Does Modi Govt Realise US-Israel’s War on Iran Has Entered Indian Homes? | Central Hall

0:12 Namaskar. In this episode of Dils, we'll be talking about uh the continuing uh events that are taking place uh in the Israeli US Iranian conflict. And every day the goalpost changes. is we don't know what's going to happen tomorrow. And ever since Trump has come to power uh since uh January 20th, 2025, the global order seems to have changed radically. Both the economic global order and the political global order. Sometimes President Trump says, "Okay, uh we're giving you 48 hours and then we will uh finish you." Uh and thereafter he says, "Okay, we paused it for 5 days and uh let's deal with the matter." And then he says, "We're sending our troops

0:59 in and they'll occupy the islands." He's sending their marines in. And we don't know really what's happening. And in the meantime, the attacks are taking place. Drones are being fired, missiles are being fired, bombers are being sent. And quite frankly, with precision strikes, Iran has been in in several senses inhalated in terms of its power. But this is an asymmetric war. Uh I don't think Iran can win that war. That's my own personal opinion. But at the same time if Iran prolongs that war and that's the strategy of Iran uh that to impact the economic order of the world deprive them of essentials which are fuel to economic growth in various parts

1:45 of the world and if they squeeze Iran squeezes the global community barring China and Russia which he's had great relations with um it's going to impact the US inflation is going to rise the global economy is going to suffer. Growth is going to come down. Employment would be affected. The source materials for agriculture, for steel, for aluminium, for textiles, plastic industry, all that will be impacted very seriously. And as far as India is concerned and that's really what saddens me, India imports about 5 million barrels a day of crude. Approximately 3 millions are sourced from the Middle East. The price of Middle East crude blend of sweet and sour is approximately today US dollars

2:32 160 per barrel premium over 60 over the North Sea brand. Explanation is high Asian demand but why such a differential? Now the arithmetic is that we are spending incrementally US dollars $270 to $300 million per day as a result of the conflict. In addition to that the impact on higher price ura is 50% higher LNG LPG sulfur and helium if this continues we will face supply shortage we will face hoarding black marketing stagflation high interest rates falling FDI and we have stocks only for 7 to 8

3:20 days whereas countries like China have stocks for 120 days. Japan 28 days, South Korea 200 days. Now the irony is that we are close both to Israel and uh to the United States and in the speech in the Knesset when recently Modi G went it was in full support of Israel in every sense of the word unlike what he said in parliament the other day. Now the fact of the matter is that this if this war continues for a long period of time, who are Israel and the United States hurting the most? India. It's the action of our friends is hurting India the most and they never

4:06 took this into account when they launched this attack and that's the irony that we are friendly with these countries and their actions are hurting us and Iran is only trying to prolong the war by using a asymmetric system of war and you know it better the fact of the matter is that Iran has a decentralized system of operations. In other words, if you kill somebody at the center, it doesn't really matter. The three 32 odd provinces, I believe, where decentralization has taken place take their own decisions and don't have to go to the to the central authority as such. So, we're going to discuss all these aspects especially in the context of our foreign policy where we might have sort of not really been futuristic enough to

4:54 understand as to what the consequences of this war been. You remember despite all this Iran is willing to supply oil to India, willing to supply oil to to China and a couple of other countries as friendly countries and I think Iran needs to do that because it'll be depleted of their economic resources. So we have three extraordinary people to with us today who will discuss many of these issues. Thank you uh TCA Ragwan please. You're the you're a foreign service officer of 82 batch retired in 2015 got a PhD in economic history from JNU expert in South Asia in political in these um strategic studies um and and you have been in park as the deputy high commissioner then high commissioner in

5:39 Pakistan in 2009 you've been the GS park Afghanistan Iranian desk so you know the complexities of these issues you've otherwise been to Kuwait UK Bhutan and of Of course, you've written fiction as well as non-fiction and your books are widely read. Thank you very much for being here. I have with me today a military expert who's going to give tell us give us a view as to what are the military consequences of what's happening uh out there. Commodore uh Udear Gji, thank you very much for being here. You're one of the India's most foremost experts in security and strategic affairs particularly in maritime, nuclear and international security domains. and you joined the NDA way back uh and were commissioned into the Indian Navy. served for 37 years in

6:26 the Indian Navy and uh retired and then of course deeply involved in the IDSA right from 1989 later became a director of IDSA and also you are currently the director in the society for policy studies in New Delhi uh in focusing on independent research in security and foreign policy you've been a member of the member sector of the government of India task force on global strategic developments ments and you've held influential positions in India in areas of security. You're also a visiting scholar in McGill University and of course in in Italy in Pavia University of Pavia. Uh so thank you very much for being here and uh what can I say about

