PBDF online Peace and Security Lecture Seeies 7

0:00 where we go with this. Uh let me start by saying that when fear replaces citizenship citizenship, it produces helplessness. Uh now we find that Nigeria's security crisis has evolved into one of the greatest threats to democratic governance since the country's returned to civil to civil rule in 1999. What began as a localized insurgency in the northeast has expanded into widespread banditry terrorism, kidnapping violence extremism and organized criminality affecting various or virtually every geopolitical zone. Beyond the immediate loss of life and property lies a deeper governance crisis.

0:46 >> In many rural and perurban communities, the Nigerian state has effectively retreated. I mean the state is no is no longer there allowing armed and nonstate actors to exercise control over territory economic activity and civilian populations. We see a lot of this in Katsina. We see this in places like Zanara, SooKoto, KBI and of course the Boru state and although other parts of the country increasingly even when communities are not directly affected by these gang violent gangs they are increasingly brought under a system of coion and this is very common in the southern part of Nigeria. This system of co of question of coercion uh

1:34 operates as auxiliary state operatives with powers to regulate social engagement movements uh collecting illegal taxes determine access to various state facilities administering informal justice and negotiating different forms of with different forms of local population. There's hardly anywhere in Nigeria you go to, you want to start even a farm or you want to start a business or you want to go in there to do anything that you don't have to negotiate with somebody who has you sub the power of government and is ready to exercise authority using whatever means available to them. So this is basically a very disruptive sense of state statethood which has allowed

2:21 people to think of their citizens citizenship in a way that basically produces hopelessness. This condition we have described as captive population syndrome is a situation in which citizens lose the practical benefits of citizenship because of fear, coercion and violence being violence have displaced which has displaced constitutional governance. In such environments, democratic rights become meaningless and and survival depends on accommodation of these illegal tendencies rather than protection by the states. We hear it every time. Oh, if I call them up, why don't you do something about it? Mommy, what can we do? We cannot. We can only

3:08 negotiate. That's why we're negotiating with bandits, calling them repentant insurgents and all sorts of things. Even the state itself has has has basically abdicated that responsibility and allowed them to to do what they want to do and leaving citizens to bargain and and and negotiate with people who have clearly very very um uh violent and unable to to run a state in any other way except they resort to violence. In terms of the implications of this captive population syndrome, the crisis extends beyond state security. It also has to deal it is also dealing with human security. So it's not just about whether our country as a country is safe

3:56 and is secured the individual human being security is affected. Citizens are deprived not only of physical safety but also of secure livelihoods. We know that for many farming communities in different parts of the country, they cannot go to the farm and this used to be their livelihoods. Education, health care, food security, freedom of movement and confidence in public institutions. Security must therefore be understood as protecting people as much as it is about protecting territory. So beyond territory people need to be protected as it's increasingly the case with troubling as the case with um the way the Nigerian democratic uh regression that we are

4:43 beginning to see is very troubling that we are going beginning to see that the regression in our democratic experience is not unconnected to these tendencies that we are dealing with. It seems established that without human security democratic governance has lost both its legitimacy and public trust. So what are we saying about captive populations? We're saying that there is a core relationship between captive populations with fractured communities and human security. Following therefore from this conversation, the impact of insecurity extends beyond territorial control. It has fundamentally fractured the social fabric of communities between ethnic groups that country.

5:31 >> Your excellency. >> Yes. >> Is it possible to adjust your camera? You are actually upside down now. We're seeing you upside. That's right. Thank you. >> Thank you. I'm so sorry about that. Sorry about that. Thank you. I'm sorry. Okay, thank you. Following there from the impact of insecurities extends beyond territorial control. It has fundamentally it has fundamentally fractured social the social fabric of communities between ethnic groups that make up the country. These violent trends have have destroyed all networks of trusts. Today if you go to any place they'll say ah is the fan is it that it is that? And there's no reciprocity and

6:19 collective action that sustain communities. Communities used to lead together agreed on how to manage their communities. But today it's more of mistrust than anything. So local governments and coexistence have already been thrown aboard overboard. We can see what is increasingly happening in parts of our state, Lagos state who owns the land and all those relocation businesses that we are beginning to hear. Even if the trend in migration is re reversed, say for example, you say don't come to my communities anymore stay in your community and let the ones who are in my community leave those communities and go back. You still have not solved the problem. Many families will remain displaced and traditional institutions that used to hold those together will

7:06 become uprooted will still remain uprooted because they have been weakened already by these violent tendencies that we'll see. schools will still be affected, livelihoods will still be disrupted and the dispute resolution mechanisms that have existed will still remain under underutilized. So what I'm basically saying is that the answer is not in asking people to respond >> somebody speaking okay and this is a tendency we have tended to see and that's the tendency is that people are saying go back let the fan leave let this ones go let that one go we are

7:53 saying that with the way this impartations have done the captive population syndrome is such that it's not just about asking people to remigrate it's not just about asking people to leave the communities have been so impacted and so affected in ways that we cannot not just call for those simple answers and responses. Let's see some of the ways that that has happened. As communities have become fragmented, social coition has declined and human insecurity has deepened. The leftovers you you see the forms that you have you continue to see are internally displaced people, widows, orphans and all kinds of people that have become in increasingly dependent on humanitarian assistance being located within those communities. So you are having a situation that you have to rebuild the community support

8:39 systems and that traditionally used to provide protection for for the people who were in u in need. Explaining this is more gra in more graphic terms may lead us to the reverse consequences. We just do not think about these captive um population syndrome h in in just ordinary terms. There are graphic experiences of it. Take the case of violence against or gender based violence has escalated where state authority is so weak and where impunity prevails they are not even able to protect women from violence and girls and you'll notice that the face of most of these violent tendencies tend to be that of children women that's easy to go to target schools and soft sports like that and just carry people away and uh

