The BEST EVER Cumulative Case for God

Brief Summary

The speaker recounts his journey from a devout Catholic upbringing through atheism and agnosticism to belief in theism. He presents a cumulative philosophical case arguing that theism is a reasonably simple and coherent hypothesis that explains a wide range of otherwise surprising features of reality better than naturalism does.

  • Contingency arguments support a necessary foundation for reality, while the universe’s laws, fine-tuning, consciousness, rationality, moral knowledge, beauty, and religious experiences are presented as evidence favoring theism.
  • The speaker responds to objections involving suffering, divine hiddenness, evolution, the multiverse, and alternative non-theistic explanations.
  • He concludes that theism is more probable than its competitors, while noting that further videos will address miracles and the distinctively Catholic case.

Intro and Outline

Joe Schmid introduces a three-video series presenting his case for Catholicism. This first video focuses on natural theology: his personal path from Catholicism through atheism and agnosticism to theism, followed by a cumulative philosophical argument for God’s existence. The series’ later videos are planned to cover miracles, alternative explanations of miraculous claims, objections to Catholicism, and his conversion itself. Schmid directs viewers to a resource document containing further reading and materials, as well as a full script available to patrons.

Catholic Upbringing

Schmid grew up devoutly Catholic. He prayed, read the Bible, attended the sacraments, went to Catholic school, and regularly debated religious and philosophical questions. Learning about evolution in middle school initially unsettled him because he wondered how it fit with the Catholic teaching that humanity’s first parents fell from grace. He later encountered models of theistic evolution, including proposals in which God used evolutionary processes and specially endowed ancestral humans with rational souls and supernatural gifts. These approaches let him retain both Catholicism and evolution for a time.

The Deconversion

In high school, Schmid’s faith deteriorated as he considered the suffering built into evolution: animals endured predation, parasitism, starvation, disease, and natural disasters over immense stretches of time. This seemed more expected under naturalism—a view in which nature is ultimately purposeless and indifferent—than under belief in a perfectly good, powerful God. He also encountered arguments concerning evil, religious diversity, divine hiddenness, and problems in Christianity, including apparent biblical contradictions and troubling Old Testament passages. After extensive research, he concluded that he was a naturalistic atheist, believing the universe was all that existed and that religion was largely a product of social and evolutionary forces.

The Agnostic Turn

Before his final year of high school, Schmid discovered the YouTube channel Worldview Design, where Josh Rasmussen presented arguments for God and engaged seriously with objections. Schmid corresponded with Rasmussen, then read work by Alexander Pruss on contingency, the principle of sufficient reason, modality, and infinity. These arguments challenged his confidence in naturalism. He also realized he had not encountered many serious arguments defended by professional philosophers and had judged the question of God’s existence prematurely. By the start of college, he suspended judgment and remained agnostic through college and his first year of graduate school.

Intro to the Contingency Argument

Schmid explains the distinction between contingent and necessary things. A contingent thing could have failed to exist, while a necessary thing cannot fail to exist; for example, people and ordinary objects are contingent, whereas the truth that 1 + 1 = 2 is necessary. He argues that contingent things plausibly require explanations. An endless chain of contingent causes does not explain why that entire chain exists, just as a chain of shiny spheres would still need an explanation even if it continued infinitely. If contingent things have explanations, their ultimate explanation cannot itself be contingent without assuming the existence it is meant to explain. This points toward a necessary foundation for contingent reality.

The Shift Toward Theism

Three considerations renewed Schmid’s inquiry into theism during graduate school: he became less persuaded by objections to fine-tuning, encountered the argument from psychophysical harmony, and found empirical reports of supernatural phenomena difficult to explain atheistically. He stresses that this video’s philosophical case is not the whole case for Catholicism; later arguments from miracles are intended to provide further evidence. The philosophical arguments still matter because, in his view, a strong case for theism can make someone more receptive to evidence for miracles.

Master Argument for Theism

Schmid’s central argument is Bayesian: theism is not very improbable before empirical evidence is considered, and it predicts the evidence much better than atheism. If a hypothesis has a reasonable prior probability and strongly predicts the data, then the data make that hypothesis probable. He argues that theism is simple, coherent, and non-arbitrary, rather than an implausible hypothesis requiring an extremely low starting probability. The argument’s two main premises are that theism has a reasonable intrinsic probability and that it explains or predicts the evidence better than naturalism.

First Premise: Theism’s Intrinsic Probability

The intrinsic probability, or prior, of a hypothesis is its probability before empirical evidence is taken into account. Schmid uses comparisons such as spatial uniformity versus a universe with an unexplained anomalous patch, and temporal uniformity versus laws that arbitrarily stop applying in 2050. Both alternatives might fit present observations, but uniformity seems more probable because it is simpler, more compressible, and less arbitrary. He identifies modesty, simplicity, non-arbitrariness, and coherence as factors affecting a hypothesis’s intrinsic probability. Theism, understood as a fundamental mind unlimited in power, knowledge, and goodness, is immodest in what it rules out but may compensate through its simple, unified, and coherent account of ultimate reality. He presents several ways of unifying the divine attributes, including deriving them from perfection, limitless mentality, or a basic orientation toward value.

Objections to the First Premise

A central objection says naturalism must be simpler because it posits only the natural universe, whereas theism adds God. Schmid replies that counting entities alone does not determine simplicity: a theory with more entities can be simpler at its fundamental level if it explains complex data through a compact underlying principle. Solipsism and the “short past” hypothesis illustrate how apparently simpler accounts can require a complicated, coincidental collection of unexplained facts. He argues that theism may unify data that naturalism must accept as separate brute coincidences. He also maintains that theism need not prove that its divine attributes are likely fundamental; it is enough that there is a non-negligible chance that they are, or that they follow from a simpler foundational attribute.

Second Premise: Evidence for Theism

A fact supports a hypothesis when it is more likely under that hypothesis than under its rival. Schmid illustrates this with DNA at a crime scene: it is evidence of guilt because it is more expected if the person committed the crime. He then lays out the evidence he will examine: contingency, laws of nature, nomological harmony, fine-tuning, psychophysical luck, non-skepticism, moral and other a priori knowledge, beauty, and religious experience. He begins by comparing theism mainly with naturalistic atheism, then considers non-naturalistic alternatives.