7:12 Raja? Every time I think of foreign policy of India I I ringing ring him up and say please come over because you're the expert in this area. very few people have the kind of knowledge and the depth of knowledge the breadth of knowledge that you have. You are the founding director of the Carnegie India and New Delhi. Sixth such international center of car end carnegi endowment for international peace, distinguished fellow of the RF, senior fellow of the center for policy research new Delhi, professor of South Asian studies in JNU. Um and of course you're an expert uh in national security affairs. You're a member of the uh national security advisory board and what the Henry Alfred Alfred Kissinger Chair in foreign policy

7:57 and international relations at the Library of Congress Washington. We read your articles every day. Every other day you're writing about foreign policy and what it means in the context of this conflict for India. So thank you all for being here. Let me start with you. Um sir, what do you think is going to happen? >> Well, nobody quite knows. I think right now we appear to be in a pause where both sides are trying to see if they can after 3 weeks of pretty intense conflict now find some middle ground which was obviously not there earlier. I think in the past uh uh 3 weeks in fact longer than that uh both sides have realized that uh this conflict has consequences which they did not fully anticipate. uh

8:44 the Americans and the Israelis certainly do not appear to have been ready for such a prolonged uh period of combat. Uh I think the Iranians also are conscious of the great damage which their country and their society is facing. So at one level it appears to be a pause to see if they can find some middle ground. >> But this 15 point the Americans have suggested it doesn't seem to be something that the Iranians are going to buy. I think both the Iranian and the US initial positions are more as negotiating starts. I don't think these will be the final outcomes but in the beginning it is customary although it's unusual that after such an intense face of conflict to come out with demands which are unlikely to be conceded but

9:31 nevertheless I think that these are initial uh but perhaps the real discussions will be on other uh issues uh and possibly they there is expectation that they may be able to find a way out but it depends really on the internal assessments of each of these each of the parties. about that we don't know that much. You see there is a minority view that this is no more than a pause and both sides are using this uh to get ready for the next uh that's right >> next phase. >> But uh where exactly we stand therefore it's very difficult to say. I would say that things are possibly balanced on a knife's edge and uh uh could go either way. >> Well, let me ask you a further question.

10:18 when the 12- day war in June took place when America attacked the nuclear facilities he said we've accomplished everything right and that they have no you know enriched fuel left and we've destroyed everything now suddenly that's become a a talking point uh that that Iran should not give a promise that they will not have nuclear weapons and then they say that you give an undertaking that uh you will you know do this you will not do that how is that possible You see uh I think the US administration after a long gap in its public uh postures the present administration is not processdriven. They are not they are not basing what they are saying on being consistent. Uh it's a it's much more of

11:04 a improvised uh uh situation that they they face a certain situation and they will say something. But if one is to look at the positives and see if there what is the common meeting ground one possible common meeting ground is that Iran has always said that we have no intention of making nuclear weapons. >> Yes. >> Uh you know so so their position has never been that we are not going >> now never that's what they said >> that is their their position. So that provides the basis for people to work towards a middle >> that they said earlier >> that they said earlier that they said earlier because we should also not forget that each of the parties the their mutual relationships are deeply visible >> and it's something we find it difficult to understand if you apply rational uh

11:52 scheme of calculation. These are these are very very elemental relationships uh uh on on all sides and that I think adds to the element of unpredictability to this particular >> because of the element of distrust for both sides >> distrust there are strategic uh uh issues and over the past 40 45 years certainly there is a there's a element of uh it's much more than distrust there's an element of uh uh this zero sum mentality that we cannot allow the other uh to exist at least in our region. >> Now, let me ask you, Udik, you're a military strategist. You know exactly what's happening. What do you think in terms of military outcome? Uh that's possible in the context of the

12:38 fact that the Americans sending Marines. They also realize that maybe they'll occupy the south islands, south of Iran, but that exposes their marines to their being, you know, uh killed even. >> Absolutely. >> So, what are the consequences of this kind of strategy? >> If we look at the trajectory of the war, it'll enter the fifth week on Saturday, 28th of March. And in many ways if you look at what has happened in the past five weeks and what may happen in the next week or two I would say that number one the scale of destruction that starting from the early phases of epic fury >> the Israelis and the Americans were able to use their superior ordinance delivery

13:24 capability meaning the aerial bombardment the use of missiles and to pick up what Ragun has just said the initial assumptions seem to have been totally off the mark meaning that there was an assumption that they could wrap this up in the first two weeks. >> That's correct. >> And once that's done, there'd be a regime change and perhaps a scaling up of the Venezuela model, >> but that did not happen. >> And from week three onwards, you see Iran regrouping and Iran's ability to strike, >> right? And one military red line which I think was crossed was around the 21st of March when Iranian ordinance was able to reach Israel and particularly in and around Deona their nuclear shall we say assets. >> Yes. >> And I think that was a significant