9:26 there's absolutely nothing happens and it increasingly points to the collapse of these things. While women and children face this risk, the men too are not left behind. Boys and girls, men and boys experience force recruitment, torture, sexual violence, and other pressures that are coming with their militarized masculinity. So, how do we rebuild such a fractured society? How do we overcome this captive population syndrome? I I think it is something we must begin to wear the the the the thing like a post-war situation which we saw with the Marshall plan in the in Europe which basically allowed the con the the the continent to rethink its its um its

10:11 future and then build it towards economic recovery and modernization. Uh what I'm trying to say in in fact is that we are actually in that state in Nigeria that the post conflict state the post in in insecurity state should be a a state that begins to respond to what the future of Nigeria should be and we should equate this to what happened post the world wars for example and ask ourselves whether we are not looking at trends that are very similar because when you have your population largely living under a certain syndrome how do you break that syndrome? and begin to make them productive of the country. >> The breakdown of systems even >> survival of the of of

10:57 >> guys just finish my just administration. >> Okay. So there's a breakdown of the justice system which is compounding existing survivors of banditry cannot even report their cases. they just keep quiet and the courts are nonfunctional. >> Thank you for your >> the propellence of violence and the fear that all of this is creating has led to even other situations. Um for example, one of the response and this is the point I'm trying to make look at this as just a temporary thing that need to address. We must as a more holistic thing. We are in an a country now that is almost completely engulfed with the trend.

11:43 >> I said it. >> If this trend has >> I don't know who is speaking behind the background please. If this trend has to change then we must think of it in a more holistic and what has the country done? The country has started to do some thinking but where did it go? It quickly started to call for the creation of an establishment of state police as one of the main proposals that it is coming up with based on the argument that the central police is overstretched and insufficient response to local threat. Again, how can that explanation handle the issues that we are dealing with the issue of this syndrome that we are we are talking about. So for us to properly

12:29 we we even to for us to use the state police option that has been put forward we need to ask the question how is it going to be regulated. Uh is the state police going to improve on our intelligence gathering rapid response community trust and collaboration between the the traditional institutions and the formal institutions of government. These are several questions that we need to ask. But let me say that while not throwing away the idea completely, I'm saying that the idea itself is grossly inadequate for a state that has been completely taken over by this syndrome that we are talking about. And therefore for me in addition to whatever proposal that is being put forward state police, we must be mindful of the fact of in its inadequacy first and foremost, but also the risk and

13:16 other factors involved. I give you a small anecdotal to this this morning my security at my mother's house called me and said mommy I want you to be my guardian I said uh my guarantor and I said guarantor for what he said the youth leader in the comm the neighborhood brought him a form and asked him to join the state police that they are recruiting for state police the first thing that came to my mind was the presentation I'm making today this is a man who only three four days ago beat his wife brutally brutally. It was a big issue for us. We even almost wanted to throw him out of the job, but the wife begged us to let him have a last chance. And the same guy

14:02 the very two three days later is telling me that he wants to become recruited as um into the state police. So that tells you the kind of state police we're going to be uh uh dealing with. The other issue that needs to be done even if we thinking of the state police is that you can't have the state police on one hand and have the governor serving as the chief security whatever um um whatever of the state officer of the state. We need to make them more accountable and take those resources that at their disposal and speak to the formal institutions like the police and the defense and all those civil police civil institutions that support us in terms of trying to protect. Why are we saying that? Because then you give them

14:48 that power. They'll use the same power to override the state police itself. Uh and it will amount to absolutely nothing in the long term. Okay. So how does the security se sector reform uh move forward and become something more uh useful for us? I think we need to think about it in terms of community lead resilience. How can we make communities be the ones to fight back and and in fighting back how do they overcome the syndrome itself that they are faced with? And so we are of the opinion or I am of the opinion that it is important that we we we pull these communities together, invest in inclusive local governance, uh the issues of um of um local autonomy for the autonomy of the

15:35 local governments is something we need to push for but push for it in a sense that is driven towards the building of community resilience. things like early warning, youth engagement, women's leadership, um uh livelihood restoration education psychosocial support. These are all the kinds of of things we need to be in interested in as we try to build into this whole uh notion of community resilience. Um um um some sort of reform agenda that works for the community. And again like I said this cannot be done outside the context of having given more autonomy to the local governments uh and holding them accountable and holding them accountable

16:20 for the resources that come into the local government. Uh let me go then to one last point before I come to my conclusion. We're going to um the 2027 elections and what implication does this have for the general elections in a context where even the human security itself is a huge problem and I argue here that security remains a preerequisite for democratic participation where communities live under fear elections cannot fully reflect the expression of the citizens will the persistent captive populations that we have seen face several electoral risks. For example, millions of them are internally displaced. Some of them were unable to

17:06 register and all of them even though they had registered many of them will be unre unable. They continue to be people groups are able to determine and manipulate the direction in which they they would be going. So we think that for the purpose of the elections we are faced with a real big issue that we need to think about and and and address. So how does this um impact on us? Ultimately we're going to see that fractured communities will produce weakened democratic institutions. There will be a decline in government ability to uh to to protect citizens even more because the outcome of the election

17:52 would not reflect the will of the people. Electoral legit legitimacy of May I advise that the admin mute everybody? She mute everybody. Yes. Thank you. >> Thank you very much, sir. Thank you.

