Mosca, Mafia, & The Moral Buffer: Cybernetic Regulation In Weak States (Gaetano Mosca)

0:00 What is mafia? This was a question posed by and answered by Gayatana Mosca, a founding member of the Italian school of elite theory in a series of lectures that he delivered in the year 1900. In this video, we will not only perform a deep dive analysis of this lesserknown work of Moscow, which has since been translated into English by Marco Lazerod, but we will also seek to update it and modernize it. In particular, we will analyze this phenomenon of the mafia using three models. Stafford Beers's cybernetic viable system model, Manser Olsen's stationary bandit model of civilizational development, and Bertrand Juvenile's so-called high low middle control mechanism. But ultimately

0:47 the topic that we will discuss in this video is the topic of control systems, systems of societal control and regulation. And since cybernetics after all is the science of control, we'll focus primarily on Stafford Beers's viable system model and the mafia or mafiaike entities broadly are a good case study for such an examination. Although the word mafia is associated with Italy and with the island of Sicily in particular, the mafia itself is a general phenomenon. All societies at some point in their development have or have had mafia-like entities where in Maner Olsen's model of civilizational development, mafia-like entities function as rudimentary stationary

1:34 bandits which have some encompassing interest over the territory that they rule. In Olsen's model, the Hobsian anarchy is one dominated by groups of roving bandits, which hold only very short-term and very narrow interests over the territories in which they rule and roam. And they will tend to steal, pillage, or tax at a rate of roughly 100%. And if a societal system is always at risk of being ransacked and raided by roving bandit groups, something analogous to unrestrained parasetization, it cannot economically and technologically develop. And of course, if a society cannot develop and become more advanced, it may be absorbed, consumed, or otherwise destroyed by a

2:20 neighboring societal system that can. In Olsen's model, then societal development follows a trajectory from the hobbsian anarchy of the roving bandits, one of low order, low neg entropy, and low complexity to small localized societal systems that are themselves controlled and secured by a stationary bandit who in exchange for providing security over his domain gets to collect taxes from his subjects. And as Olsen's model posits, the stationary bandit thus develops an increasingly encompassing interest over his domain such that he is he is incentivized to lower his taxation rate and even to provide public goods and services to his subjects such that

3:05 their productivity continues to increase over time. And after all, if the productivity of the stationary bandits domain increases as a result of greater order, greater neg entropy and technological innovations, he will be able to collect a much higher amount of tax revenue in absolute terms, i.e. it is a much more optimized and more complex variant of the parasite strategy that is employed by the Hobsian roving bandits. Further, as the productivity and technological prowess of the stationary bandit's domain grows, the stationary bandit will be able to expand his domain to encompass and consume adjacent societal systems in the age-old game of evolutionary competition. So then, in addition to referencing

3:52 Stafford Beers's viable system model, we will also use Maner Olsen's stationary bandit model of civilizational development when we discuss the phenomenon known as mafia. And as a final model, we will incorporate a model or mechanism from the elite theory adjacent Bertrand Juvenile and what is sometimes called the high low middle control mechanism. To put it simply, the high low middle control mechanism implies that the high, the ruling class, the state, the establishment power structures, etc. will always ally themselves with the low or the criminal underclass for the purpose of controlling and squeezing the middle. where the middle are the skilled, productive and largely independent class of citizens which have the potential to

4:38 threaten the status quo of the high. One fundamental reason for this high low alliance is that the underclass portion of the low often has a high concentration of individuals who are willing, able, and even skilled in the arts of violence and coercion. And a second reason is that because they are poor and have little, the underclass elements of the low can be bought off very cheaply and easily and very efficiently by the high. These two reasons in combination provide cheap utility for the high, i.e. they can more or less easily and cheaply recruit goon squads to go about terrorizing the masses on behalf of the high while maintaining plausible deniability. And

5:23 on this topic later we will also briefly discuss the history of Brigandage in the feudal period a sort of crude progenitor of the modern private military company. With respect to these three models, Stafford Beers's cybernetic viable system model, Mancer Olsen's stationary bandit model, and Juvenile's high low middle control mechanism. I have discussed all of these models in depth in past videos, so I will not spend too much time explaining them in detail in this video, but perhaps they are somewhat self-explanatory or even obvious. On this topic of obviousness, we can even quote Stafford Beer in reference to Ashby's law of requisite variety, a foundational law of cybernetics. to quote Beer, "This Ashby's law, like all profound

6:10 statements of natural law, is perfectly obvious once it has been pointed out." End quote. And then, as a new analytical concept, we'll introduce the idea of the moral outrage reservoir. The public, the citizenry, the town's people, or the masses more broadly can be said to have a moral outrage reservoir. or this outrage reservoir serves as a regulatory or algodonic loop that can to some degree restrain the behavior of mafia-like control systems as well as the control system of the state. Further, we'll discuss how this regulatory mechanism, the public's moral outrage reservoir, has largely been neutralized by the algorithmic internet

6:56 and by the dissipative structures that result from the kaleidoscopic siloization of the narrative landscape. But with that said, on with the analysis. To begin with, we can briefly introduce what is perhaps Gayana's most famous contribution to sociology. Moscow's law of the rulers and the ruled. as it will be fundamental to understanding how mafia-like entities operate and how they control their domains. Moscow's law states that the disorganized majority will always be ruled by an organized minority. And as a note, minority and majority here are with respect to numerical quantity rather than some kind of qualitative ethnic or racial category. Further Manser Olsen's seinal

7:43 work the logic of collective action later proved Moscow's concept mathematically i.e. The effectiveness of small group coordination always exceeds large groups because of lower coordinational costs in smaller groups, a diminishing return on the gains from collective action in larger groups relative to smaller groups, and the general tendency for large groups to have less cohesive strength purely because of their size with that latter point itself showing up in the age-old mechanism of divide and conquer. But with that said, Moscow summarizes his so-called law of the rulers and the ruled in the following passage from his seminal work, the ruling class. Here he not only introduces this concept, but he

8:28 also alludes to the developmental trajectory of civilization, which will be especially relevant when we discuss mafia-like entities and the relationship with the state over time. And in the following passage, coincidentally, the topic of obviousness comes up also. To quote Moscow, among the constant facts and tendencies that are to be found in all political organisms, one is so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye, in all the societies, from societies that are very meagerly developed and have barely attained the dawnings of civilization down to the most advanced and powerful societies. Two classes of people appear. A class that rules and a class that is ruled.