Contingency

Schmid restates a more modest contingency argument: for any contingent thing, there is at least a defeasible presumption that it has an explanation, meaning an explanation is reasonable to expect unless there is evidence against one. Applied to contingent reality as a whole, this supports the probable existence of a necessary foundation and reduces the probability of views that deny any such foundation. He argues that a necessary foundation is more naturally understood as unlimited than as a limited deity or an initial singularity with arbitrary finite properties. He also replies that a necessary being can explain contingent things without making them necessary: its explanation could involve a free choice among possible outcomes rather than a deterministic process.

Laws of Nature

Even if contingent reality exists, it need not contain laws governing how its contents change. A universe might instead have lawless initial conditions that remain static or evolve chaotically. Schmid argues that laws are more expected under theism because orderly development makes valuable outcomes—such as conscious life, knowledge, love, virtue, agency, and relationships—possible. This argument depends on rejecting “Humeanism” about laws, the view that laws are merely summaries of patterns in spacetime. Schmid notes that under many non-Humean views, including governing-law and powers-based theories, a universe without laws remains conceivable.

Nomological Harmony

Nomological harmony is the fact that the laws of nature match the universe’s contents so that the laws can govern those contents and produce change over time. Schmid compares this to a game whose rulebook fits the pieces on its board; a mismatch between laws and physical contents would leave the universe unable to evolve in the way ours does. He argues that the match is highly fortunate under naturalism but unsurprising if a good God seeks a world containing valuable outcomes. He considers three theories of laws: Humeanism, the powers theory, and the governing view. In his account, Humeanism faces problems including circular explanation, disagreement about what laws exist, and a “cosmic coincidence” problem; the powers theory relocates the issue to why the relevant powers fit the actual contents; and governing-law theories still face the original matching problem. Proposals involving vast ensembles of laws or universes may incur costs in simplicity, lack support from standard physics, or generate skeptical scenarios involving short-lived observer duplicates.

Fine-Tuning

Fine-tuning refers to the fact that the universe’s laws, constants, and initial conditions fall within ranges that permit life and other valuable phenomena. Schmid distinguishes fine-tuned law structures from fine-tuned constants and initial conditions, and also discusses fine-tuning for discoverability and an a priori version of the argument. He argues that countless simpler laws would produce barren, static, chaotic, or trivial universes, while the actual laws permit complex, evolving structures. The cosmological constant is a key example: a value roughly one part in 10¹²⁰ larger would prevent stable structures from forming, while a comparable decrease would cause rapid collapse. Physicist Luke Barnes estimates that, taking relevant factors together, the chance of a life-permitting universe under naturalism is below one in 10¹³⁶. Schmid also presents evidence that certain parameters may make the universe unusually discoverable by scientific observers, and argues that the universe’s coherent, value-supporting history is more expected under theism than under purposeless chance.

Seventeen Objections to Fine-Tuning

Schmid responds to seventeen objections to fine-tuning. The puddle analogy fails because a puddle conforms to whatever hole it occupies, whereas life cannot exist outside a narrow life-permitting range. The anthropic principle—our inability to observe a universe incompatible with our existence—does not show that the observed constants are equally likely under theism and naturalism; survival after a firing squad would still be evidence of intentional intervention. The argument is not limited to carbon-based life, and Bayesian reasoning can assess unique events without relying solely on repeated samples or frequentist probability. It requires conceptual alternatives for the constants, not proof that each alternative is metaphysically possible.

Schmid argues that saying the constants are necessary does not automatically remove the evidence: a general claim that their actual values are necessary does not explain why those values fall in the life-permitting range, while specifying that these exact values are necessary carries a correspondingly low prior. He also rejects the idea that God requires fine-tuning, since God is not a composite object made of narrowly calibrated parts. Other objections—such as the claim that life has no objective value, that the universe is mostly lifeless, or that a designer’s intentions are unspecified—are addressed by arguing that theism need not make life overwhelmingly probable, that several plausible goods may explain a sparse universe, and that an all-good God can be expected to favor valuable outcomes. He further argues that limitations on probability measures, appeals to the principle of indifference, deeper laws, and multiverse hypotheses do not remove all fine-tuning evidence. In particular, standard multiverse proposals do not explain discoverability or the selection of life-permitting law structures, and may invite Boltzmann-brain and skeptical problems.

Psychophysical Luck

Psychophysical luck is the collection of fortunate ways consciousness is linked to physical reality. Schmid first explains dualism, the view that consciousness and matter are fundamentally distinct, and contrasts it with physicalism. If dualism is true, psychophysical laws specify which physical states are associated with which experiences. He argues that such laws are surprising under naturalism because consciousness enables valuable things such as love, enjoyment, knowledge, and rational agency, but less surprising under theism.

He then introduces psychonomic harmony: the fact that the psychophysical principles pair consciousness with physical states that actually occur. They could instead have linked consciousness only to impossible arrangements, nonexistent matter, or states never realized in our universe. A third group of facts concerns the ways consciousness is connected to value: our perceptions generally correspond to the environment, our feelings and actions tend to align rationally, and our conscious lives avoid an overwhelming proliferation of overlapping subjects. Schmid argues that these features are improbable under naturalism but expected if God intends to create conscious beings capable of valuable lives.

Eight Objections to Psychophysical Luck

Schmid argues that natural selection cannot explain psychophysical harmony because evolution selects physical behaviors and structures, not which experiences are paired with them. If the psychophysical mapping had been different while the physical processes remained the same, evolution could have proceeded identically but produced experiences that were chaotic, unhelpful, or inverted. He maintains that this problem persists on dualist, panpsychist, and most physicalist views; even if psychophysical identities are metaphysically necessary, alternative mappings remain epistemically conceivable.

He addresses further objections involving physicalism, phenomenal powers, normative roles, multiverses, imperfect or disharmonious experiences, God’s own supposed “psychophysical luck,” and Philip Goff’s rational panagentialism. He contends that appeals to necessary psychophysical principles do not eliminate the evidence, that conscious qualities need not automatically produce their familiar physical effects, and that standard multiverse models do not vary the psychophysical rules. Imperfections in memory or perception, he argues, do not outweigh the broader evidence that mental life is highly orderly and useful. Rational panagentialism, the proposal that fundamental matter responds rationally to experience, is said to relocate the mystery to the microphysical level and fail to explain how rational micro-experiences yield harmonious human-scale experiences and subjects.

Non-Skepticism

Schmid argues that it is striking that human beings avoid many possible skeptical scenarios, including deception by spirits, simulations that began recently or may soon end, Boltzmann brains, disembodied minds, philosophical zombies, and arbitrary breakdowns in the laws of nature. These possibilities threaten knowledge of the past, future, external world, other minds, and science. He compares their shared feature to the presence of several Inuit people at the same street corner: separate explanations for each case may be possible, but a common explanation is more satisfying. Theism, he argues, unifies the fact that people generally do not occupy skeptical scenarios: God would be unlikely to create a world that systematically frustrates human knowledge and flourishing.