18:37 >> Yeah. Going forward in my recommendations, I'm of the opinion that Nigeria's security crisis is no longer solely a matter of counter counter insurgency or crime control. It has become a crisis for democracy. It has become a crisis for constitutional governance. It has become a crisis for citizenship. It has become a crisis for human security. It has become a crisis for social cohesion. So therefore, if we are going to deal with this, we need to restore some of that authority of the state to be able to go beyond winning military victories to actually rebuilding trust uh within

19:23 those uh institutions. We have to rebuild accountable institutions. We have to trans make our financing of security transparent. That continues to be a very big question whether it is with the state police, whether it's with the existing police, whether it's with any form of engagement that we are going to take on uh in the future. We are even looking at it even in terms of things we do with trauma, peace building and all the rest of it. So as we go forward, five short-term priorities I would recommend. We should strengthen human security and human security. How do we do that? which should involve uh protecting which involves protecting lives, livelihood, education, health, food security, access to justice along with territorial

20:09 security. These are some of the ingredients of what we can do to strengthen the human security condition. We should adopt carefully regulated state policing. This business of state policing that we have not seen the police bill itself not to talk of the act. I don't know whether we have seen what is being circulated at all. Um it's something we need to be very worried about because it would actually help to complicate the problem on ground. Like I said, my security guard is going to leave me as a guard and become a member of our state police here in the Cross River State. So that tells you the quality of that human resource that's going into that uh into that institution. So we need to come up with safeguards. We need to to set professional standards. I don't see how

20:55 that is happening. And we need to look for ways to create independent oversight of whatever this the government is trying to do. Otherwise, they would further complicate the problem that is on the ground. We need to deal with opaque security votes and replace them with transparent institutional financing so that we are strengthening these institutions in ways that are accountable, financially accountable. One of the biggest arguments against the state police is that you have not funded the the main police. Are you going to be able to fund fund the state police and even the funding that is being given? How accountable are these institutions for the use of that money? How do we build community resilience? We have to create collaborations between the state

21:41 and communities. We have to reconcile communities. is not enough to ask people to return to their states of origin or just um go into communities and displace people. I think it is important that some reconciliation is built but built on common agreements in terms of engagement. Uh we need to deal with livelihood recovery. We need to go beyond just youth unemployment to addressing youth engagement. I think there is a difference between the two. You don't just give them jobs and say you've dealt with the problem. They need to be engaged effectively in the future of the country, the present and the present and the future of the country and of course bring community early warning. And I'm taking a comment that I just received on Lake. Lastly, we need to promote sustainable

22:28 peace. And in this way, I'm thinking of those dealing with those structural drivers of violence, which include things like poverty, exclusion, inequality, weak governance, impunity, political marginalization, all those things that make people feel excluded. uh this business of leaving no one behind, pulling people in are ways that we can get um peace to return to our country. And so beyond the question of coming up with a post ins um post uh um in insecurity marshall plan uh I believe what we need to think about in the short term are those things that respond immediately to how sec how communities can rebuild their resilience, how

23:15 sustainable peace can be built around the things that people have um are complaining about things like poverty and other forms of exclusions. So ultimately democracy and development cannot flourish where citizens live in fear and the notion of the um of the captive um population syndrome is a is a notion of fear. So we are trying to go beyond the loss of citizenship results in a in living in fear. Uh so for for me I think that human human security, resilient communities, accountable institutions, sustainable book piece must form the foundations on which we move forward with our democratic experience.

24:01 Rebuilding them is essential not only for the 2027 general elections which are around the corner but also as we go beyond that we should plan for a Marshall plan type agenda that will result in a secure inclusive and prosperous Nigeria. Thank you very much and I'm grateful for the opportunity to make this brief presentation. Thank you Baji. you your excellency, [clears throat] you're always on time and uh your points are well noted. Uh I always want you to actually round up meetings because of the way you summarize ideas. But excellency have to leave. I'm sure you have a lot of questions. Uh we will not take your questions now. um uh if you

24:49 can write them and send us a message on the group chat, she will be able to um respond and at the end of the program if uh our excellency if you have your excellence if you have time uh to join us at the end of and we will finish exactly by 12. Um please even if you're at the airport and you have a space you could respond to some of the questions. We like to take in all the comment all the lectures so that we have a robust discussion. Thank you so much. >> Please just a warning. Excellent ma'am. >> Yes, I'm here. Thank you. >> Okay. Yes. Just just a warning because you know we have people respected people from different spheres of influence. If

25:36 you're joining, please [clears throat] mute your mic so that our resource person will be free to talk and uninterrupted. Please, let's do that. Let's let's uh respect the audience and everybody here. Uh our next speaker is Generalai. Uh representing him is um Lieutenant General um one of the most decorated and most respected military generals in Nigeria. Uh he was VC general officer commanding uh seventh division in Miduguri, the former chief of training and operations, former chief of policy and plans Nigerian army and also former first commander of the multinational joint

26:23 task force in Germaina. Uh, General, please you have the floor. >> Thank you very much. uh our excellency uh former ambassador to Ethiopia ambassador toyo that are just giving us a very inspirational talk on the topic for today. Thank you so very much ma uh professor professor yu and all other resource persons and those on the line. I say good morning and uh I

27:10 want to thank the organizers for giving my boss the opportunity to be the keynote speaker of this uh very important uh program. uh on his behalf I want to convey to all of us that he is not able to be here because of other engagement outside Nigeria as we speak is out of Nigeria and that was I now handed in his uh paper to me to [clears throat] deliver this morning. So having said that uh I want to crave the indulgence of the organizers and uh everybody to go ahead and present his paper. Whatever I say here is as how he