9:13 The first class, always the less numerous, i.e. the numerical minority, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings. Whereas the second, the more numerous class, i.e. the numerical majority, is directed and controlled by the first in a manner that is now more or less legal. now more or less arbitrary and violent." End quote. And with respect to that last part, the arbitrariness or violentness of the means by which the ruling minority directs and controls the masses, this brings us to the central subject of this video, the organized mafiaike entity, which of course specializes in the use of coercive

9:59 force, violence, and the threat thereof. And in viable system terms, the mafia controller must have some kind of governing metal language that it uses to guide and govern its own actions. And this metal language includes the code of conduct of the mafia or what Moscow refers to as the spirit of the mafia. But before we dive into that, a quick note. For much of this video, we will be quoting the English translation of Moscow's lecture series, What is Mafia? As translated by Marco Lazerodi. Some of this English translation is a bit rough in places. So I have clarified and streamlined some sections with respect to grammar, syntax, and readability. And further, as I almost always do, I have provided additional notes and commentaries, all of which are embedded

10:45 in brackets in the following quotes. But although it is rough in places, the translation of this important and lesserknown work of Moscow by Marloti is of course much appreciated. And bushwhacking through Moscow's verbally delivered lectures, nonetheless translating them, only makes such an endeavor more challenging. So thanks to Marzeri for doing this translation. But with that said, I'd recommend buying the book version of this of this English translation. It's available in wherever you buy books, apparently. It's around 100 pages, so it is a quick and very interesting read and a good addition to your your uh your book collection. But anyway, onward we go. To quote Moscow in the English translation of what is mafia, the mafia spirit, or rather the essence of the mafia can be described in

11:32 a few words. It is considered a sign of weakness or cowardice to appeal to official justice, to the police or to the state authorities when one has been wronged. This is especially the case when it is perceived that the offense has been committed for the express purpose of defiling the victim's honor or for demonstrating superiority over the victim. The mafia considers the reporting of these offenses to the authorities to be an unsemly and cowardly act. These offenses carry with them a sort of chivalry disqualification. As such, these offenses take on the character of personal revenge, i.e. vendetta. If you report them to the authorities, it is only pro-forma to address the matter, as they say in Sicily. But in no way does the offended party help to facilitate the discovery

12:17 of the offender, who is often well-known. The point is let them feel the weight of your vendetta." End quote. So already we can begin to see that the mafia-like entity compartmentalizes itself off from the state and the state's security and judicial system, preferring instead to handle its affairs autonomously and typically in a violent or coercive way. Further, from a system level, so long as a mafia type entity exists and wields influence, the state's monopoly on violence remains shaky and incomplete, something which ultimately undermines the power and legitimacy of the state. And a note here with respect to the monopoly on violence specifically, I'm speaking of organized

13:02 entities which use violence to pursue their own extraleal goals. It is the organized nature of this violence that one magnifies its potential damage and disruption to a society. And two, it is the organized nature of the group that conducts such violence that ultimately threatens the state's own claim to power and sovereignty. In other words, these autonomous extraleal organized mafia-like entities challenge the state's sovereignty and legitimacy in the eyes of the public, in the eyes of the masses. something of course which the state will view as a threat. Further we can contrast this organized violence with the disorganized chaotic violence which is conducted by criminal individuals or

13:48 by generally disorganized groups as being in a separate category. A category that is of course bad but is distinctly different from the organized criminal activity of groups like the mafia. And this distinction is why police must use vastly different methods and techniques to combat organized crime. Methods such as the RICO act, racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations. But back to Moscow. Gayatanamasca was one of the founding members of the Italian school of elite theory. And here to broaden our scope a bit, we can tie this notion of the spirit of mafia in with another founding member of Italian elite theory, Vfredo Paro. and Prao's classification of residues. It is worthwhile to do this because although

14:34 Moscow is specifically discussing the Sicilian Mafia or the Italian Mafia broadly, this phenomenon of mafias, cartels, and Alsonian stationary bandits really is a fairly common socioultural isomorphism that would have predominated in many cultures prior to the rise of the state and the state's taming of the wild, rough, and always dangerous Hobbesian anarchy. The hobs and anarchy we could propose relied upon a kind of balancing mechanism. If one is viewed as weak, they will be prayed upon. And if they are viewed as strong, they will be prayed upon less. Further, if an offense is taken, the offense must be paid back in turn such that future offenses are discouraged. The prototypical tit fortat

15:20 strategy from game theory. And here we can quote Paro on the residue class that perhaps most closely approximates the so-called spirit of the mafia where Parisian residue classes are themselves like psychosocial isomorphisms to quote Paro the classification of residues for class 5 integrity of the individual and his pertinances class 5 subtype gamma restoration of integrity by acts pertaining to the individuals whose integrity has been impaired. integrity having been somehow altered. The effort is to restore it if possible or else obtain compensations for the alteration. The variety we are studying embraces the purifications that were so generally

16:07 used in ancient societies and which are still common among univilized or barbarous peoples, i.e. things like blood revenge, honor-based in quotes, retaliations, animal sacrifices, literal scapegoating, an eye for an eye, etc. What has been done cannot be undone, but one can meet one force with a counterforce of equal power and opposite tendency so that the two will balance and effects will be neutralized. End quote. So then we could say that the spirit of mafia is like some kind of lingering relic of a less civilized and more barbarous time. A time when there was no state to hold back the roving bandits of the Hobsian anarchy and one had to be fearsome because one could not rely upon