14:09 punctuation and after that I think both Israel and America have been forced to rethink that early assumption that they they had degraded Iran militarily not now but in 2025. the 12- day war that you're talking about. So I think there's been a case of you know reooking at the military kind of options and that's when you see Trump asking the Marines to come in. >> So they have moved number 11 MEU 31 aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln in the Arabian Sea Indian Ocean and also a sense that they might now mount this assault >> on the K island. So number one is the destruction that has happened over the last four to five weeks. Iran's ability to deliver ordinance not only to Israel but the other Arab nations that have US

14:58 bases and what has happened now in countries like UAE, Dubai, Bahrain, Saudi is one of the consequences of the military outcome of the war. destruction to assets, instability and a sense of anxiety, panic which has its own strategic ramifications that you can't trust the US >> to give us that foolproof umbrella. >> Looking ahead, I would say that much could depend on the kind of decision President Trump takes about getting the US military involved in a more direct way. At the moment, there is no direct contact. It's all missiles, aerial and the anxiety that the Iranians may use their proxies. >> That's correct. >> As of now, the entire focus is on the hormones. If, and this is a hypothetical

15:43 scenario, the Iranians are able to motivate the southeast to do their bit in the Red Sea, then you will have a pinser in terms of global energy, global trade. And we come back to the human security consequence of a military action which is the 3F syndrome that is fuel, >> fertilizer and food. >> Right? >> And this will start kicking in after I mean the expert kind of assessment coming out is that by the time we come to day 100 which is in roughly week 14 15 I think the human security dimension is going to become far more grave and dangerous than what it is today. Now we talking about gas cylinders in India >> shortage and all over South Asia. >> All right, >> there is now the impact of the fallout

16:28 of the war. But if the United States decides to step up and militarily bring in the carriers, bring in naval power, bring in the Marines and attempt an assault, which I personally think would be very imprudent, I think then Iran's ability to use its other options, the proxy options, and maybe escalate even horizontally in terms of whom it'll target is a high probability. And then frankly, all bets are off because we are talking about >> it's a highly incendary situation. very very I would say it's very very dangerous at this point. >> But Trump doesn't really want to have a full-blown war involving the American military troops >> and that's why he's telling the alliance partners that why are you not supporting me >> right and and they are not keen to do

17:14 that. So I wonder whether Trump is going to take that option at the moment. I think this is a posture to threaten the Iranians that you better come to terms otherwise I'll I'll do something. I I think that word that you use it is right the posture because if you read Trump and his whole psychology >> one of his things is about the art of the deal >> which is that you push the adversary or the interlocutor to the absolute edge >> and then like PCA was saying you look at the backdoor diplomacy and the other options and pedal back >> you look you attributing too much rationality to someone >> who doesn't at least don't appear to be to be rational but rather Let me come to you. In the context of what's happening here, where should our foreign policy

18:00 have been? Did we did we make the right calls in terms of our relationships? >> I think uh to understand the calls we made, it's important to note how much India's policy towards the Middle East has changed in the last decade. Mhm. >> Now, Israel, for example, the Congress party, it was the one which actually recognized the Israelis, full diplomatic relations, >> but there's always a hesitation to go the full full distance with Israel, >> right? >> Uh no Indian prime minister had visited Israel and no Israeli prime minister had come to India. But I think when the BJP came to power, they were very clear, we going to build a solid relationship with Israel, >> right? And I think on the technology side on the defense side the scale and

18:46 intensity which all began under the Congress rule but I think in the last 10 years that has become much I >> myself went to much more you were in the science and technology ministry and I think it became much more intense. So that's that's one point. >> The second I think is the transformation of India's relationship with the Gulf Arab countries. See going back to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and Prime Minister that I'm hugging Saddam Hussein. Uh the Kuwait is that that relationship was normalized only about a year ago when Prime Minister Modi finally went to Kuwait. But what has changed is really deeply was India's relationship with Saudi Arabia, India's relationship with United Arab Emirates. These two have become major economic partners for India, >> right? >> Major investors in India,

19:31 >> right? Because what's happened the Gulf has become a rich place >> right >> that is today the money in Qatar Saudi and uh UAE of course let's see how much survives this war but I think the capacity today financial capacity almost equal to London New York Hong Kong level of money that exists and money is looking to be invested so I think we've seen that >> the future financial capitals of the world if everything had gone would have been these areas >> so in a way I think prime minister Modi built a personal kind of rapo with the with the with the sultans. I mean uh and I think that has worked to some extent and if you remember the UAE at one point had invited uh Sushma Swaraj to address the OIC meeting organization of Islamic conference meeting and when India changed its position on Kashmir in