28:00 retired former ambassador to the republic of bin and former chief of army staff is how he has put it down. Starting keynote address by Lipna General Ty Braai retired former chief of army staff and the peace building at the peaceuilding development foundation online peace and security lecture series 7 on the theme I quote banditry insurgency terrorism and the captive population syndrome while on the topic military responses to banditry insurgent Y and terrorism lessons for protecting vulnerable populations and strengthen national

28:46 security unquote today Friday 10th July 2026 via Zoom straight I'll go into the introduction the battle against insurgency banditry and terrorism represents one of the most complex challenges confronting contemporary national security establishment ment today as a former chief of army staff who is not only who has not only commanded military operations against this threat but also witness their devastating impact as an indigen of Bono state. I approach this subject with a unique perspective that blends professional military experience with profound

29:32 personal concern. the mass displacement of communities across the northeast and northwest regions. The tragic loss of innocent lives and the systematic destruction of livelihoods have left an indelible mark on my understanding of what true security entails. Armed conflict in northeast Nigeria has displaced over 2.2 2 million people and severely impacted access to food, health care and basic services with civilian casualties continuing to rise. According to United Nations Office for the Coordination of Manitarian Affairs report of 2017, the crisis which began in 2009 with an

30:19 insurgency led by Boku Haram and later joined by splinter factions including the Islamic State West African province is for short has resulted in approximately 3.5 million internally displaced persons across Nigeria. nearly 10% of all displacement across Africa as reported by Torson. The central dilemma that confronts any military force engaged in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations in the deliberate exploitation of civilian populations by non-state armed groups. Insurgents, bandits, and terrorists have have perfected the art of blending into communities using innocent civilians as

31:06 human shield while simultaneously drawing essential support from these populations. This tactic represents a calculated strategy designed to exploit the military's obligation to protect civilians and to weaponize any collateral damage for propaganda purposes. When military operations inadvertently cause civilian casualties, these incidents are transformed into recruitment tools foiling resentment and driving vulnerable populations further into extremist networks. This vicious cycle underscores why intelligence operations must become paramount in any effective counterinsurgency strategy.

31:54 This paper this morning examines the principles, challenges and solutions for protecting civilians in military responses to banditry insurgency and terrorism. It argues that sustainable peace requires a fundamental shift from purely kinetic approaches towards comprehensive strategies that integrate intelligenceled operations, community engagement, development, investment and robust adherence to international humanitarian law. The the analysis draws on operational experience, scholarly research and documented case studies to present a nuance understanding of civilian protection in asymmetric warfare. Now starting with the primacy of

32:40 intelligence in civilian protection, intelligenceled operations must extend beyond targeting combatants to encompass the entire ecosystem that sustains insurgency and banditry. The informants and spies who provide any warning to terrorist groups. The logistics suppliers who ensure the flow of weapons and profisions and even those who facilitate medical supplies to wounded fighters constitute critical nodes in the support network that enables violence to persist. Identifying and neutralizing this element is essential for proper protection of civilians as it disrupts the infrastructure that allows insurgents to

33:27 operate with impunity while minimizing the need for large scale kinetic operations that risk civilian casualties. Nigeria's counterterrorism operations are fundamentally dependent on human intelligence. The terrain is fast. Surveillance capac capacity limited that is that technical technical surveillance capacity limited and insurgents aimed themselves within civilian populations. The intelligence chain runs from local observation through informal reporting and vigilante mediation to military interpretation and action. Civilian armed destruct the chain. The immediate air effect is information

34:13 withdrawal. Communities with withhold knowledge. Informants go silent and vigilantes grow cautious. If reporting leads to strikes that kill neighbors, informing is recorded as betrayal. The medium-term effect is intelligence contamination. As trust collapses, information quality deteriorates. Rifle groups exploit the system and communal tensions shape reporting. What reaches commanders become less reliable and harder to verify. This analysis is consistent with scholarly findings on the relationship between civilian arm and operational effectiveness.

34:59 Research examining Nigerian Air Force air strike between 2014 and 2024 has found that air strikes intended to target angr inadvertently caused harm to civilians and their properties, eroded public trust in the military and exacerbated instability. The frequency and recurrence of these mishaps along with mounting civilian casualties raise critical concerns about whether this incidents are genuinely accidental or indicative of systemic failures within intelligence and operations. The military's claim that air strikes on civilian populations who are mere accidents fail to address the systemic issues within their intelligence

35:45 architecture. The importance of intelligence in protecting civilians cannot be overstated. Therefore, effective intelligence enables precision targeting that minimizes collateral damage, facilitate the early warning of attacks on civilian communities and support the identification and isolation of insurgent elements from the broader population. Conversely, intelligent failures lead to tragic errors that undermine the legitimacy of military operations and strengthen the insurgence narrative that the state is hostile to its own people. Therefore, investment in intelligence capabilities both technical and human must be a priority for any counterinsurgency strategy that seeks to

36:31 protect vulnerable populations. Now to the principle of mining collateral damage. The principle of mining collateral damage must be observed as an operational imperative rather than merely a legger or ethical constraint. While military forces must retain the capacity for decisive action against identified threats, every operation must be guided by the principles of distinction, proportionality and military necessity. This is not simply a matter of compliance with international humanitarian law. It is a strategic necessity. The application of international humanitarian law in counterinsurgency operations preserves civilians and

37:17 guarantees that military activities adhere to norms of humanity and legality. However, Nigeria struggles with consistently enforcing international humanitarian law despite its commitment under international treaties, facing challenges such as inadequate military training, weak accountability mechanisms, and the absence of robust civilian protection strategies. Furthermore, the absence of international humanitarian law principles within military doctrine hinders counterinsurgency operations and risk civilian safety. Scholars have emphasized that enhancing Nigeria's legal and consumer frameworks will guarantee international manarian laws compliance, recommending upgra