16:53 any external state-like entity. No Leviathan to guarantee their security. So, we could imagine this respect or honor culture formed an essential foundation for guaranteeing security in the pre-state or weak state era. Or even today within our advanced post-modern states, there exists some no-go zones which are largely abandoned by the state, sacrificial zones that have seemingly been relinquished to the Hobsian bandits and their entropic anarchy. Similarly, life on the street for homeless people is typically governed by similar hobbsian dynamics. So really, there are still parallel societies that are nested within our larger societal systems which still do largely abide by these dynamics. But

17:40 with respect to this spirit of the mafia, a culture of revenge and vendetta, if an offense was taken, it was necessary to take revenge. And further, this revenge would only spiral onward into the future. A largely destructive, erosive, and entropic spiral. Because, after all, violence begets more violence. Bloodshed begets more bloodshed. One clan fights another clan because so and so's great uncle offended soandso's great-grandfather, etc., etc. And although some people may like to romanticize such antiquated systems, they are very destructive, very entropic, and you would probably not enjoy living in them very much. But romanticize them people do. And one can even find many such examples on YouTube

18:26 of channels which basically glamorize the conditions of hobbsy and anarchy. But we can continue on with Moscow on this topic of revenge and insult. To quote Moscow, we have to note here that the character of revenge and insult towards a particular person is a peculiarity of the Sicilian delinquency. Note, Moscow later states that rather this phenomenon arises from environmental conditions rather than from some kind of inherent property or defect of the Sicilian people. Crimes that occur elsewhere, i.e. other than on the island of Sicily would have no personal motive and they are routinely committed by professional criminals who choose victims simply within their reach, i.e. crimes of impersonal opportunistic utility. However, in

19:11 Sicily, crimes assume the semblance of revenge for a real or supposed tor where a tort is a legal term for an offense or transgression that the offender or some relatives or friends suffered because of the victim. We have to say that often the mentioned tort is not the real cause but rather the pretext of the criminal act. Note the terminology be can be confusing because of the cyclical nature of this violence i.e. the offender in round one becomes the victim in round two and the victim in round one becomes the offender in round two etc. end quote. More or less we can begin to see the emergence of what can generally be referred to as a kind of pathological respect culture. If one feels disrespected, then they must vigorously

19:57 defend their honor. Otherwise, they risk having their status drop in the eyes of the community. Further, this drop in status or this drop in respect comes with a conccommptant increase in the future risk of being robbed, extorted, victimized, or otherwise mistreated. So in such an environment it is then rational to engage in violence tit fortat reprisals in the event of some kind of offense whether real or imagined and as we will explore more over the course of the video. This is of course not a distinctly Sicilian phenomenon but rather it is a predominantly is a result of the environmental conditions that prevail at any given time. Specifically environmental conditions in which there is a weak state i.e. one in which the institutions of the state, especially

20:43 its legal, judicial and law enforcement functions, are weak, overwhelmed, unreliable, or corrupt. And as all states must transit through this weak state period, this mafia-like attitude, the spirit of the mafia or respect culture generally can be very persistent and even pathological at some point interfering with the development of both the state and the society. Further, as the society grows and becomes more pluralistic, there is an odd sort of in-group outgroup dynamic. I.e., this pathological respect culture will be primarily applied to those of the participating inroup. Those of the outroup, outsiders, will generally be given a pass and will generally be exempted from at least the most strict

21:28 and rigorous aspects of this mafia culture. Moscow elaborates on this in-group outgroup distinction in the following passage. To quote Moscow, "It is for this reason that an Italian from the mainland and in general all the foreigners who travel or even live in Sicily are almost always respected by criminals. Being a stranger, a person generally does not have ancestral relationships with the criminal class. Therefore, it is difficult to aduce against him any pretext for a personal vendetta. It is for the same reason that the Sicilians themselves who live in big cities on the island are rarely victims of revenge-driven criminal acts. End quote. I.e. Mosque is pointing out these traditions are maintained more in a rural or otherwise insular environment

22:15 such as in places like the countryside places coincidentally where the state's institutions remain relatively weak. Further, with respect to Prao's classification of residues, we can recognize that cities will often attract those higher in class one residues, the so-called foxes, who possess an instinct for combination, novelty, hold progressive values, etc. Whereas rural areas often have higher concentrations of class 2 residues, persistence of aggregates, conservation of traditions, cognizance of ancestral honor, etc. with respect to geographic region, class, and the proclivity for the so-called spirit of the mafia. Moscow elaborates to quote Moscow, making some distinction according to the different social classes into the different regions of the island of Sicily. I will

23:02 say that generally speaking, the spirit of mafia is more widespread and strong in the countryside and is much less so in the large cities. It is also natural that the spirit of mafia is generally stronger no matter what one says or writes to the contrary among the poorer and rougher social classes rather than among the rich ones and those that are educated. On the other hand, it is also true that some fractions of the ruling class and even some wealthy families are heavily linked with the mafia. End quote. So then we could surmise this tendency for rural regions as well as the more poorer classes to be more imbued with the spirit of mafia is a function of the strength of the state's institutions in any given area. In rural areas, poor

23:48 areas, economically depressed areas and in weak states generally state institutions are weak, absent or even or are very corrupt. More or less, the spirit of mafia is maintained and reinforced amongst the populace so long as the state's law enforcement and justice systems are viewed as weak, ineffective, or illegitimate. As such, the continued existence of the so-called mafia spirit could be said to be largely dependent upon the prevailing environmental conditions, specifically those characterized by a weak state or geographic areas where the strength of the state's institutions are felt only weakly. Further, there's a territorial aspect. In a city, in the nicer parts at least, people are much more atomized, dassinated, and alienated from their familial group. And as such, they may