Beauty and Aesthetic Experience

Schmid lists the variety of beauty found in nature, organisms, deep space, landscapes, mathematics, music, architecture, art, cultures, and ideas. He argues that the world could have been aesthetically dull while still containing conscious beings, so its abundance of beauty is more surprising under naturalism than theism. God could have reason to create beauty because it is valuable, can draw people toward God, and displays intelligence and creative power. The existence of beings capable of appreciating beauty is also not guaranteed by evolution. Responding to ugliness as counterevidence, Schmid draws on Augustine’s idea that apparently ugly parts may contribute to a beautiful whole, and argues that ugliness can create contrast, enable aesthetic development, or serve other goods.

Religious Experience

Schmid presents accounts of people who reported experiences of God, Jesus, saints, angels, or heaven. Examples include a person who became Catholic after praying for the intercession of Mary and Augustine and then dreaming in Latin about the saints; a former leader of a Satanic organization who reported encountering Jesus; a man who attributed a woman’s recovery to a Hail Mary he had prayed; a child who said Jesus showed him heaven and instructed him to be baptized before a fatal illness; a couple who described seeing a luminous figure of Christ; and a motorcyclist whose crash was reportedly anticipated by a warning received by another driver. Schmid does not present these stories as a complete proof of Catholicism, but as examples of religious experiences and apparent corroborations that occur widely.

He argues that such experiences are more expected if God seeks relationships with people. He also discusses Richard Swinburne’s principles: people are generally justified in trusting how things seem to them unless they have a defeater, and testimony about others’ experiences can also be trusted absent a defeater. In response to objections, Schmid argues that religious experiences do not always directly contradict one another, that many are corroborated by other people or events, that neurological correlates do not prove they are false, and that the absence of religious experience in some people does not cancel the evidence from those who report it.

Summary of the Evidence

Schmid brings together the preceding arguments as a cumulative case. Contingency points toward a necessary foundation, while laws, nomological harmony, fine-tuning, psychophysical order, non-skepticism, moral and a priori knowledge, beauty, and religious experiences are presented as distinctively favorable to theism. He argues that these facts form a pattern of “fortunate coincidences” that naturalism must treat separately or leave unexplained, while theism offers a unified explanation. He compares the explanatory role of theism to evolution, which explains many otherwise separate biological patterns through one framework. He also claims that evidence against theism, especially evil and hiddenness, is less independent than the positive evidence: once one major problem has been considered, other forms of suffering or apparent deficiency may be less surprising under the remaining theistic hypotheses.

Evidence Against Theism

Schmid acknowledges that the problem of evil, divine hiddenness, and religious diversity may provide evidence against theism. He argues that the cumulative evidence for theism can outweigh it, and that a range of non-negligibly probable theodicies—explanations of why God permits evil—can reduce how surprising suffering is under theism. These include the goods of free will, opportunities to help others, self-sacrificial love, virtue-building, and redemption. He also appeals to modest skeptical theism: given the gap between human and divine understanding, God may have reasons for permitting some evils that humans do not recognize, without implying that all evidence about God is inscrutable.

The Problem of Evil

Schmid lists possible goods that may require or make serious suffering more likely: morally significant freedom, opportunities to improve others’ welfare, costly love, and virtues such as courage, compassion, mercy, patience, and resilience. Christian doctrines of incarnation, redemption, and atonement are also presented as goods that may be connected to humanity’s estrangement from God. He argues that humans may not be able to assess the full value of a world whose history and possible afterlife extend beyond what they can observe. A modest form of skeptical theism therefore weakens the inference from apparently pointless suffering to atheism, while leaving open that sufficiently extreme patterns of suffering could still count against theism.

Hiddenness and religious diversity

Schmid argues that hiddenness and religious disagreement are not fully independent from the problem of evil, since a God who permits great suffering might also permit periods of non-belief and confusion. He suggests that religious diversity can create opportunities for people to help one another find truth, form deeper relationships, and develop perseverance, humility, courage, and faith. Non-belief may also coexist with an implicit relationship to God that later becomes explicit; Schmid sees his own decade away from faith as having increased his empathy for nonbelievers and his appreciation of religious arguments. He adds that Catholic teaching does not condemn people merely for non-culpably belonging to another religion and holds that God gives all people sufficient grace for salvation, though the manner is known to God. These considerations, he says, do not eliminate the evidence from hiddenness or diversity but reduce its force.

Non-Naturalistic Alternatives to Theism

Schmid compares theism with non-naturalistic alternatives, including axiarchism, teleological laws, the simulation hypothesis, and limited-God views. He says such alternatives often explain less of the evidence, unify it less effectively, have lower intrinsic probability because of complexity or arbitrariness, collapse into theism, or lead to skepticism. Axiarchism holds that reality exists because its existence is good, but Schmid considers this explanation incomplete unless a mind chooses to bring about the good; he also argues that axiarchism may make God’s existence more probable. Teleological laws—laws directing the universe toward value—cannot explain the existence of physical laws, contingency, or many forms of psychophysical harmony unless they are made fundamental in a way that approaches axiarchism.

The simulation hypothesis leaves unanswered questions about the base reality and may undermine confidence in the past, distant places, and other people if they are not included in the simulation. It also relocates problems involving fine-tuning, moral knowledge, and psychophysical harmony to the simulators. Limited-God views face a tradeoff: vague limits make them poor at predicting evidence, while precise limits are arbitrary and lower their prior probability. If a limited God can explain the positive evidence for theism, Schmid argues, that God may also be capable of addressing evil and hiddenness, making the proposed limitation less helpful. He concludes that these alternatives are inferior to theism in explanatory power, coherence, or probability.

Summary: The Master Argument for Theism

Schmid restates his conclusion: theism is not especially improbable before empirical evidence because it is reasonably simple, coherent, and non-arbitrary. It also predicts the total evidence better than the most intrinsically plausible versions of atheism, while alternatives that predict the evidence similarly well are said to have much lower prior probabilities. Therefore, he concludes, theism is probably true. He ends by saying that the next stage of his broader case will present what he considers even stronger evidence: miracles, including miracles he believes support Catholicism specifically.