38:03 upgraded military training, establishing independent oversight organizations to ensure accountability and partnering with international organizations to monitor compliance. Operations that consistently result in civilian casualties erode the legitimacy of the state and undermine the very population that security forces are meant to protect. The National Human Rights Commission has raised fresh concerns over the growing number of civilians reportedly killed during military operations, warning that civilian populations must never be treated as losses in security operations. This was as reported in human rights watch of 2023. Amnesty International and multiple

38:49 international reports have documented that Nigerian military strikes have repeatedly caused mass civilian casualties over several years. The long-term consequences of such erosion are devastating as communities that lose faith in the military's ability to prepare them may become passive observers or active supporters of insurgent groups. It was contained in international crisis group report of 2026. The principle of proportionality requires that the anticipated incidental arm to civilians must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This requires careful assessment before every

39:35 operation weighing the potential civilian cost against the military benefit. The principle of distinction requires that combatants must distinguish between civilian populations and military objectives directing operations only against legitimate military targets. These principles are not merely legal abstract legal concept but practical guidelines that when properly applied saves lives and preserve the legitimacy of military operations. Now a look at the exploitation of civilian populations by non-state armed groups. A fundamental challenge in protecting civilians is the deliberate exploitation of civilian populations by insurgents

40:21 and bandits. For insurgenc and civilian arm is a strategic asset. It reinforces narratives of state hostility and its recruitment. The military designates certain areas as hostile enclaves based on intelligence and surveillance. Yet civilians living or trading there are sometimes not clearly informed or effectively evacuated. They remain in spaces the state already considers in the line of fire. This gap between military knowledge and civilian awareness is a key driver of civilian arm. Strikes may be intelligenceled, but those affected are often unaware they are within a battle space. The result is structural exposure. Over time, that exposure eros

41:09 the flow of local intelligence on which operations depend. Civilian arm does not simply reflect error. It disrupt the human networks that make anterrorism possible. The pattern of civilian casualties has been well documented. In January 2017, a military jet struck a displaced person's camp in Ran Bono state, killing over 50 civilians and injuring more than 200. This was contained the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Manitarian Affairs in 2017. In December 2023, a strike in Tudbury Kaduna killed 85 and 120 civilians with human rights watch describing it as

41:55 emblematic of recurring failures. Between 2024 and 2025, repeated strikes in San Faroto and Karduna kill civilians in markets and villages. By 2026, the Associated Press estimated 400 to 500 civilian death from such errors since 20 2017. The complexity of implementing international humanitarian law in nonational armed situations causes issues for Nigeria as asmetric warfare blurs the line between combatants and civilians. Insurgent organizations like Boo Haram and Islamist Day for West African Province are responsible for the protected conflict raising serious questions regarding suspected violations

42:41 of international humanitarian law and their severe manitarian effects. Studies have found a clear case of violation of human rights and rules of engagement by the parties involved resulting in various degree of war crimes and crimes against humanity as quoted by aqu and all in their works of 2025. The exploitation of civilians by armed groups takes multiple forms. These include using civilians restructure for military purposes, forcing civilians to provide food and shelter, using civilians at human sheets during military engagement, and embedding fighters within civilian populations to deter attack. Each of these tactics places civilians at heightened risk and

43:28 complicates military responses. The challenge for military forces is to respond effectively to these tactics without causing unacceptable civilian harm. A task that requires exceptional discipline intelligence and operational precision. What are the limits of military approaches to all these problems? Beyond the immediate tactical challenges, the military response to insurgency and terrorism faces structural constraints that demand urgent attention. The Nigerian armed forces are currently engaged in numerous international security operations, internal security operations across the country, stretching military resources

44:13 and personnel to their limit. This overstretch compromises the military's primary constitutional responsibility of defending the nation against external aggression while simultaneously degrading the effectiveness of internal security operations. Constitutionally, the primary responsibilities of the armed forces of Nigeria include defending the nations the nation against external aggression, protecting territorial integrity, suppressing insurrection, and providing aid to civil authorities when called upon to do so. A clear time a clear time bound and conditionsbased exit strategy is needed to gradually return internal

44:59 securityities responsibilities to civilian authorities while preserving military readiness for external threats. The reliance of military-led approach to internal security is unsustainable and in many respects counterproductive. Military forces are trained for war for war fighting not for nuanced community oriented approach required to address the root causes of insurgency. When soldiers are deployed to perform policing functions in environments where they are viewed as occupiers rather than protectors, the potential for friction and misunderstanding increases exponentially. As Bratai has emphasized in one of his works, the threat is societal and cannot

45:45 be eradicated by kinetic military action alone. It is essential to recognize that the root causes of banditry, insurgency and terrorism are fundamentally failures of governance and development rather than purely military problems. Poverty, euthon, employment, underdevelopment and ungoverned spaces create the conditions in which extremism and criminality flourish. Addressing these underlying factors requires a whole of society approach that goes far beyond the capacity of capacity of any military force. The country's security crisis is equally a governance problem, an economy problem, a justice problem, and increasingly a social breakdown.

46:32 Sustainable peace will only be achieved through sustained investment in development including the construction of roads, railways, educational institution and healthcare facilities alongside the creation of economic opportunities that offer young people a viable alternative to violence. The military cannot address these root causes alone. While military operations can create the conditions for development by neutralizing immediate threats, they cannot substitute for the long-term investment in human capital and infrastructure that are essential for lasting stability. This requires a comprehensive national strategy that integrates security, development, and governance reforms with clear roles and responsibilities for all stakeholders.

47:22 Excuse me. Excuse me, please. Sorry, it was uh a computer problem. I'm trying to sort it out.