20:17 August 2019 the UAE is one of the few countries that supported India >> and in fact Iran was not in support that >> and then you had actually the first country to say look we'll invest something in Kashmir. So in a way our stakes purely irrespect of the political side the economic stakes with both Israel and the Gulf Gulf had increased and at the political level there was a new bonomy uh and then they were willing to support you in a way that previous uh in the past I think we always talked about Arab solidarity but but I think the our political class premod was never comfortable with the dynamic within the within the Arab world. The finally I would say what has changed also is the Abraham Accords >> where a a section of the Gulf Arabs were

21:03 now normalizing ties with Israel. So the old framing that Arabs versus Israel does not apply >> right >> that actually they today some of the Gulf Arabs see Iran as a threat >> right >> and not Israel actually for them their existential challenges come from Iran and not from Israel. So I think the structural change that has taken place and I think perhaps India saw this look these guys stood with us therefore we going to stand with them. I don't know if you saw the statement by uh the UAE officials in the last two days where they said look this is not enough to have a ceasefire that existence of Iran and a revolutionary Iran that seeks to overthrow the existing order is a fundamental threat. >> Right? So I think it's it's it's really we're in a new situation and I think given our stakes with Israel and the and the Emirates and the Gulf Arabs uh we

21:49 seem to have uh taken that into account in taking the opposition but as you mentioned in the beginning that is not that you still have some leeway with Iranians because the size of your as a as a customer as a as a as a neighbor so they're willing to let go and I think what's happened is for all our talk about Israel Iran uh TCA was the joint secretary looking at Iran as well that it never took off the economic relationship because they were under sanctions. What you could do with Iran was always constrained by Iran's quarrels >> right >> with the western world >> while with the UAE and with Saudi and the and the Israelis relationship has took off. So I think it is we take those weights into consideration it's not difficult to see why we've signal support for these two countries. >> Okay. So the basically what you're saying is as the geopolitical situation

22:36 and relationships have changed, we found that India would be better served in our relationship with Israel and the United States and the GC and the and the GCC countries than to push our relationship with Iran to the extent that we might have wanted to. But then the problem is and this is the problem which is why I want to ask you this question. The problem is that basically because of the states of hormones because of hormones because of our huge economic interests in terms of oil and in terms of gas are supplied through the states of hormones. I think that we should have realized at some stage if a conflict takes place, what are we going to do? Right? And I think at that stage that to be so completely aligned with Israel and and the United States of America may not

23:22 according to me may not been the best way to deal with the situation because now you are not even in a position to to in fact help a deal come through. you have Pakistan, you have Turkey and you have Egypt you know who are the interlocators now. So somewhere down the line I think we took a very strong position and the fact that we did not even condemn the killing of Kamei is something that you know that Iran will never forget. So I think there's a problem there according to me and and maybe I'm wrong but that's >> no no I I think you know countries do take the overall weight as I said Iran has not been too nasty to us. >> Yes exactly >> they might not forget it they might not forgive it but but at this point they're

24:09 still engaged with us and we are engaged with them. >> I think on the question of states of I think which is what you you mentioned just now I think that is the key. >> Yes. I think three weeks ago no one thought that would become the central issue but today it is >> but foreign policy about thinking ahead. No >> sure >> I'm going to come to you on that. >> Sure. So but but I think the I think clearly I mean I think you know even the Americans did not expect >> well their foreign policy is not really something that we admire. I mean at least I don't. >> But my sense is on the international law and the record of the last 100 years where actually it is considered an international state. Iran has no right to stop. But what Iran is doing, look, Americans are fighting a conventional military war. As you said, Iran is fighting a political war of using its

24:55 leverage or the or the no business to decimate a nation. No business to kill people like this. I think that any rightthinking nation should stand up and say this is wrong. This is what I think. Ragman, what do you say? Well, it's, you know, we can put it in different ways, but if you assign a certain weightage to relationships, the weight which exists because of your relations with the Gulf, with Israel and with the United States far outweighs any equities you are likely to have with Iran. uh and secondly the fact that you have such large number of Indians in the GCC countries that acts as a weight on policym which you cannot underestimate >> right >> because there's no way those Indians can ever come out

25:41 >> you see this is not even near the Kuwait situation during the first Gulf war where you could ring fence and bring the Indians out and that in fact the first Gulf War you could see Indian policy being driven entirely by welfare issues concerning your Indian population there. So I think in this case these factors have more or less predetermined the overall posture of your the substance of your position. But I agree with you. I think there was scope for nuancing it. Certainly when that Iranian vessel got uh sunk after participating in a exercise in India or when Kamay was uh uh >> and now the naval chief the naval head has been assassinated while they're talking they're having a dialogue the

26:27 naval head has been killed >> yes >> but they do but you know as I said as we were discussing these countries have a very very deep uh highly relationship based on animosity alone there are no length which have held any of them back >> within the GCC also. No, no one country >> it lacks the cutting edge for instance of the US Iran relationship from the days of the revolution. Can you imagine the embassy was stormed their diplomats were held hostage for such a long period of time. So this is a these are relationships and Israel uh Iran is on a different uh orbit altogether because for them on both sides uh assassinations has been part of the way they conduct their normal business. >> But they have an existential threat. No

