules" is diminishing, while their reliance on "strength" is increasing. The CCP is undoubtedly the first to break the rules; but humanity's true misfortune

24:51 often lies not just in bad actors ignoring rules, but in even those who initially wanted to uphold them gradually losing faith in them. We still have a little time, let's discuss the potential bankruptcy of the United Nations in about two months. Recently, UN Secretary-General Guterres issued a warning, stating that the UN is racing towards bankruptcy, and if the current cash flow continues, the account will be depleted by mid-August. The direct cause of the UN's funding shortage is that its two major contributors are both facing issues. The Trump administration, which has always looked down on the UN, now owes over four billion dollars in dues; and the CCP has also technically defaulted on over four hundred million dollars. Together, these two contributions from the US and China

25:38 account for forty-two percent of the UN budget. The UN is now exploring every possible way to cut costs, including closing offices, eliminating three thousand secretariat positions, and reducing interpretation time, Headquarters maintenance has been postponed, among other things. In an effort to save money, they even resorted to turning off the escalators. Recently, to save seven hundred thousand dollars, they closed a security check entrance, which caused inconvenience for diplomats. As a result, they were forced to reopen it two days later. The United Nations is currently facing an unsolvable financial dilemma. Legally speaking, the UN cannot operate by borrowing money. Moreover, the UN leadership lacks the authority to massively cut down on its agencies or eliminate its missions. All member states want to gain a platform,

26:25 gain resources, and gain influence from the UN, but no one is truly willing to provide it with a financial foundation for independent operation. Countries are eager to introduce new projects to the UN, but no one wants to remove old ones. Everyone advocates for multilateralism, but when it comes to contributing more money and receiving fewer benefits, they quickly revert to their own interests. The UN is increasingly resembling an old machine that the world is reluctant to support seriously, yet cannot bear to dismantle, because while this machine may not function well, everyone still wants to take home a piece of it. Consequently, the UN continues to expand, becoming more bloated. The Trump administration made it clear to the UN: if it wants American funding, the UN must cut staff, reduce costs, and minimize waste. Simultaneously,

27:11 the Trump administration announced its withdrawal from various UN agencies and projects. On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party publicly supports the UN, but since 2022, it has increasingly delayed its payments. The CCP is using the timing of payments as a pressure tool, influencing the UN's budget, human rights, peacekeeping, and other issues. The pressure from the US is evident, everyone can see it. The CCP's pressure is much more subtle. The CCP typically does not directly state its desire to control the UN, but instead manipulates the payment schedule. Budget mechanisms, group alliances, and program details, embed influence into the United Nations. For example, the Chinese Communist Party expresses its views through the 'Group of Seventy-Seven', packaging its own agenda as the common

27:57 opinion of developing countries. It exerts pressure in technical areas like the budget committee, human rights funding, and peacekeeping benefits, quietly redirecting resource flows. By demanding cuts to the human rights budget, it threatens these institutions to silence their criticism of the CCP's tyranny. It insists on maintaining peacekeeping troop benefits, partly because many inactive peacekeeping troops come from China. The United Nations, as an international institution, has lost its fundamental independence. While it is nominally an international body, it has effectively become a battleground for great power competition. An increasingly hollow United Nations, is less about maintaining minimal global cooperation, and more about propping up the last facade of a completely ineffective international order.

28:43 Often, what goes bankrupt first is not the finances, but the credibility. Before its economic collapse, the United Nations' credibility had already been long gone. Alright, today's 'The Jason Angle' program concludes here. Thank you all for watching! I encourage everyone to visit 'Jason News Express' to hear Minister Hegsey's Shangri-La speech and the simultaneous interpretation of the Q&A session. I also hope you will subscribe to and recommend both 'The Jason Angle' and 'Jason News Express' channels.