24:34 feel less ownership over the urban territory that they share with their numerous and quite cosmopolitan neighbors. Whereas, in contrast, if you head out to a rural area, even today, the town's people may quickly identify you as not being from around here, where a statement like, "You're not from around here," has a sort of vaguely threatening territorial quality. And further, in areas of the modern inner city that have been largely abandoned by the state, ones in which the state's institutions are only weakly felt and hobbsy and bandit groups dominate the streets, you may find something very similar to this so-called spirit of the mafia. It is, in other words, something that is common across human cultures, and it predominates when the hobbsian anarchy has not been suitably restrained

25:21 by a strong enough stationary bandit with a suitably encompassing interest, a state-like entity, or in the words of Hobbes, the Leviathan. But on this topic of the environment and human behavior, Moscow elaborates to quote Moscow. Another interesting phenomenon is that in the same family and even in the same individual, the spirit of mafia increases or decreases and disappears depending on his location. I.e. it is dependent upon the environmental conditions and the dynamics of his surroundings. The Sicilian who moves into the continent and into countries where the mafia is considered somehow something low and vulgar will abandon immediately any spirit of the mafia. The same phenomenon happens to a lesser degree with the Sicilian mafioso who moves from

26:06 a small town to a big city within northern Italy. Conversely, in some small rural towns where the legal system is not effective, the Sicilian coming from the big city after having since moved to one of these big cities in northern Italy will once again acquire a strong spirit of mafia once he has returned to this rural environment. If however they, the Sicilian natives from the municipalities and rural villages that are more deeply and traditionally rich in the spirit of mafia, live for a long time in big cities on the island or in the Italian mainland, they undergo a psychological transformation in virtue of which they feel a certain repugnance to return permanently to their paternal place. And as a result of the abovementioned psychological transformation, their newfound respect

26:52 for the law and their feelings of disgust for private violence will not be inferior to the one of the most perfect gentlemen of northern Italy. This, if other arguments are not strong enough, would be enough to prove that the phenomenon of mafia is not hereditary or a matter of race, but it is an effect of the environment in which you live." End quote. But regardless of its environmental dependence, the spirit of the mafia, which generally comes with a refusal to to cooperate with state authorities, only acts to propagate this cycle. A cycle where the state remains weak and some local mafia group remains strong. More or less, this dynamic is self-propagating and it continues to assure that the state that the official state institutions in the affected region remain weak and ineffective.

27:38 something that slows down the region's economic development and discourages outside capital investment as the state will be unable to adequately enforce contract law in the event of any disputes or really because the area will be viewed as lawless. This translates to an unacceptably high level of risk with respect to predicting a return on investment. As long as this continues, the state can never attain a true monopoly on violence or a monopoly on taxation. And as we will see, mafia-like entities primarily engage in extraleal taxation regimes which compete with and thus undermine the state's own taxation regime. Further, just as we still see in many countries today, the capital city may be controlled by the state, but as

28:24 one moves away from the capital city or large cities, the influence and power of the state and its institutions may fade rapidly. Or alternatively, this may be the case in areas of the modern inner city as well. And in these areas, this generally contributes to a felt sense of state illegitimacy or state weakness. And as such, these peripheral regions will still be ruled largely by either roving bandits or mafiaike stationary bandits with their own extralegal taxation regimes that exist outside of the centralized state's control. Further, and perhaps most destructively, recourse for tors, offenses, transgressions, and even minor conflicts will be handled extrajudicially, i.e. be not handled within the state's court systems, but rather they will be handled

29:09 in the streets, so to speak. This also contributes to a general level of chaos and uncertainty, which keeps these weak state domains with at least one foot still partially within the regime of the dysfunctional Hobsian anarchy. But Moscow continues on discussing this respect culture before he segus into another important element of the spirit of mafia, the code of silence, or what is referred to in Sicilian as a muerta. To quote Moscow, "A precedent has been set that for the prevention and compensation of a broad category of personal insults, a man who wants and knows how to be respected, it is a technical phrase, cannot appeal to the law. The result is that it is permissible, even obligatory, to cheat the authorities or at least to not give

29:56 them any help, especially when the legal authorities want to interfere in private disputes, which disturbs the natural course of the vendetta via the application of the penal code or the penal code is the state's judicial punishment system that competes with the vendetta based extrajudicial system of the mafia. Therefore, a direct consequence of the spirit of mafia is a muerta, the co the code of silence, the rule according to which it is a dishonorable act to give information to the state's judicial arm. This rule is the main cause that leads the witnesses to lie and to be reticizent during a criminal trial. We have to say that among the Sicilian people, even the ones who belong to the more miserable and uncou social classes, a blatant liar is rare, and he will hardly tell a lie. But he will

30:43 frequently show up and claim that he does not know or does not remember the real facts. Of course, he knows and remembers them very well. End quote. And of course, although Moscow here is writing to us specifically about the 19th century in Sicily, such dynamics are of course common outside of Sicily and throughout history. Such codes of silence and a refusal to cooperate with the state authorities is not something unique to the island of Sicily, but rather it arises as a consequence of incomplete state power. And for most of human history anyway, state power was always incomplete. And this here invokes Maner Olsen in the stationary bandit model of civilizational development, which is the topic of my last deep dive video. So watch that video if you

31:28 haven't seen it yet. In Olsen's framework, at some point, geographic domains were entirely lawless, patrolled by the roving bandits of the hobbies and anarchy. Whereas over time, some of these roving bandits would have settled down and become stationary bandits or mafia-like entities. And once they settled down, they would have developed an encompassing interest over the domains in which they ruled. And rather than purely looting and stealing 100% of all that they could, they would have transitioned into a kind of stewardship role. One in which they could maximally benefit by providing some degree of public goods, security primarily, such that their domain could become more productive because ultimately a more productive domain is a domain that generates more taxation revenue for the stationary bandit or mafiaike entity.