27:13 >> they all feel an existential threat from >> I mean Israeli talks about that we have an existential threat. I think Iran has an existential threat because Israel has been saying that we will decimate them. will finish. >> So, so this is you're not dealing with a normal set of relations. >> That's right. >> And the question really therefore is that how should you position yourself >> to cause least damage to your interests? Some damage is inevitable. >> Nobody has come out of this whole trackus unscathed. >> Uh but I would say that I think the sinking of that Iranian uh naval vessel, the assassination of Hamai required that we certainly nuance our position a bit. But you know as I said the weight of the Indians 10 million of them uh also makes

27:58 you take positions which you may not like. >> But the but the Iranians are not targeting the Indians. They are targeting the basis the basis that the Americans have in those GCC countries or attacking. >> My feeling is that our real concern was about how the leadership in the GCC states would look at the Indians if our position was not totally inclined with them. No, it's I don't think that you should be inclined towards A or towards B. I think at the right time you can criticize what has happened by killing of Kamei. You can sort of at least at least through your words give some kind of sucker. >> I I only on that of course you're >> I think I think we should have certainly condolled the execution of assassination of >> I want to add a couple of things here sir. We've talked about weightage >> as to why AntCA as a very experienced

28:45 diplomat has put this in Raj. But I think there's some intangibles here >> and I feel very strongly so I thought I would like to bring it on the table here that while there is this whole question about weightage and where the national interest lies and this is a very valid argument. I think there's a texture to India's engagement with the region historically. Raj has given us all the detail of that and I think our position our profile has been tainted. Strong word to use tainted mainly because we refuse to do what would have been expected of a country like India. India has pedigree. India has depth. India has a history of a relationship not just with the region but globally on that not

29:32 being able to condol the death of Kaman when he was assassinated again I'm saying it very bluntly he was assassinated by the Americans and the Israelis as part of epic fury we said nothing then we had the dinina the naval ship >> it was sunk just outside of India >> that's right >> sailors went down >> we did not sympathize even the code of the sailor that we should have reached out to them and this is something which I find very difficult because by all means you can go to the Israeli parliament. Prime Minister Modi went there and it is very clear that India is now leaning closer to the Israelus US kind of position in the region and in this war in particular. But the fact that we could not I think you know nuance to use the word that he said and

30:17 reach out and what to me was even more dismaying is that the average Indian citizen when they tried to sympath you know extend their condolences even that they put a filter on it. went much later >> but the spontaneous kind of responses of people sympathizing with what had happened the state ensured that you know it was in a way kept below the median and in Kashmir when people wanted to send aid to those who were in distress in Iran even that was not encouraged and this is 1.4 4 billion people. So on that I feel very strongly that yes the weight of foreign policy should be an objective clinical decision but the whole I would say kind of position and what we associate with India a certain degree of both principle humanism should we sort

31:04 of be completely devoid of that there I use the word again I think we stand tainted in the not just the Iranian eyes but generally in the global committee >> well you know I think that what both of you are saying is right the national interest requires us uh to look at really the larger interests of India in the context of the positions we take. But is foreign policy only that or is there any moral fiber >> to that as well? I mean I >> somewhere down the road there is a moral fiber >> nuanced better said >> we're not going to side with you right now. They say but you know and you know all western western countries are dependent on the US but Spain took a position. President Lula took a position okay he didn't succumb. So I think at

31:50 some stage you're right. I am with you on the national interest. But there's also a moral dimension to it. >> For example, you know, moral politic and real politic there's always the tension. For example, our position on Ukraine. >> Not only we didn't condemn Russian invasion when successive resolutions in the UN, we kind of duck the issue because Russia is your friend. And not only that, I mean a large part of the Indian elite was saying, "Oh, Ukrainians deserved you know because they provoked Russia into attacking. So, so I think our record is not a neat one as Bascar is trying to say where we are always taking moral positions where your interests came in it was tempered by the reality of look you couldn't alienate the Russians therefore while you didn't like what Russians have done in Afghanistan or in Hungary Czechoslovakia

32:38 you you had to temper down your moral I think there's a far more complicated uh situation as far as Russia's attacking Ukraine is concerned Quite frankly there is a historical context to it. There is the issue that NATO should not be come to the borders. There is the issue of Russian population in certain areas in the Ukraine predominant population. So I think each conflict has its nuances and I think you can't compare one. >> This is what the Gulf Arabs say. Look from its birth they were trying to undermine the Gulf kingdoms. >> That's I agree with you. I >> I think everywhere there is a context. >> That's right. I'm just saying where does India stand in that context? India would not in the context of the Russian and the Ukraine conflict there's a different context altogether and in the past also