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Transcript

Full transcript of “The BEST EVER Cumulative Case for God”. Click a timestamp to open the video at that moment. Need another video? Use the YouTube transcript generator.

0:00 Sup dogs. Welcome back to the Majesty of Reason. I'm Joe Schmid, a philosophy PhD candidate at Princeton University. And today I'm presenting a comprehensive case for Catholicism. You may have seen my recent video in which I announced my conversion to Catholicism. After losing the faith of my youth and becoming an atheist, I studied these topics for about a decade before giving my life to Christ and his church. My aim here is to take you on a similar journey. Specifically, my goal is to take you all the way from atheism to Catholicism. I'd encourage you to watch the whole thing, even if you need to break it up into chunks. There's going to be a lot of awesome evidence for theism and Catholicism that you've probably never heard of. And later on, I'll issue a challenge directly to you. So, hear me

0:48 out because this video might just set you on a beautiful new path. God. All of the To give you a sense of where we're going and what you're in for, here is an

1:33 overview of our journey together. So, first I'll talk about my Catholic upbringing, after which I will talk about my deconversion from Catholicism and my turn towards atheism. Then I'll talk about my turn towards agnosticism and what induced that. after which I'll talk about my turn towards theism. What sorts of considerations led me to start taking theism a lot more seriously. After that I'll talk about my shift towards theism. And there I'm going to be giving my comprehensive philosophical case for theism. So that'll be a very substantive and very fun part. After that we get to even stronger evidence for God's existence and for Christianity and for Catholicism than even my philosophical case for theism in part five. There we're going to be talking about miracles and the evidence not just for miracles but for miracles that seem

2:20 to vindicate distinctive Catholic doctrines. Miracles that only seem to make sense if Catholicism is true. After talking about miracles, I'll go through my biggest objections to Catholicism. Almost certainly some of your biggest objections to Catholicism too are going to be contained therein. That'll be in part six, barrier removal. After that, I'll just talk about some key realizations that I had throughout my conversion process that ultimately culminated in my conversion. But of course, conversion is not just a change of mind. It is also a change in heart. So, in part eight, I will be talking about the various factors about Catholicism and Christianity that kind of resonated with me on an existential level. The sorts of considerations that led my heart to change and not just my mind to change. In part nine, I will relatively briefly talk about the

3:05 metaninoia, the complete turning, the complete 180, my my conversion itself. In part 10, I will give my challenge to you. And finally, in part 11, I shall conclude. Okay, y'all. This is Joe postrecording. It turns out I recorded the entire comprehensive case video, and it was 25 hours long. So, what that means is that I've got to break it down into three separate videos. So that outline that I just went through, that's not going to be the outline of this particular video. The outline of this particular video is just going to be my comprehensive cumulative case for God's existence from philosophy alone. So I'll be going through the Catholic upbringing, my decon conversion, my turn toward agnosticism, and then my shift towards theism. And so this will just be the the comprehensive case for theism.

3:51 This is my natural theology part of my comprehensive case. That's going to be in this video. My second video, which should be coming out tomorrow, is going to be my comprehensive case for the Catholic miracles. It's going to be around 11 hours, and I'm just going to systematically comb through all the miracles and the vindicatory implications thereof. So, that's a second video in this comprehensive case. And then the third video, which should hopefully come out by Friday, is just going to be me going through firstly alternative explanations of the miraculous data and explaining why they don't work. So, I'll look at demonic explanations that some Protestants profer. I'll look at some kind of accommodationist approaches, appeals to a selection effect, and various other puditive explanations that ultimately fail. And then I'll just go through all the different barriers that I had to Catholicism like hell and my moral

4:37 problems and my magisterial problems and my theological problems and various other problems. I'll then go through some key realizations that I had and then the existential resonance, my actual conversion, my challenge to you guys that I'll be issuing. And then finally, I will conclude in that third video. So, this is going to be a three video series and that means the burden's on you guys to share the videos with everyone. Now, before we embark on our journey, note that I put together a comprehensive resource document containing links to papers and books and videos and articles and some of my own notes on the arguments I'll be covering in this video. Definitely check the link in the description and pinned comment to that document that'll contain ample links to resources that explain and defend in more detail parts of the video. Trust me, check it out. Oh, and of course, patrons have access to my

5:22 videos over 300page long script. So, if you'd like that or if you'd like to support my work, my Patreon is in the description. Thank you from my uh certified grifter heart. So, I grew up devoutly Catholic. I was totally on board with the faith. I prayed very regularly. I read the Bible. I frequented the sacraments. I had theology classes almost every day at Catholic school. My dad played Catholic radio every day on the rides to and from school. And I've been extensively debating people online about ethics and theology and philosophy ever since I got my iPod touch in fourth grade. I was uh totally locked in as the youths say. But

6:09 when I learned about evolution in seventh or eighth grade at my Catholic school, I started to wonder how it was compatible with Catholicism. Catholics seem committed to some primordial fall by which our first parents disobeyed God, lost friendship with him, and passed on various effects of that fall to the subsequent generations. For some time, I was struggling to coherently combine these views with a historical picture given to us by science. Soon enough, though, I was introduced to several reasonable models for harmonizing the truths of faith and science. Thanks to the Bologos Institute and Francis Collins, I learned about theistic evolution. The view that God used the evolutionary process to create biological diversity in general and humans in particular, there different models for understanding Adam and Eve. For instance, maybe God chose two of our ancestral organisms within a larger population and specially infused them with rational immortal souls enjoying

6:54 various supernatural gifts or graces. And there are lots of other more liberal proposals to boot. Um, but all in all, I had survived the first wobble in my faith. I could see reasonable ways to maintain both evolution and Catholicism, but that survival didn't last very long. Near the end of my freshman year in high school, my faith began to deteriorate. I started reflecting more deeply on the evolutionary process and its brutality really troubled me. For hundreds of millions of years, animals have been ripping each other to shreds and predation, parasetizing one another and

7:41 languishing from starvation, dehydration, disease, and natural disaster. It seemed like the very mechanism, the very engine of God's creative process was eons upon eons of suffering and death and languishing on the part of innocent animals. animals who didn't deserve that suffering, many of whom didn't seem to benefit from it, at least at first glance, and where God easily could have created through much less gruesome means. How could this be the creative choice of a perfectly good, perfectly loving, all powerful God, I wondered. At the time, I didn't find satisfactory answers, and the data here seemed much better explained by naturalism or naturalistic atheism, the view that the natural world is all that exists. And fundamentally or ultimately,