48:23 All right. Sorry for the small break. It was a technical problem. Um, I'll go straight into community based security initiatives and local engagement. The fight against insurgency cannot be completed without active citizen participation. No nation can defeat rising threats without strengthening local governance local governance structures and deepening grassroot intelligence networks.

49:10 Community- based security initiatives such as local vigilance groups and early warning systems must be supported and integrated into the broader national security framework. These initiatives not only enhance intelligence gathering but also foster a sense of ownership and responsibility among communities reducing their vulnerability to exploitation by insurgent groups. The formation of civilian defense militias in northeastern Nigeria provides instructive evidence. In June 2013, residents of Maidu reform a civilian defense militia to protect themselves from Boku Haram. Within months, the

49:56 civilian joint task force had driven Boku Haram out of the city and into surrounding rural areas. Inspired by by Maduguri's success, civilian defense ministers quickly spread across Bono state as communities sought to emulate the civilian JTF uh procedure. Research has shown that communities with high capacity for collective action form community initiative initiated militias and maintain social control over their activities which enables militias to effectively protest civilians against rebel violence. By contrast, communities with low capacity often host state initiated militias and struggle to

50:43 establish social control over their members, rendering them ineffective against the rebels. The success of community-based security initiative depends on several factors. First, communities must have the capacity for collective action including social coercion, trust, and effective leadership. Second, these initiatives must maintain social control over their members, preventing abuses and ensuring that they operate within acceptable norms. Third, there must be a clear relationship between community initiative and former security institutions institutions [clears throat] ensuring coordination and accountability. Fourth, communities must have access to

51:29 resources and support to sustain their efforts over time. Furthermore, youth focus programs and anti-radicalization efforts are essential for preventing the recruitment of vulnerable individuals into extremist networks. By addressing the social and economic graffiti that extremists exploit, these programs can break the cycle of violence at its source. Citizens must be mobilized psychologically through social media, press and community support to overcome what has been described are the so-called terrorists and bandits.

52:18 The mobilization of civilian populations through awareness and community engagement is essential for sustaining counterinsurgency efforts beyond military campaigns. Let's now look at development and security. An inseparable part partnership as an inseparable partnership security and development are just together. One cannot achieve with cannot be achieved without the other. The ministry can create the conditions for development by neutralizing immediate threats, but it cannot substitute for the long-term investment in human capital and infrastructure that are essential for lasting stability. As security scholars have observed,

53:04 counterterrorism efforts have been undermined where displaced civilians remain unable to return safely and land disputes go unresolved. What is needed is investment in civilian protection and local reconciliation processes that rebuild trust between communities and the state. The fight against terror financing must also be intensified as a critical component of any comprehensive strategy. Insurgents and bandites require substantial financial resources to sustain their operations and these resources often flow through legitim legitimate economic channels. Disrupting these financial pipelines is essential for weakening insurgent groups and

53:51 reducing their capacity to cause harm. This requires enhanced cooperation between security agencies, financial intelligence units and international partners to track and interdict illicit financial flows. Studies have affirmed that Nigeria's quest for sustainable peace in the face of insurgency depend not only on military strength but on the capacity of leadership to uphold the rule of law. ensure human rights compliance and build inclusive security structures. Recommendations include enhance leadership training in human rights, robust oversight mechanisms and partnership with civil society to

54:38 rebuild trust. The adoption of human a human security perspective since security from a state centric aspect to a more humanist humanistic aspect provides a valuable theoretical framework for understanding these challenges. The relationship between development and security operates at multiple levels. At the macro level, economy development reduces the grievances that exploit and provides alternatives to violence. At the community level, development pro project build trust between communities and the state, creating the conditions for effective security cooperation. At the individual level, education and

55:23 employment provide young people with hope and opportunity, reducing their vulnerability to recruitment by extremist groups. A comprehensive strategy must address all three levels simultaneously. Now to recommendations. Based on the analysis presented in this paper, the following recommendations are offered to enhance the protection of vulnerable populations and strengthen national security in the context of banditry insurgency and terrorism. One, establish a comprehensive civilian protection framework. The Nigerian government should develop and implement a comprehensive civilian

56:10 protection framework that integrates international humanitarian law principles into all aspects of military operations. This framework should include mandatory reoperation civilian risk assessment, clear protocols for the evacuation of civilians from designated combat zones and robust incident investigation mechanisms. Independent oversight bodies should be established to monitor compliance and ensure accountability for violations. The framework must also include compensation and support programs for civilian victims of military operations as this will help rebuild trust between communities and the state. Two, invest

56:58 in intelligence infrastructure and community policing. Significant investments should be made in enhancing human intelligence capabilities and community based security initiatives. This includes training and equipping local vigilance groups, establishing formal early warning systems and creating intelligence sharing platforms that link communities with security agencies. Community policing models should be expanded and adequately resourced to reduce the military's involvement in internal security operations. Furthermore, intelligence prisoners should receive specialized training in community engagement and cultural sensitivity to build the trust necessary for effective intelligence

57:45 gathering. And three, pursu pursuing a comprehensive development and governance agenda. A national strategy that A national strategy that integrates security development and governance reform must be prioritized. This strategy should focus on addressing the root causes of insurgency and banditry including poverty, youth employment, youth unemployment, underdevelopment and governance and ungoverned spaces. Specific investments should be made in education healthcare infrastructure and economic opportunities in conflict affected regions. Land reform and reconciliation

58:33 program should be implemented to address grievances that fuel conflict. The strategy must also strengthen local governance structures and ensure that communities have a meaningful voice in security decisions, decision making processes around them. Strengthen international partnerships and legal framework is the fourth one. Nigeria should deepen its engagement with international partners, monetary organizations and regional bodies to enhance his capacity for civilian protection. This includes assessing technical assistance for military training in international manitarian law, establishing partnership for monitoring and evaluation of military operations