33:23 this has happened so I'm not I'm not in any denigrating that but I'm only saying that in the ultimate analysis if Holmos closes down in this fashion >> of course that's >> it will have disastrous consequences and why would America and Israel not think of India when they are our closest allies I'm only on that they should have thought that you know this can happen >> I think they didn't think many things true. Uh that's very evident. But it's also possible uh that the Iranians didn't think many things through. >> I agree. I agree. >> And I think the the biggest of course uh the Iranians always assumed that the Americans would be taking the possible closure of the strait of Homus into account when they do something major with Iran. >> They were told that

34:09 >> but the Americans didn't do that. They didn't take it into account. So there is a failure of uh assessment uh on all sides but on the on the question of you know our overall posture I mean as I said I think our the substance of your policy is more or less predecided uh and the Indians alone would have predecided that for you but I would agree that I think there is scope for uh nuancing it for taking a certain position on on some issues where you feel even the lines Even standards which are very low where Israel Iran relations are concerned or US Iran relations are concerned but where even low standards have been breached I think we should take a position >> but look at what Israel has done to the

34:54 Palestinians and look at our foreign policy and our foreign policy posture throughout till we change that position. We've said nothing about the kind of killings that have taken place. 72,000 people have died today. Israel is attacking the Hezbollah and southern Lebanon is sought to be occupied by them. A thousand people have already been killed uh out there and Israel supposing Iran loses this war. Let's assume what's going to happen? What's going to happen? There are 90 million people in Iran about 97 odd million people. There are 27 million in the Gulf. Now you can't throw out those 90 95 million people anywhere. the consequences would be horrendous. Which nation has thought of those

35:40 consequences? Not America, not Israel. Because Israel is only, you know, Netanyahu is only concerned with one thing to decimate. >> I think there is a need. I think what you're pointing out is how do we construct an architecture >> which where the interests of all countries can be taken into account that I think would involve at least two three broads. I think one the interference in the internal affairs. >> Yes. where Iran's interference by using minorities by using militias in other countries is a problem. So when today they talk about proxies that's an issue >> but that's connected to >> yeah I'm so same at the same time you say look does Iran as the largest country it needs a say in the way the architecture is established that too needs to be respected I mean I think uh TCA served in you know Singapore where Indonesia where the largest country is

36:26 willing to accommodate interest and the others are willing to accommodate >> uh Indonesia's interest so I think we need a fresh set of principles on which the the last 47 years of the Iranian revolution you need some way of tempering and taking into account everybody's interests hopefully I think all sides are also talking about a a regional security architecture Iran talks about it our Gulf Arab friends talk about it so I think there might be a room as we begin to move towards engaging I agree with the RTC there is scope for diplomacy here as you said on Iran saying you know we don't you know there's a fatwa against making nuclear weapons but they insist on the right to develop nuclear energy >> which actually there's a way of finessing missile program is a new element Americans have introduced. Then there is

37:11 the question of proxies. So I think there is actually an Iran that is assured of non-intervention by the Americans. >> Would also have to reassure its neighbors that we're not going to mess around with your domestic politics. >> So I think this tragedy ends up in a new engagement on these ideas. This is something we need to support. The greatest irony would be if you remember before Feb 28 under Omani sort of sharpine they almost reached an agreement. >> Yes. >> Between the United States and Iran and apparently from whatever and and and America withdrew from >> Yeah. No Iran was willing to even give up more >> than what it had on the Obama plan the JCOPA. >> Zero stockpile. Zero stockpile >> and the Americans cut it. >> Yes. So today if there's a new agreement they'll have to go through many layers

37:57 including when Raj was talking as just struck me that at one of the conferences the Saudi and the UAE position was that Iran is the head of the snake if only that is cut and this is serious stuff they're talking about the ideology they said something terrific right only then will we be able to have some kind of a kind of assurance >> that we would not be threatened again these are very extreme positions so I don't think they'll be reconciled in a hurry but what perhaps And just perhaps is can we revisit what was agreed before Feb 28? >> Yes. >> And see if that is a starting point for the kind of you know paddling that you're talking about that we have three very angry ducks which are spitting missiles at each other but there's paddling going on you know below the water that we perhaps don't know and we hope. >> Let me go back back to the pre-Trump

38:44 era. After all, Israel had the same position about Iran even in the pre-Trump era. But none of the previous presidents were willing to do what Israel wanted them to do. >> Yes, that is true. >> That is true. And why is that? Why is that? >> Because because >> because they were negotiating with Iran. >> They were negotiating and they did not want a major war in West Asia. >> Exactly. They knew the consequences. >> They knew the consequences. >> Right. So it's Trump that changed everything. >> So there is a new there is a new uh there's a new drift in US policy. >> That's right. and they don't want to involve any technical experts in the negotiations. That's the other problem. >> The politics of US on the Middle East have changed in favor of Israel and >> that's that's right and that's what led to the problem and without >> the institutional checks and balances that you saw in the Biden watch and in Obama have been completely removed by