32:14 And Moscow elaborates on the fact that this mafia-like phenomenon is not something unique to Sicily. to quote Moscow, we could instead and with more reason note that the spirit of mafia is not a distinctive feature of Sicily, but on the contrary, we can find it in many other parts of the world wherever civil jurisdiction has been or is unable to eradicate and replace the whole system of private vendetta." End quote. In our modern period, or at least in advanced nations, the state has largely come to hold the status of uncontested legitimacy, a status it gains once it has come to monopolize violence and taxation within its nation state boundaries. But in the grand scheme of history, this is a fairly recent development. In the past, the people in a given geographical area would have

33:00 respected the authority of whoever had the most power in their immediate geographic vicinity. Perhaps technically an area may have been under the jurisdiction of some faraway unseen king. But if daily life was instead dominated by some more local and more immediate stationary bandit group or mafia-like entity, then that mafia would have taken precedence in the minds of the local towns people. And thus these extrajudicial non-state authorities, the local stationary bandits or mafia-like groups would have had greater power and legitimacy than the faraway state or king whose powers were only weakly felt in the peripheral regions. In this case, the farway state or king is like an abstract phenomenon. Whereas the very

33:46 real and palpable and tangible mafia that's down the street is much more easily felt by the populace and thus dominates the dynamics. More or less, the town's people will follow the rules of what whoever they fear the most. And if the state's power is weak or is otherwise noncredible within a geographic area, then the town's people of that area will instead be forced to abide by the rules of the local mafia, a militia, or some other bandit gang. Something that generally contributes to a a level of lawlessness, chaos, and depressed economic growth. Moscow elaborates further on the spirit of mafia which really captures some objectively valuable and noble elements specifically strength and self-reliance. But when these elements are rigidly maintained within the emergent dynamical

34:32 environment of the modern state it can become disruptive and problematic to say the least. With respect to this issue, the natural course of action for society and for the state is to ultimately recruit such people into the military or into the state security apparatus where their skills and proclivities can be aligned with state interests. But we'll discuss that more later. to quote Moscow on these more positive or noble elements. I've known even educated people from northern Italy that found something proud and pleasant or at least not entirely ignoble in this feeling of of the spirit of the mafia. They think there is something right in the fact that every individual believes that it is honorable to trust in his own strength and courage in order to reject

35:17 and prevent injuries. However, it sometimes happens that a way of thinking and feeling whose reasons are not all ignoble produces a complex of damaging outcomes that we must have the courage to condemn vigorously and without extenduating circumstances. Now, the spirit of the mafia is essentially an antisocial feeling that prevents true order and true justice from being established. And as we'll see further ahead, its ultimate consequence is the oppression of the weak by the strong and the tyranny that small and organized minority groups exercise to the detriment of the majority of disorganized individuals. End quote. So in that above passage, we can see Moscow's law of the so-called rulers in the ruled in action. A small and

36:04 organized minority, in this case the mafia, is capable of exerting its will upon the disorganized majority of the population. Or really, in any society, there is some collection of organized minority groups both within the governmental apparatus as well as outside of it. Lobbying groups, industrial cartels, pressure groups, special interest groups, andor semi-criminal groups, etc. which by virtue of the fact that these groups are organized and their numbers are comparatively small, these minority groups can more efficiently and effectively coordinate themselves such that they can pursue some relatively narrow goal which will benefit their members. And generally this benefit will come at the expense of the disorganized majority of the population. Further, we

36:50 can note so long as there is a functional or semifunctional state, the ultimate goal of any organized minority group is to gain access to the state's levers of power. And then we can think about how these different organized groups may even transact with one another to exchange the kind of instrumental utility that only small organized groups can provide one another. We can imagine that the organized high, the ruling class, state officials, or the upper classes more broadly, could even conceivably coordinate with other organized elements of the low, semi criminal or even outright criminal groups like the mafia. Because, as we will discuss later, there is potential utility in such relationships. And with respect to juveniles high low

37:35 middle control mechanism, we could even see how the high could ally itself with the criminal low for the purpose of managing, controlling, and suppressing the independent and productive middle class citizenry. Because from the perspective of the high, the middle classes are often the source of revolutionary counter elites who may wish to disrupt or even destroy the status quo entirely via Prao's revolutionary elite circulation mechanism. And on the topic of this so-called mafia spirit being present among some of the upper classes, Moscow elaborates to quote Moscow, while the above mentioned perfume, i.e. the perfume of the spirit of mafia among certain strata of the Italian populace, could be found in northern Italy only among the very low social strata on the

38:22 island of Sicily. You can still occasionally find it and very intensely even in individuals of the upper classes. These are people who sometimes occupy high places in society from which they receive a lot of authority and enjoy the esteem of their fellow citizens. End quote. And indeed, the high may sometimes find itself entwined and in league with criminal elements of the low, mafia-like entities, because the organized criminal elements of the low may provide instrumental utility for the high. In some cases, these mafiaike elements may act as contracted extralegal security forces that can be expediently used by the elite of the high for instrumental purposes while at the same time allowing for plausible deniability to be maintained. Some

39:09 examples could be using such maful-like entities to suppress rural peasant uprisings or the more modern equivalent variant as union and strike busters. But of course, if you live in the West, most of the means of production have long since been outsourced overseas. So perhaps that problem has already been cleverly engineered away. But I've discussed that extensively in past videos. And then we can zoom in on one of the services that the mafiaike entities may provide to the ruling class, powerful people, and politicians, extraleal security forces, goons who may expediently punish, threaten, or deal with the enemies of the powerful. And then in exchange for their services, these organized criminal elements of the low receive top cover, a friend in high