8:27 it's purposeless. As Richard Dawkins puts it, there is at bottom no design, no purpose, nothing but blind, pitiles indifference. If naturalism is true, ultimate reality is not aimed or directed towards any end or goal. And so, in particular, it doesn't care about the flourishing and languishing of sensient creatures, making it seem to me unsurprising that reality would basically be a bloodbath. By contrast, that seemed way more surprising to me if theism is true and there's a perfectly good God providentially orchestrating reality. Evolutionary animal suffering then seemed to me at the time at least to be very strong evidence for atheism. So the problem of evolutionary animal suffering deeply disturbed my faith. And soon enough I was just voraciously consuming articles and books and videos

9:13 and blogs and podcasts about God's existence and religion and everything in that neighborhood. I came across Sam Harris and Richard Dawkins who emphasized the disorienting contingency in my religious beliefs, right? Like had I been born a few blocks down, I would have been Protestant and had I been born in Saudi Arabia, I would have been a Muslim. You know, I started to think that I didn't have particularly good grounds to accept Catholicism. I graduated from the New Atheists in sophomore year after watching a debate between Frank Turk and Jeff Louderder on God's existence. I was impressed at the time with Jeff Louderder's case for naturalistic atheism which mainly drew inspiration from the work of Paul Draper who was actually one of my letter writers from grad school as I got to study under him in college. I love you so much Paul. So I then read a bunch of Draper stuff uh in high school. I

9:59 listened to a lot of philosophy podcasts and soon enough the problems for theism and Catholicism were mounting. I worried about the problem of evil more generally. You know, if God exists, why is there so much seemingly pointless suffering and evil in the world? Why is there such horrendous suffering and atrocious evil like the Holocaust or torture chambers or a fawn being burned to death in a forest fire? And why does the distribution of suffering seem kind of random? I worried about the problem of religious confusion. If God exists, why is there massive religious diversity and confusion, especially if God wants a relationship with us? The world contains thousands of religions with competing claims about God's existence, nature, character, desires for our lives and the appropriate ways of relating to God and achieving salvation. God seemed inept at conveying matters of dire and eternal

10:45 significance. Relatedly, I worried about divine hiddenness. I and others seemed open to God's existence. We didn't seem resistant to God, and we didn't seem culpable for being persuaded by the various arguments for atheism. But if God is perfectly loving, he'd want a personal relationship with his beloved creatures. And so, he would ensure that there's no one who doesn't meet the necessary conditions for a relationship with him through no fault of their own. But then we would expect God to ensure that there are no non-resistant or non-culpable non-believers. But it seemed to me like there were at least some people like that. During this process, I also lost most of my positive grounds for thinking God exists. It didn't seem like we needed God to explain anything and it seemed simpler to do away with God in our theorizing about the world. And finally, I started

11:31 to accumulate difficulties for Christianity specifically. You know, apparent contradictions in the Bible, seeming atrocities in the Old Testament like genocide and slavery and so on and so on and and so on, etc., right? I put all my research and argumentation about this stuff in a Google doc that I worked on near the end of nth grade and throughout 10th grade which I still have by the way. Um near the end of 10th grade it was 456 pages long. Uh suffice it to say that uh by the end of this process after accumulating all these objections and losing my grounds for belief I lost my faith in Catholicism and at some point around the end of 10th grade I became a naturalistic atheist. I thought God didn't exist and that the

12:17 cosmos was all that ever was, is, and will be. I thought this view made the best sense of the evidence. The world seemed too cruel, indifferent, and arbitrary to be the product of a perfectly good, all powerful, all- knowing being. Religions seemed like socioultural byproducts, burped up for evolutionary reasons and maintained by indoctrination and the need for belonging, community, and social cohesion. Religious texts felt all too human, and the world didn't look anything like I would expect a perfect being to make. It looked at bottom blind, pitiles, and indifferent.

13:09 But in the summer before my senior year of high school, things started to change. I stumbled across a YouTube channel called Worldview Design and watched a few of its videos. I was fascinated by what I found. I mean, the creator was like forwarding genuinely novel arguments for God's existence, defending them exceptionally well, anticipating my objections in the videos and cogently but lovingly responding to them. I mean, I mean, I landed on a gold mine, it seems. After binge watching his videos for a couple days, I formulated several objections to the arguments contained therein. And, you know, I figured that the creator might be willing to talk about them. So, I decided to send him an email. And as you can see on screen, this is the actual email that I sent him with my old email account naturalistically inclined. So you can see my views at the time. Wow, look at that date. Summer of 2018.

13:58 Wow. Hello, Dr. Rasmmanson. Oh yes, indeed. Oh yes. I have spent the last two days binge watch. See, you guys, I'm not lying to you. I still I got the receipts. I spent I spent the last two days binge watching your YouTube channel videos and I found them very valuable and provocative. That being said, I have some, you know, questions regarding some of your work and I really hope you can answer them or provide some clarity for me. Okay. So, you know, what followed were several detailed paragraphs outlining my central misgivings for the arguments Josh presented on his channel. And to my delight, I soon received Josh's extensive and modest answers to my various questions. Naturally enough, I had follow-up questions, and Josh had follow-up answers. And by the end of the year, we were just extensively

14:43 corresponding on a very regular basis. He introduced me to his book, Necessary Existence with Alex Puce, which in turn introduced me to Alex Puce's work more generally, and Alex was just like a huge intellectual influence on me. You know, I read his book on the principle of sufficient reason. I read his book about the metaphysics of modality. I read his book on infinity paradoxes. I I I basically couldn't get enough of of his work. Josh was also starting to make appearances on capturing Christianity and other channels. And so, you know, I was definitely keeping up with YouTube philosophy religion during this time as well. And, you know, combing through all this material by Puce and Rasmuson in my senior year, it kind of just like awakened me from my dogmatic naturalist slumbers, I started to find their

15:28 arguments for a foundational or ultimate or fundamental necessarily existing being quite compelling. You can learn more about these in my contingency arguments playlist as I continued to be sympathetic with them past high school and of course still now. But here's a basic simplified version of one of their contingency arguments. A contingent thing is something that can fail to exist. It doesn't have to be in reality. There's some possible way that reality could be such that it doesn't exist. So for instance, you and me are contingent things, right? Like had our parents never met, we wouldn't have existed. My water bottle is a contingent thing. You know, it's not like my water bottle must exist. In fact, there was a time when it didn't exist and it'll eventually be destroyed. Contrast these with something