39:30 Mr. Trump, Donald Trump. >> That's correct. >> So now it is Monday morning >> this is the my you know it'll be on social media. >> Thank you for your attention. you know I am doing ABC and on Tuesday morning there'd be another sort of social media as he says full caps for emphasis >> and congress is not consulted. >> Exactly. So I >> you know so where do we go from here? If if one if one person in the world takes decisions to create an upheaval to the world economic order then surely shant somebody should stand up and say this is not right but India is not the one that going to say that because that's in our national interest I guess >> I think there three three broad directions I think one is same course they'll continue to escalate both sides all of us are going to pay a huge price second some way a diplomatic engagement uh would would begin uh and that would

40:17 open up some possibilities or the third option is actually there someone inside actually would change the equations uh in in Iran or in the US where the domestic politics will begin to uh test the two governments and say that look the path you are on is unsustainable. So I would think these are the three broad ways in which we can imagine >> if you're killing people I don't think domestic politics in Iran is going to change. In fact, what could have happened without inter intervention will not happen now because >> no one is the big picture. I mean what you're talking but the other is look within the elite they're taking enormous pounding. Yes, of course. >> At some point a section of them say that look because after all it's not for all its coherence there were different groups a large section of the Iranians

41:02 always wanted to do a deal with the Americans but anybody is left in that so I I would say how the use of force I think as you know use in any war one of the big changes is the domestic politics of the combatants always gets affected and I think that is that logic >> Trump is worried about that also because there's no corner so you don't >> the trigger could be the price of Yes. >> The moment it crosses $4, >> I think the domestic mood in the US and the elections for the Congress that may compel but I agree with you sir on this that I think the Iranian position internally is going to become more resolute everything that you look at you know while there are different factions for them for the regime you know for the clerical regime now it's do or die. >> Yes. So I think they will ensure that

41:48 all the levers of power that they have after all they control the gun in Iraq >> between the revolutionary guard and the militias they will ensure that nobody there'll be no faction that will emerge. So to that extent I think it's a clash of two strategic cultures. One is 7,000 years of Persian history and the other is roughly seven years of Trump and his presidency meaning term one four years and the other three that he has the kind of very I think peculiar strategic culture that he exudes just Donald Trump DJT I think that's going to be the clash that will play out >> I think the the problem for us is that you are confronted with a situation over which you have very little control that's true >> and which is going to damage you regardless of what is the final outcome now in those circumstances >> what do we What do you do?

42:33 >> Do you I mean should you be like boistered on the warning deck and condemn openly or >> no you condemn nothing. I don't think you should >> but I think we have to be mindful of our interest and realize that yes there are things which you have to take a stand on but one shouldn't take stand for the sake of staying. >> No no I think if I were if I were somebody in India I would ring up uh Mr. Trump and say look this is hurting us big time. Our country cannot afford it. We we've got six or seven days of reserves with us. What are we going to do in the process? You're destroying us. So come do something and to resolve this situation as quickly as possible. Well, we don't have we have not done that. If at all Trump tells us what is India is

43:18 doing. You see this is very unfortunate and this is what worries me that we have no voice at all. We're not ringing up anybody. Even the last time it's Trump who called us, right? We're not called up Trump. We went to Israel in between. There's no exchange between between Trump and us and and the and the prime minister. Why is that? I don't understand that. At least we can call up people. We are having a having talks with all the GCC countries. We're having a good dialogue with them. We can't talk to Trump. >> Bricks could have had an emergency meeting. >> Yes, we are. >> There's a problem. No, the UAE is also bricks member. So there is the bricks members themselves are at each other. >> You won't be able to get a resolution there. No, but you can call the meeting sir. You don't need a resolution. India's voice should be heard. >> At least we should be >> say that we are attempting and link it

44:05 to human security. >> This is a problem. >> We should bring it back according to call whether you should uh you know >> there's no empathy in take cover when you know the consequences are going to be bad for you. >> What are the consequences or take a stand >> but Ragman there can be no worse consequence than what are happening to you. >> That's what I'm saying that this is not something which you can control. Correct. You may ring up but it is not going to make >> but you can you can at least see for the domestic audience for the rest of the world. Please understand I mean polit foreign policy is not about just you know there's also a domestic audience to address there is also the international community to address what do others think of us you know that also is important >> politics of your policy can be there's no empathy in our positions that is something which I think is very very disappointing >> this is what is unfortunate and that's all that my my my sort of view on this