59:18 and participating in regional counterterrorism frameworks that emphasize human rights compliance. Additionally, domestic legal framework should be strengthened to incorporate international monetarian law standards with clear profisions for prosecution of violations and protection of civilians in armed conflict. The government should also enhance cooperation with financial intelligence units and international partners to disrupt terror financing networks. Now the conclusion, the fight against insurgency, banditry and terrorism is ultimately a struggle for the hearts and minds of the people. Military victories that come at the cost

1:00:04 of civilian lives and community trust are hollow and unsustainable. True and lasting security can only be achieved when vulnerable populations feel protected not only from insurgent from insurgents and bandits but also from the systemic failures that make them vulnerable in the first place. The lessons from my experience at chief of army staff are clear and compelling. The protection of vulnerable populations in the context of banditry insurgency and terrorism cannot be achieved through military means alone. It demands comprehensive strategy that integrates intelligenceled operations, community engagement, development, investment, and a sustained commitment to addressing the roots

1:00:51 causes of violence. Military forces must remain disciplined and professional, adhering to the highest standard of conduct and minimizing collateral damage even in the most challenging operational environment. At the same time, the broader society must recognize that security is a shared responsibility requiring the active participation of all citizens, communities, and all levels of government. By aligning counterinsurgency operations with international standards, Nigeria can reduce the challenging humanitarian implications of its internal conflict. The protection of civilians is not merely a legal obl obligation or an ethical imperative. It is a strategic

1:01:38 necessity upon which the long-term success of counterinsurgency operations depends. As a soldier who has witnessed the devastation of conflict as an indigen of a state that has borne the brunt of insurgency, I am convinced that the path to peace lies in a people centric approach that prioritizes protection, development and justice. The military has a vital role to play but it cannot and should not shoulder this burden alone. It is time for a renewed national commitment to address the root causes of insecurity and building a future where all Nigerians can live in peace, dignity and safety. The lessons of the past decade are

1:02:25 clear. The question is whether we have the wisdom and courage to act upon them. Thank you so very much for your wrapped attention. Uh this is the end of the presentation. Thank you very much. >> Oh, thank you General. Uh also on crime and um very robust presentation. Our appreciation to you and also to General Buratai for this uh lecture. Uh, General spoke on military responses to banditry insurgency and terrorism, lessons for protecting vulnerable populations and strengthening

1:03:11 national security. Um, Professor Chidalu made some observation uh just to inform our audience and also resource persons that the lecture series is recorded for people who could not join. Um the message is on um on our YouTube page. Um the idea is to speak honestly from your own perspective so people can learn and analysts can watch later and learn uh from your observation. Before I proceed to the next item, I want to just uh inform you we have some of our we have the chairman of the peace building development board of elders um Ricard general of immigration ti babe

1:03:58 day uh with us and then we also have the former director general of the national orientation agency. I know some of them have also joined. I can't see everybody online. Um but just to welcome you and to honor you uh I can see the subsequent general of customs uh human resource development. You're all welcome. Um I'm also compelled to take the last lecture before we ask our questions so that we can put everything together. General is here but ambassador you have to go and I've requested if you have one or two questions has told me that if she can't answer some of the questions professor

1:04:43 can answer for her but if you have one or two questions directly to uh ambassador you can ask now before I move to the last presenter any question for our excellency If there's none, you can still put those questions down for her. She will be able to respond. >> There's a question. There's a question now. Please, can I ask? >> All right. >> Okay. Please go ahead. >> Thank you ma your excellency. That was a very fine presentation. My question quickly is um how what model are we? >> All right, thank you.

1:05:29 >> Where did you >> just hold on please? Hold on please. Um so let's take these questions one by one. Galaxy X phone. Just hold on and let's allow the >> Thank you. >> Okay. Okay. In a in a situation like this, I think um um it's fine that a country will come out and say right we are we are copying this uh particular um um model. So I have Nigeria chosen a model which they are copying and if at all we did not we have not chosen for instance I thank God my is here we know the Nigerian system from the onset was

1:06:15 fashioned after the British colonial masters. So my question is that what actually is um Nigerian policing system the state policing what model are we copying so that at least we'll be able to make a way forward. Thank you very much. That's just my question. >> Okay. Thank you um Laian. >> Okay. Excellency, you can answer that. >> Yes. I'm sure um I'm sure Chitty will answer this better than I will. But from what I have read online and we still haven't seen the law and the bill if we're going by what we've seen, it's just a model of decentralization. It's a bundle of uh making policing

1:07:02 closer to the people which is different from I mean it's also embedded in the whole federal structure where every uh every federating unit should be able to run its own um security outfits and make it work for them. However, you know this big long debate in Nigeria about whether we have a proper or true federal system or not. So all of that is embedded in it. Um yeah but there's no given the fact that we need something that is closer to the people but definitely not something that is controlled by the Gulf doors which is going to be the challenge we'll have. So we'll have multiple centers of conflicting interest uh which will also in itself raise conflict issues as well. Thank you. >> All right. Thank you ma.