16:14 like, you know, 1 plus 1 equals 2. This is a necessary truth. It couldn't fail to be true. It must be true. There's no possible world in which it's false. In which, you know, 1 plus 1 equals like 7,812. In other words, there's no comprehensive way that reality could be such that that claim is false. Likewise, a necessarily existing thing or a necessary thing is something that cannot fail to exist. It's its non-existence is impossible. It must be in reality. You can think of it as something whose nature almost like demands that it exist. Just like the very nature of the number one and addition and equality guarantees or demands that 1 plus 1 equals 2. Well, for any contingent things, it seems

16:59 plausible that there is an explanation of their existence. You know, suppose you and a friend are hiking in the forest and come across a group of shiny spheres on the ground. Naturally, you'd wonder how they came to be there. If your friend said, "Well, hey, like, listen, there's no reason or explanation for why they're here. You know, their existence is just an unexplained or brute fact. Like, you just stop wondering. Like, they just are. They just exist." I mean, if he said that, you you'd probably think that, you know, he's lost the plot or, you know, he's pulling a trick or he's gone insane or something, right? Like, it seems like their existence needs explaining. They didn't have to exist, and they certainly didn't have to be in the forest or be shiny or be spherical or have that exact size. It seems like these facts need explanation. And that spheres would still need explanation if they were larger, for example, the size of a

17:46 stadium or even the size of the whole universe. In fact, they'd call out for explanation even more if they were like that. And even if they were produced by earlier shiny spheres, we would be left none the wiser since we would rightly wonder where those spheres came from. Even an infinite regress of shiny spheres replicating for all eternity wouldn't remove the need for explanation since the whole infinite series of shiny spheres would call out for explanation, right? Like why is there that series when there easily could have been a different series of dole spheres or shiny cubes or marshmallows or no infinite series at all? So positing that the shiny spheres are the size of the universe or produce each other one after another for all eternity doesn't seem to remove the need for an explanation of their existence. And there doesn't seem to be a relevant difference between the

18:32 spheres and other sorts of contingent things that could account for why the former but not the latter need explanation. Plausibly then for any contingent things there's an explanation for their existence. And this makes intuitive sense, you know, like both the existence and non-existence of a given contingent thing or plurality of contingent things are real genuine possibilities. And yet only one of those genuine possibilities is actual as opposed to the other. And that seems to demand some account, some reason as to why it does exist when reality easily could have been such that it didn't. This explanatory principle is also just like abundantly confirmed by our universal experience, right? Like when we encounter contingent things in our experience, every which way we look, they uniformly have explanations,

19:17 including quantum particles that indeterministically fluctuate into existence in a law governed way from causally prior conditions. And this offers strong inductive support for the principle too. And you know, just more generally, the principle just very nicely accounts for our observations. You know, like if this explanatory principle is false, like why on earth do we consistently and repeatedly find that contingent things have explanations and never stumble across violations of the principle? Like if contingent things really could exist without any deeper explanation, why don't we witness chaos? Like like bunches of photons, say popping into existence inexplicably on my front porch or all manner of contingent chaos inexplicably existing from eternity past. The explanatory principle provides a nice account of why inexplicable chaos doesn't pervade reality which otherwise seem to me to be a mystery. Flusters like Alex Puce and

20:04 Rob Coons have also argued that denying the explanatory principle has disastrous skeptical implications that undermine our empirical knowledge. Uh, one reason beyond those they give uh is that you know if it really were a live possibility that contingent things exist inexplicably then it would also be a live possibility that inexplicably there exist universes causally disconnected from our own which are filled with brains that duplicate your brain structure and dynamics for a very short period of time before fizzling out of existence. But if that's a live possibility, then it's a live possibility we have no empirical knowledge and no knowledge of the future, which is absurd. Because if it's a live possibility that a large proportion of observers who are indistinguishable from you from a first-p person perspective are radically deceived, then that would just undermine your knowledge of the empirical world.

20:49 But of course, we do have lots of knowledge of the empirical world. So it can't be a live possibility that contingent things exist inexplicably. And in that case we can be highly confident that the explanatory principle behind the contingency argument is true. Now there are lots of other arguments for the explanatory principle besides you know you can see the books and papers on screen for more and together the arguments made it really plausible to me that contingent things both individuals and groups thereof have explanations. But considering all the contingent things that exist if there's an explanation of their existence it seemed that some necessary thing must exist. After all, nothing contingent could explain why anything contingent exists. It would invoke as part of our explanation the very thing for which we're seeking an explanation to begin with. It would be like appealing to a

21:36 penguin to explain why all the penguins exist. Like no, like that fails to explain why all the penguins exist since it simply assumes rather than explains the existence of the penguin cited in the explanation. From these premises, it follows that some necessary thing exists which explains contingent things. So that's the first stage of reasoning of a simplified form of one of Puce and Rasmuson's arguments. They have lots of other contingency arguments with more modest premises that introduce possibility operators and use modal logic. And I also found those super interesting and quite reasonable too. But even if there's a necessary thing which explains contingent things, it doesn't follow that such a thing is God. That's where the second stage of contingency arguments comes in, which tries to identify such a thing with God.

22:23 In high school and college, I found the second stage reasoning interesting and thoughtprovoking, but ultimately not fully convincing. Still, I could see some plausibility to it. So, it was getting harder to maintain my confident naturalism. I could see why people think the necessary thing would have to be non-physical or immaterial, right? Like physical and material things seem contingent and no physical thing seems relevantly dissimilar to contingent physical things that could account for why one would be necessary while the others are contingent. I could see why one should posit only one necessary entity since that's much simpler and less arbitrary than other numbers and only one seems needed to explain contingency. And while I wasn't fully convinced at the time, I could definitely see where Josh was coming from when he argued that the necessary

23:08 thing would be unlimited in value. According to Josh, it had at least some value given that it has various valuable powers to produce lots of good things. And any finite cutoff in value would seem to be an arbitrary unexplained cutoff. That alone seemed somewhat problematic. But it also just seems problematic to posit brute unexplained necessary features of things, especially ones that seem highly arbitrary and could conceivably be different in hordes of ways. The same reasoning would motivate thinking this reality has unlimited power, too. I mean, after all, it has some power. You know, it made contingent things after all. And a finite arbitrary cut off in power seemed problematic for the reasons already noted. More generally, it just didn't seem plausible that the necessary foundation could be say, you know, like a turtle or the shape of a Disney