44:52 subject is what do you see and then what are you doing in the ultimate analysis if tomorrow you have you know you Pakistan has a defense deal with Saudi Arabia here supposing Turkey comes on what happens? I mean Pakistan has gained according to me gained much more in this scenario than us and that's not good for India. >> No that's a subject for a whole new debate. >> I'm just saying I'm just saying >> I have a different view. I don't I don't think we should see what is happening in West Asia through the prism of India Pakistan uh differences because you know in that case we will distort the picture. The the fact is Pakistan was deeply and very adversely impacted by what is happening. It has stakes in that region which are much more than ours because it has a huge border with Iran

45:40 of course >> and major consequences to Iran's integrity have a dramatic impact on Pakistan population but that's not only in Pakistan or other Gulf countries which have large population >> finally finally it has it has a certain position because of the fact that it does not have relations with Israel which makes it more acceptable to uh to uh uh to >> whatever it is whatever Iran. So those factors, you know, made it possible for it to be nimblefooted and put itself forward as a board of >> I'm worried about Iraq, Turkey joining into this alliance. I'm a little worried about that. >> They may they well may >> because that would be dependent on their own threat perception. >> You know, one of the interesting things that's happened is in a way Pakistan was

46:26 always seen as a player in the Middle East and I think we've forgotten that which is >> going back to the one reason people say for partition. the fact that Pakistan would be more emmenable, Muslim League would be more ammonable to join the cold war alliances and the cold war alliances the Cat sent over linked to the question of oil resources in the Middle East. Therefore, having on the flank Pakistan on your side so that's the reason why Pakistan was a member of the Baghdad pact then became member of the Sento. Uh it has been part of the protectorate force supporting force for the Saudis. So I think they were a much longer involvement. So I don't think that fundamentally changes our balance has actually shifted in India's favor. I would say if you see today Pakistan is stuck at $400 million GDP. They're under

47:11 the 26th IMF program. To say I've got some small diplomatic victory doesn't change. >> I don't think they have a diplomatic victory. I'm not worried about people are saying that they've got you know they're playing a big role but but they fundamental weakness. Uh >> the problem is that Pakistan strategic position they're in a sweet position. You have China which deals with them as a you know a country which is going to protect them in every sense. The Americans deal with them because the Americans have great strategic interests there. Right? They are close to Turkey right and therefore even though they have to gone to the IMF several times over they will continue to get help. There's no doubt about it. >> So what is the point of being in a geopolitical sweet spot? This is the

47:56 term which people used to use with regard to India also at one time few years ago but with regard to Pakistan when their internal situation is so badly >> I agree with you I agree >> you know the the with their problems with Afghanistan >> I know I know >> they have a certain nimble-footedness because of their capacity to exter to securitize issues and that helps well dealing with the external environment and that has made them very useful to the US and the past. You think that the that the Chinese presence there and the proximity of the US has no strategic implications as far as India? >> I think it does. I think we should begin with the assumption that Pakistan is a major geopolitical factor in our neighborhood. That's correct. >> If we think it is irrelevant as we started thinking then we are going to compile the point I was trying to make. >> So I don't think it's irrelevant. It has

48:43 always been a major player. It's the fifth largest country in the uh in the world and we should deal with it as such as a real problem not something to be brushed away or to be ignored and then we are surprised as to why other countries are paying it attention. >> Yeah. Calling them a broker or calling you know making these kind of noises is not the kind of language that we should normally use. >> In any case, it doesn't help in your dealings with with Pakistan. It maybe helps domestically. >> But I'm saying for now >> I don't even think it helps domestically quite frankly. Hypothetically, I'm saying in the current scenario, if Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan are able to play a constructive role and the hormones hypothetically is open, we should welcome it. Yes, I agree. >> So, I'm saying our responses should not become a function of domestic politics. I said this on your show last time also

49:29 and that is the unfortunate part. One gets the sense that much of the choice of word and phrase which is coming out from the Modi government now seems to be in a way influenced by the domestic. you know there's an election coming up in West. >> So I think that is the unfortunate part. >> I just want to add I think the Arab and Muslim countries they're also utterly compromised to say for example you mentioned Gaza earlier. >> It was the Arab and Muslim countries eight of them including Pakistan and Indonesia which drafted a resolution where virtually you accepting Israeli American >> which then gave the Americans the chance to go to security council and say let's make a board of peace and one man will run the show. >> That's right. So it is not as if these guys are principled in their support for Palestine. >> No, no, they've let them down if you ask. >> No. Yeah, they've actually

50:15 so I don't think we should overestimate in that sense their role. But it's important to see what's going on. >> I think that we've had a very very interesting discussion and uh and let's hope that tomorrow Trump doesn't change the parameters of of the contours of this discussion. You >> got 10 days. >> 10 days. Thank you very much. >> Thank you. Thank you. >> Thank you. Heat. Heat.