39:55 places who can intercede on their behalf with respect to legal issues. Or in other cases, the elites of the high can help to rehabilitate the image of their loyal underclass allies via the forgiveness mechanic, which we'll discuss more later. Moscow elaborates more on the insidious nature of this entwinement in the following passage. to quote Moscow, "Perhaps the most perhaps the greatest damage of the spread of the spirit of mafia in all social classes, but especially in the high classes, lies in the fact that it is very difficult to be affected by or to live by the mafia spirit and to act according to its commandments without entering more deep more or less deeply into relationships with those very low strata of the society which from which professional criminals are recruited. where in fact

40:42 the social etiquette requires the use of brute force instead of taking legal action in order to prevent or punish some tort offense or crime. And we can easily understand that the isolated good and honest man must suffer many troubles because he does not know how to adapt himself to the above mentioned social etiquette. This isolated, good and honest man cannot or does not know how to rebel against this etiquette, and he does not have the protection of numerous friends, especially because he is not wellconed with the people most capable of committing tors, offenses, and crimes." End quote. Thus, this above dynamic, so long as it is allowed to prevail, will tend to tip the scales of equilibrium more in the direction of

41:28 rewarding dishonesty, brute force, and the reliance upon closed extrajudicial networks for remedies to the kinds of problems that invariably spring up in any human society. Further, if we imagine that the parameter that we can broadly refer to as honesty is itself at least partially a function of environmental conditions, then we can imagine that whether or not the average person will be more or less honest will itself be dictated by environmental factors. If any human parameter exists in some kind of normal distribution, the bulk of the population will sit somewhere in the middle between totally dishonest and totally honest. We could propose these environmental factors incentivize and steer the average person to act with more or less honestness,

42:13 with more or less trustingness, etc. The average person is most likely quite malleable and adaptive. And thus, when the spirit of the mafia prevails in a society, the bulk of the populace is forced to act in a less honest and less trusting manner, behaviors that in all likelihood further act to dampen societal development. There are after all high trust societies and low trust societies and one tends to do better than the other when it comes to social and economic development. In other words, perhaps at the extreme ends of the distribution, some 15% of the population will almost always be fatally honest. Whereas at the other end of the extreme, some 15% of the population will be almost terminally impulsively and

42:59 criminally dishonest. But for the 70% in the middle, they are, we could propose, left largely malleable and flexible, which means that they are almost like undifferentiated cells, which as a result of their environment will either differentiate to become more or less honest. When there is a weak state and when citizens are forced to live under the more crude and brutal control regimes of stationary bandits or mafia type entities, perhaps all citizens must suffer a as the greater cruelty of their environmental domain will tip the overall societal regime into the kind of system which preferentially rewards dishonesty, brute force, violence, and coercion over law-abiding and cooperative behavior.

43:44 With respect to the intersection between these more criminal elements and the juvenelian high or the upper classes more broadly, Moscow elaborates to quote Moscow, therefore in those parts of Sicily where the spirit of mafia is more invogue, a wealthy man with a high status who wants to take an active part in the life of his town and become, as they say, a personality will start to cultivate all kinds of relationships. These relationships are ultimately nourished by a series of protections and favors by which the high-placed person obtains the respect of the ones who have a lower social position. This results in respect from other people and unconditional support for his political aspirations. End quote. This last passage becomes especially critical in democratic systems, i.e. political

44:31 systems of representative government, universal suffrage, and where the masses vote to install certain aspiring politicians into power. In some cases, the organized mafia-like entities of the low can be used to help encourage the masses to vote in a certain way. Perhaps most often, this is just by leveraging the influence that they hold over their communities. But in extreme cases, more severe means of quote unquote motivation could even be used. And if doing such a thing provides any significant advantage, then the unscrupulous politicians, politicians who themselves possess the spirit of the mafia and who are willing to engage in this alliance with mafiaike entities of the low, will gain an advantage over their more honest rivals. Moscow elaborates more on the

45:18 juvenile hyo alliance in the following passage. To quote Moscow, "When the spirit of the mafia is possessed by some of the people who've reached high positions, such as mayors, counselors, provincial counselors, and sometimes even members of the parliament, such people do not feel or they feel it in only a very attenuated way the repulsion that the true gentleman feels against the thugs or against the individuals capable of committing such crimes. Therefore, the mafioso with a high social or political position will plead with the authorities for the benefit of his lowclass friends. It is certain that he will not leave his friend to his own devices unless the criminal has committed such grievous and numerous crimes that it is impossible for him to invoid avoid imprisonment. End quote. So

46:05 again, we we can begin to see the transactional nature of this hyo alliance. Further, the last statement alludes to something very important. one of the primary algodonic loops that of the public outrage reservoir, a kind of morality buffer that must be managed by both the state and by the mafia itself. More or less, the mafia will be allowed to get away with whatever their predations are so long as their predations are not too extreme. If the predations of the mafia become too extreme, this will cause the public's moral outrage reservoir to fill up. And if it fills up too much, this morality buffer will overflow, which then causes problems for the state, especially with respect to the public's perception of the state's legitimacy. And if the state is made to feel illegitimate, the state will need to restrain the mafia. And thus for the mafia, they have an

46:51 interest in not pushing things too far because they want to find an optimal zone where they can have optimal amount of predation while minimizing exposure to the state's uh violence or judicial system itself. So in other words, the unscrupulous members of the high which have allied themselves with the mafia elements of the low will run cover for their friends in lower places and seek to alleviate any legal problems that arise for them so long as their friends behavior does not run into certain limits which are ultimately constrained by this public outrage or morality reservoir. Or really this is politics in a nutshell. It is pretty much all cynical. Those of the high will seek to cover things up as much as possible. But if things get too out of control, even clever narrative engineering and public relations strategies will eventually