1:07:50 >> Okay so let's take the last question. There's I can't see your name but it's galaxy fold. Um, you can grab your question now, please. Okay, I seem to have lost him. I can't see him again. So, we take the last uh presentation from uh Professor Chidal. General uh please if you have questions for general just put them together after professor Dinku's lecture we will take all the questions together and then summarize um prof I'm sure professor Dinku is not we all know him is a former chairman of

1:08:36 the um national human right commission um a legal law professor and a wellrespected human right activist in Nigeria Um, you have the floor. >> No, thank you very much um Dr. K. And um good morning colleagues and compatriots. Um, you know, you wait um for years to meet and greet a general and then like the proverbial British double-decker bus, two leftenant generals arrived in one morning uh with staggering brilliance. um

1:09:22 leftand general of course and gen left general gurai um and uh then of course you've got an outstanding lawyer activist and diplomat um my sister ambassador Coyo Toyo I therefore consider myself um worse than an interalupa in these conversations um and entirely unqualified to do anything like what is called a lecture and I hope that nobody describes what I'm about to say as anything of the sort. Um I would have preferred to actually just say and I I'd actually and to be perfectly honest I did tell Kate that um what I was going to do was come along on

1:10:07 this platform and say I totally agree with what has been said uh and go and sit down. But since he restrained me very manfully um manil military um I'm going to try very quickly to say one or two things and I want to treat myself more as a discussant of what has taken place um before now rather than as a presenter as such and I want to start with um a few three stories that may appear unrelated um and then try to tie them up. Now in 2017, the then national security adviser himself also major general um general

1:10:55 started off the practice issued the first security threat analysis um synthesizing presumably material from the joint services and other entities in the joint intelligence architecture in Nigeria. Yeah. And um essentially I mean that report was for the consumption of the senior most political and strategic leaders uh in the country and uh so it's not public document and um he that it basically itemized the security threats in Nigeria as well northeast booh haram northwest bandits

1:11:41 north central um farmer heard Southeast in uh IPOB South South uh resource militants southwest cults and sundry purveyors of violence and somebody quite senior in government brought document to me for some reason I can't quite tell and asked me to provide uh if some feedback that we're going to take back into government. I took a look at it and I'm like security threat analysis is not supposed to be uh uh an exercise in federal character. Okay, you're not supposed to say well you know every geopolitical zone this is this has a problem. You're supposed to present the country and its leaders with

1:12:28 a tool for policy making not for tactical deployment or manufacturing enemies. And and the person was asking me what do I mean? I said, "I'm sorry. The National Security Advisor got it all wrong. These are not security threats to Nigeria. They are at the very best the symptoms of the security threats underlying Nigeria." And the person asked me to name one. I said, "Well, you've got it. What you call politics is the first and in my view biggest threat to Nigeria's politics." The second elections. Now, as long as your politics is ungoverned, your elections do not produce and are not geared to produce legitimate government. You cannot bring soldiers to shoot any problem that you have out of existence.

1:13:14 And so the people whom you are giving this document are the biggest threats to your to your security. The governors and the people under their control who are used to manufacture electoral outcomes that do not reflect the will of the people. And they were asking me is this what you now want me to go and tell government. I said, "Well, if you do not well tell government want to tell government the truth, how do you want to sort out the problems that you have?" And this is really where I want to begin because as Nigerians, we afraid of the truth. Instead of addressing the truth, we tell ourselves it is not our portion. And now, so let me illustrate this issue with a second story.

1:14:00 In 2008, President Yera set up two panels. One was a Muhammad Justice Muhammad's panel on Electoral Reform. The other was the Muhammad Ko Yusfu panel, Presidential Commission on Police Reform. Now, both reported in 2008 and when they did, their reports were so telling Nigeria put them on a shelf and nobody bothered to read or implement them. I'm not going to dwell too much on the Muhammad's panel report. Many people here hopefully have heard about it. Uh none of the recommendations were implemented. Those addressed the problem of electoral illegitimacy and government resulting governmental illegitimacies that have

1:14:45 afflicted us before and since then. But the MD Ysef report looked at police and I'm looking using that report because we are now caught up in a psychosis about state policing and or state police sorry and um what it found was telling and of course MD Yuf at that point was the most senior living former police inspector general and he said look in 2000 after coming to power. In 1999, President Obasen decided he was going to expedite hiring into the police force, Nigeria police force, in order to bring us up to speed in terms of police to

1:15:33 population ratio and close the gap in provisioning that we had at the time. And so by the time so there was an expedited hire into the police force in Nigeria um uh to uh the idea was to bring hire about 40,000 over four years >> over cycle. Sorry, could people please shut down and mute? I don't want people in their bedrooms and trying to breathe hard into me. Otherwise, I'll hang up without due respect. If you are breathing heavy in your bedroom, I don't want to hear it. Please, administrator, if you cannot mute anybody, mute me, but I'm not contin I want to be very

1:16:20 rude about this. If you don't want to mute everybody, I will log out and you can bring me back when you're done. I I I'm not going to have this. I'm sorry. People are People are here with their time trying to do things and people are wasting our TIME IN THEIR BEDROOMS. THAT'S UNACCEPTABLE. Can you mute your mic if you're joining uh this conversation? Mute your mic and let's wait for the resource person to finish and be called before you make your comment. Please rude for the resource person. Please let ad to this instruction.

1:17:08 You may continue sir. Sorry sir. So there we were. The MD YSUS report captured the fact that in that expedited scheme of hire between 2000 and 2004, politicians brought their thugs and infiltrated them into the police force, Nigeria police force. And the MD Yu report said that a majority of the hires into the police in that expedited hire were quote criminals. I am not manufacturing this. Go and read the MD YSU report. Those people are now working their way. Those

1:17:53 criminals who were hired are working their way into leadership positions in the police. This is the federal police that we've got now. We could not stop criminals from being infiltrated into the police force by politicians. Politicians are the people who buy guns for their thugs and provide them with protection. And this did not start today. If you go back to the uh Bolar Babalaki Commission of Inquiry report into Feduro which was set up by President General Buhari as head of state and submit in 1984 and submitted

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