23:54 princess or a football. Like all these things have arbitrary seeming limits in shape and size and location and duration and power and whatnot. But arbitrary limits like that seem to call out for deeper explanation. Like why does the limit have that value? Like why that shape or size? Why that precise duration or location? And if arbitrary limits have further explanations, then the basic attributes of this necessary foundation precisely because they have no further explanation because this is the ultimate explanatory stopping point of reality must be unlimited. And this meshes far better with theism than standard alternative hypothesis as theism posits a being of unlimited perfection at the foundation of reality. And there are still other reasons for thinking the necessary foundation is God. You know, like given that this

24:40 foundation necessarily exists and is the ultimate source of contingency in the actual world, it's very natural to think that in any other possible world contingent things, it would also be the source of contingency therein. Especially if we grant that contingent things in any world have an explanation and there's only one necessary foundational thing. But then the foundation not only necessarily exists, but is necessarily the ultimate source of every contingent thing. That alone rules out most views incompatible with God's existence and is exceptionally well predicted by theism. What's more, if this foundation has the ability to bring about any possible state of affairs, that's at least very good evidence of omnipotence. I also had sympathies with combining stage one of the contingency argument with an inference to the best explanation of

25:25 various observed features of the cosmos, as you can see in my devil's advocate debate on capturing Christianity from 2020. The second reason is that um this immaterial non-physical necessary being is what is explaining the wonderful world of contingent things we find ourselves in. In itself, this is a core tenate of theism. But more importantly, given that the world is intelligible, orderly regular consistent rationally investigable and contains massive amounts of stunning beauty, we have reason to think that this non-physical necessary being that accounts for such a world is more like a craftsman or an artist than some impersonal chancy process. The inference can in fact be put in basian terms. On the craftsman hypothesis, the type of contingent world we see is expected or at least not very improbable. Uh but under the negation of the craftsman hypothesis, it's quite

26:11 unexpected. So all in all, I felt some pressure to accept that there was a single necessarily existing non-physical immaterial foundational entity with unlimited value and unlimited power which is the ultimate source of contingency not only in this world but in any world in which contingency exists and which may very well be intelligent and might even be perfect. Again, at the time in high school while I was coming across this stuff and, you know, early on in college, I wasn't fully convinced by this stage 2 reasoning, but I thought there's like a decent chance that these or other stage two arguments worked. And that admission naturally pushed me to take theism a lot more seriously to the point that it was starting to become a live option again and not something I could confidently rule out. Other new arguments for theism that I came across had this effect on me as well. For

26:57 example, in his 2018 book, Alexander Prof developed various arguments for causal finitism, the view that nothing can have infinitely many causes, which pretty swiftly delivers the conclusion that there's a first cause, after which we can run various stage two arguments for thinking that such a cause is God. Rob Coons was also working on arguments to the same effect, and Josh Rasmmanson has made further developments since. We have here the three gigachads of new theism. There's multiple other gigachads to add to the list, but those will come on later. to take just one example of some of these new and interesting arguments that I was coming across. Um, Kun and Rasmmanson argued that infinite causal regresses lead to viciously circular explanations. If we imagine for example an infinite regress of alternating black and white dominoes knocking each other over, we might find it plausible that the explanation for

27:43 why there are fallen white dominoes is that the black dominoes fell and knocked them over, right? And yet the explanation moreover for why there are fallen black dominoes is that the white dominoes fell and knocked them over. But then the falling of white dominoes at least partially explains itself, right? Because it partially explains why the black dominoes fell, which in turn partially explains why the white dominoes fell. And it seems like explanation is transitive. In other words, if A explains B and B explains C, then A explains C. But then the falling of white dominoes at least partly explains itself which is absurd. And this viciously circular explanatory structure is shared by any infinite causal regress since we can imagine labeling the alternative nodes of the regress with black and white labels and

28:29 you know the white nodes will partially explain the black nodes which will partially explain the white nodes. So again like late in high school early college I was starting to see reasons for thinking there's some first cause. Again, I wasn't fully convinced of stage two of these arguments at the time, which tries to identify the first cause with God or anything like that. But again, I thought that there were some reasons for identifying the first cause with God, which had to be weighed against my reasons for thinking that no God exists. I also read Puce's book on modality, and therein he made a reasonable case that a distinctively theistic account of metaphysical modality has lots of advantages over rival theories of metaphysical modality. And so my reasons for theism were really starting to mount. Of course, you know, there were lots of other arguments for theism that started

29:14 weighing on my mind. For instance, in my why am I agnostic video, I covered both an opori fine-tuning argument as well as an argument from moral knowledge for theism that kind of pulled on me at the time. But I'll talk more about these in the next part of the video since, you know, a greater appreciation of their force in grad school played a role in my shift towards theism. And again, right now, recall, we're only talking about the considerations that pushed me towards agnosticism from a state of naturalistic atheism. And importantly, it wasn't just the first order arguments that decreased my confidence in atheism. It was also the fact that I literally stumbled upon like a halfozen arguments for theism that I had never come across, that lots of professional philosophers and scientists were rigorously defending, and that I found reasonable. And this indicated that I hadn't taken into account lots of

30:01 pieces of evidence that bear on the question of God's existence. And so I was premature in judging that God didn't exist. I was also extensively interacting with theists who are obviously much smarter and more well read than me. Indeed, these were esteemed professional philosophers who could eat my arguments for lunch. So I figured that maybe they're seeing something that I'm not. These higher order realizations solidified my turn to agnosticism. I could no longer confidently maintain that God does not exist. Partly because there were reasonably plausible arguments for theism that started pulling on my mind. Partly because I realized I had prematurely judged the question of God's existence without taking into account vast swaths of potential evidence. I mean, like, after all, there was this whole world of arguments and considerations that I was previously completely unaware of. And partly

30:48 because I was interacting with brilliant theist scholars who might be seeing something I'm not. These considerations percolated in my mind throughout senior year of high school. And by the beginning of freshman year in college, I was thoroughly agnostic. In other words, I suspended judgment on whether God exists. I neither believed God exists nor believed God does not exist. I thought the evidence was roughly counterbalanced, or at least it was too unclear to tell which way it pointed. I remained agnostic throughout college and my first year of grad school, and for reference, I'm about to begin my fourth year in the fall. Near the end of my first year of grad school though, I started coming across some thorns in my side.