47:36 reach a limit. However, in our post-modern system of the algorithmic internet, siloization and the narrative kaleidoscope, perhaps the information carousel is already moving too quickly, and the elites now can merely switch from one outraging topic to another at lightning speed. something which quite predictably eventually overwhelms the public's moral moral outrage reservoir and lulls them slowly into a state of disinterested depoliticized sleep. In other words, the elites today can merely shift our attention from one outrage to another, relying upon increasingly goldfish-like memories and our increasing inability to form timelines of recent events. But Moscow continues to elaborate on this high low relationship, one that is maintained by

48:22 the shared mafia spirit that elements from both classes possess. To quote Moscow, the friendship between the rich, steeped in the spirit of mafia and the poor thug, clearly includes endless varieties which depend on the circumstances and also depend on the different characters of the individuals among whom this friendship is carried out. There are rich people who prefer to maintain a certain detachment in dealing with low-level scoundrels. They will never admit their service or foster intimacy with real criminals. They use their associations with the mafia only in order to, I would say, defend themselves. There are also those who seem to enjoy being in contact with dishonest people. Therefore, they surround themselves with murderers and ex-convicts. these kind of rich people can even prompt these criminals to harm

49:09 their enemies and to damage their properties. End quote. So with respect to that passage, first we can say that Moscow insinuates here that some elements of the upper classes, ruling class and the high broadly enjoy mixing it up with these seedy criminal types. Or as people used to say, they like slumbing it, hanging out the bad part of town where things are a little less buttoned up and people are much much less oversocialized. And further, more broadly, we can track the mutual transactional utility that is exchanged between elements of the high and the low, a symbiosis. But of course, some societal systems will be more or less dominated by these types of people. And as such we could say that a society will be either criminally dominant or noncriminally

49:56 dominant. And when the citizenry live under a regime that is criminally dominant, they will have to pay taxes to these criminal elements. And most often they will still have to pay taxes to the legitimate government as well. More or less this results in a double taxation penalty. And here some naive firstworlders will say that our governments are criminals, but they are much less overtly and transparently criminal than many other governments. People who live in former Soviet controlled territories, for example, could tell you about the extent of rampant and transparent corruption and the need to quite literally bribe state officials to even accomplish fairly basic things. And of course, all of that bribery and graft not only acts as a hidden tax, but it also shifts more of

50:42 the malleable bulk of the population into a behavioral regime that is more dishonest and less trusting, which harms societal trust and efficiency in general. But if we want to refine this further, what we're talking about is the extent to which things are overtly criminal. Because really at some point criminals, if they are really smart criminals, merely find ways to legitimize themselves within plight society to become truly upstanding and unassalable gentlemen. In other words, to make their criminality less overt, less offensive, and more legitimate. And with respect to the public's outrage reservoir or the morality buffer and its management, less overt criminality is less offensive to the masses. Over time, then we could say that it is in the best

51:27 interest of the state and select mafia elements to sort of merge over time where there is a kind of convergence where the criminal elements of the low compete amongst themselves for the privilege of being legitimized into the high of the upper classes and ruling classes proper. But this so-called competing against each other can be messy business. And if a bunch of disperate mafia-like entities are to be ultimately tamed with the worst of them being eliminated and the most reasonable of them being legitimized, it takes a higher ordered force to accomplish this. Further, it can be difficult for the state to ever really tame the most skillful mafiaike entities because such organized criminal types will excel at infiltrating and currying favor with highlevel regional political powers. But

52:14 in the US anyway, the extraleal mafia groups, especially the Italian mafia, were mostly disbanded or legitimized in the 1980s and the 1990s via RICO statutes and by the FBI, where the FBI would be forced to step in as local police forces were often totally infiltrated and compromised by the criminal elements that they were supposed to be policing. In other words, it is a very difficult and sticky problem to address, but it can ultimately be mitigated once the state becomes powerful enough and achieves a certain level of complexity and control over its domain. All of this, more or less, fits into the general theme or goal state of power, where power will always attempt to concentrate and totalize its influence over time and over an increasingly large domain. And

53:02 for the citizens, the masses, disbanding, destroying, and absorbing these overtly criminal elements is a good thing because when the state achieves achieves a nearperfect monopoly on violence and taxation, it will reduce the suffering that the masses experience as a result of being doubly extracted from by both the state and mafia type entities. I.e., it helps to get rid of that double taxation penalty. to quote Moscow more on this topic of suffering. To quote Moscow, we have to say that even in the most morally corrupt parts of Sicily, there are a certain number of poor and rich that without rebelling openly and systematically to the custom of the town, reluctantly tolerate and suffer through it. They never commit an abuse or crime, nor pretend to be men

53:47 capable of committing them. These individuals, if poor, easily become victims of harassment of the companions at the whims of the bosses. If they are rich, they must give up many legitimate ambitions and their properties are routinely targeted by criminals. End quote. So here we can see regardless of whether a person is rich or poor, they will still suffer when they are forced to live under a criminal mafia type regime, one where organized criminality is overt. Further, the ability for a person to pursue their goals and reach their highest potential will also be capped because if they attempt to do so, they will find their ambitions limited in one way or another by the criminal mafia type entities that will always be looking for a new source of revenue or a new asset to tax. As such, the person is

54:34 faced with a choice. Play the criminal game or generally sit out on the sidelines. In the next passage, we can once again see the outlines of Moscow's law. The organized minority will always rule the disorganized majority. And we can also see a tie-in to Olsen's stationary bandit model, one in which mafiaike entities are like transitionary control systems that exist and hold influence so long as the state remains weak, where the state has not yet grown in scope, scale, and complexity such that it has an encompassing enough interest and enough expansive control over its domain. In other words, mafia-like entities hold relatively narrow interests which sit somewhere between the pure roving bandit and the encompassing and wide-ranging interests of the advanced stationary bandit where an advanced stationary bandit is

55:21 something like the high complexity high control governments of modern advanced nation states to quot Moscow. But the worst consequences of the spirit of mafia is that because of it, a large number of small groups of criminals acquire an extraordinary vitality in the rich dialect of the island of Sicily. There's also a special expression to name those associations. Each of them is called the Koska, a clan or Koska mafiosa, a mafia clan. When someone says that this man belongs to the Koska, it means that he is part of one of these disreputable associations. Compared to other criminal organizations in Italy, the Koska Mafiosa or Mafia Clan has a solidity of structure, a force for action, and above all, a vitality

56:07 infinitely superior to those kosher or less formal, less organized criminal groups of Trin. This increased vitality, as well as the continuous birth and rebirth of mafia clans, is a real cultural medium in which this evil virus and all the criminal associations can live and flourish. End quote. So in that passage, Moscow is discussing one the fact that these mafia clans are organized and thus they can use their organizational prowess to extract control or even tyrannize the local disorganized majority i.e. the town's people. And two, such a dynamic is representative of a weak state, one where the centralized government or state does not have the capacity to police and enforce its laws in certain jurisdictions or geographic domains. In

56:53 other words, what Moscow is describing here is a situation in which the state does not hold a monopoly on violence and a monopoly on taxation. And this power vacuum thus allows mafia-like entities to use their organizational capacity, their solidity of structure, in Moscow's words, to dominate the disorganized majority of a given societal domain. With this being another example of Moscow's law, the disorganized majority is always ruled by an organized minority. And in some cases, the organized minority may be overtly criminal mafia type entities. This also gets into a very important issue. The perceived legitimacy of the state and the security of its ruling class. An insecure state and an insecure ruling class is the most dangerous of all. Because as Burnham tells us, the

57:41 primary objective and practice of all rulers is to serve their own interest and to maintain their own power and privilege. Insecure rulers roll in tanks and machine gun carrying soldiers to suppress mass uprisings. Secure rulers do not. Further, when the state is weak, it does not mean that the town's people will be free from tyranny and prance about in the flower fields, but rather it just means that there is a power vacuum that will be filled by some mafia-like entity or rising stationary bandit. As such, when the state is weak, the town's people may often instead be dominated by some local mafia-like entity, mafia-like entities which often rely upon much crudder forms of co coercive power, violence, and street

58:27 justice. Or in other words, if the powers of the street are stronger than the powers of the state and some jurisdiction, then a much more overtly criminal and coercive regime will dominate and the people will suffer as a result. And then of course this all becomes self-reinforcing because of the code of silence, a muerta and a mafia culture and code of conduct which uses coercive force or the threat thereof to prevent the town's people from assisting the state, thus preserving the mafia's influence. To quote Moscow, "Indeed, where it is a point of view abundantly spread that to turn in those who have committed certain crimes to the authorities is an act of weak and worthless men, it is natural that professional criminals and the scum of

59:13 the social slums will club together in order to take advantage of the subjection and terror that an organized minority, one who knows how to act in a coordinated fashion, can force upon the disorganized majority of individuals who do not dare to invoke the protection of legal forces i.e. of the state and its police force, criminal justice system, etc. end quote. And then the instrumental mechanism by which the mafia type entities maintain this control over the disorganized majority is via enforcement of the so-called amuerta or code of silence. Further, under the viable system model, we can imagine that the mafia type entity employs algodonic loops, pleasure and pain stimuli upon the town's people such that they are kept under control. And

59:58 again, this code of silence is one of the primary mechanics. Any random towns person knows that if they speak up about some crime or offense, and especially if they report it to the police or the legal authorities, there is a non- ignorable probability that they will be punished by the mafia's enforcers. Further, we could assume just like a state-like entity, the mafia controller will have eyes and ears everywhere. This being the outward-looking system 4 from the viable system model which functions as an intelligence gathering arm and the risk that those loose lips of any random member of the town gets heard by some informant somewhere and reported to the mafia's enforcement arm is high or at least in the analytical framework of risk assessment the severity of such a

1:00:45 thing is very very high. So even if the probability of detection is relatively low, the extreme severity of the anticipated punishment is enough to discourage most people from cooperating with the state's authorities. And via this control mechanism, via algodonic loops, the disorganized majority is kept in line and under control by the organized minority of the mafia organization. And with respect to the agodonic loop and the potential punishment, since this is the cruel, harsh world of criminal authorities, the punishments may be very severe, brutal, or even fatal. As such, the controller of this viable system, the mafia type entity, manages this riskreward landscape by making sure that anyone who steps out of line will be

1:01:30 made an example of, i.e. subjected to brutal treatment. This is enough to keep people in line because if the state and its police and judicial system have only weak control over the mafia dominated domain, the person knows that the state will not protect them from the mafia and as such the majority of the disorganized majority will in fact quite predictably fall in line. Mosca further elaborates on this fear mechanic, the algodana control loop of the mafia and what he refers to as the feeling of mafia and how the moral fear of violating the amuerta the code of silence begins to dominate the cultural operating system of the area that is forced to live under mafia domination to quote Moscow and if we want to deeply understand the

1:02:16 effectiveness of the feeling of mafia it must be remembered that it is not only the fear itself fear of a material damage for punishment that makes the town's people so reticizent it prevents them from openly accusing members of the mafia clan when the mafia clan commits a crime. But to the fear we must add the amuerta the repugnance to openly show yourself taking legal action in response to an offense to thus be perceived as being weaker than the offender. This kind of moral fear helps to hide and justify the material fear of the individual who is suffering. And it also happens that the physical fear helps to excuse the moral one in the eyes of the people of northern Italy, i.e. in areas that do not live under mafia de domination. End quote. So from this passage we can begin to see that the amuerto the code of silence becomes

1:03:02 embedded in the culture i.e. If a person is to have a sufficiently high status such that they can be reasonably respected and successful in their community, they must abide by the

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