31:50 So, three things prompted me to start reconsidering theism, and boy, they nagged at me. First, I started to lose my major objections to the standard fine-tuning argument for God's existence. Second, I was introduced to the argument from psychophysical harmony, which noded at me for a very long time before I eventually relented. And finally, I was introduced to some empirical evidence for supernatural phenomena that I just didn't have a satisfactory atheistic explanation of. And while this section comprises my comprehensive philosophical case for theism, even if you're not convinced by anything in this section, the miraculous case alone should convince you both that God exists and that Catholicism is true. So my case for Catholicism doesn't ultimately stand or fall on the merits

32:37 of my philosophical arguments. So don't worry too much if you come away from my philosophical case for theism unconvinced. Uh, it's still important though because seeing a robust case for theism can make you more receptive to the miraculous evidence. And I do indeed think that the philosophical case for theism is exceptionally robust. But anyway, these three prompings kickstarted a renewed inquiry into theism around the end of my first year of grad school. And the main fruit of that inquiry was a serious shift towards theism. So, allow me to walk you through what I discovered over the next year or two. And again, definitely check out the resource document in the description and pin comment for more on these discoveries.

33:24 Yes, I know you're cringing and I I revel in your cringe. I love your cringe. I embrace the cringe. I am the cringe. So, here's like here Okay, so here's like my master argument that I'm going to be defending in this section. I eventually realized that theism is a reasonably simple, non-arbitrary, coherent, and elegant hypothesis that offers a unifying explanation of a vast and diverse array of otherwise highly striking data. There is a lot of evidence for theism from its ability to explain or predict suspiciously fortunate facts about the universe. Facts that other hypotheses only explain peace meal or take to be brute lucky coincidences. And if there's a lot of evidence for something, it's very likely true unless it's super improbable prior to taking

34:12 the evidence into account. But theism isn't like that since it can be relatively compactly stated in fundamental or joint carving terms. It's highly uniform and non-arbitrary and its various claims fit together or cohhere quite well. These features of simplicity non-arbitrariness uniformity, and coherence make theism a credible contender for the true worldview before taking evidence into account. In which case, theism is very probably true if it does much better than its competitors in unifying a large constellation of otherwise remarkably striking data. And it does. Okay, so that in a nutshell is what convinced me of theism. But if you want this master argument in premise by premise form, it's something like this. Premise one, theism is not very

34:57 improbable prior to taking into account any empirical evidence. Premise two, theism predicts the data much better than atheism. Premise three, if theism is not very improbable prior to taking into account any empirical evidence and predicts the data far better than atheism, then theism is probably true. This follows from BA theorem, which we needn't get into. If you want to learn more about it, you can watch my video here. But from those three premises, it follows that theism is probably true. And you know like depending on how much better it predicts the evidence and how like the extent to which there's a disparity in the prior probabilities the probabilities prior to taking into account the empirical evidence like it'll get the conclusion that theism is very very probably true. That's kind of the conclusion that I'm going to be going for in what follows. By the way, this is actually the central argument of a new book that I'm currently

35:43 co-authoring with Brian Cutter, Dustin Kummit, Philip Swenson, Matthew Adelstein, and Amos Woolen. It's tentatively titled God, an argument, and we're going to be giving the best comprehensive case for theism on the planet. Well, okay, the best comprehensive case after my current video, you know, cuz this video is clearly the best on the planet. So, in fact, the following defense of the first premise draws from a part that I co-authored with Brian Cutter. So, I'm going to shout out Brian Cutter and give him a lot of credit for what's contained in the following. So, let's look at the first premise in more detail. According to this premise, theism is not very improbable prior to taking into account any empirical evidence. In other words, theism's intrinsic probability or prior is not very low. The intrinsic probability of a hypothesis or its prior

36:31 is its probability independently of any empirical evidence or before taking any empirical evidence into account. But why do we even need to attend to theism's intrinsic probability to begin with, right? Like why can't we just look at the evidence? Well, consider the following two hypotheses. Hypothesis one is spatial uniformity. The basic physical laws that govern the behavior of matter, you know, like massive bodies attract, like charged particles repel, etc. These these basic physical laws that govern the behavior of matter hold all throughout the universe. Compare that with the second hypothesis. We can call that anomalous patch. Those basic physical laws hold everywhere except for one tiny anomalous patch where for no reason at all the usual

37:17 laws are suspended and that obeys a completely different set of rules. So those are two hypotheses that we should consider. Now most would agree that it's more reasonable to accept the first theory than the second. But our scientific evidence is about equally good for both. Right? If there's just one tiny patch, minuscule patch governed by different equations, then it's astronomically unlikely that we would have found it. So the two theories predict our observations about equally well. If we really are justified in thinking spatial uniformity is much more probable than anomalous patch, then there must be something about the former hypothesis that makes it more probable in itself. In other words, spatial uniformity's advantage is primarily due to a higher prior probability before

38:03 taking into account any empirical evidence. The same can be seen through the examples of these two hypotheses. Temporal uniformity says that the fundamental laws of nature hold at all times. And then the second hypothesis here is induction failure. That says that the fundamental laws of nature hold all the way up until 2050 and then for no reason stop holding at some point in 2050. Again, both of these hypotheses predict our data equally well. And yet, we all recognize that temporal uniformity is far more likely than induction failure. So, there must be something about temporal uniformity that makes it more likely independently of the empirical evidence. Something gives temporal uniformity a greater intrinsic probability or prior. And notice that

38:49 even if there's lots of evidence and notice that even though there's lots of evidence for induction failure, you know, because it like predicts our predicts the data that we currently have pretty well, it still doesn't warrant our belief since it's just too prohibitively improbable from the get- go. And this shows that we need to attend to theism's intrinsic probability if we want to mount an evidential case for theism, since even if we have a lot of evidence for something, that won't matter if it's prohibitively improbable from the get-go. So we need to attend to various factors that affect the intrinsic probability of a hypothesis. One factor is modesty. A hypothesis is modest to the extent that it's unspecific or true in a wide range of possible scenarios. For example, the claim that someone died is more modest than the claim that Ethan Muse died,

39:36 which is more modest than the claim that Ethan Muse was murdered, which is more modest still than the claim that Ethan Muse was murdered after 8 a.m. mass by a Fatima skeptic. Another factor is simplicity. Prior should encode a preference for simpler theories. Most philosophers agree that simplicity has something to do with how many fundamental that is unexplained kinds of entities the theory posits and also something to do with the elegance or brevity of the theory's basic laws or principles. The preference for simpler theories is a standard diagnosis of what's wrong with conspiracy theories. Right? Like to fit all the data, the conspiracy theory needs to get extremely complicated and this complexity makes it less probable. Curve fitting is another example. Suppose the observed data approximately fit the hypothesis that Y is a simple

40:22 linear function of X. Scientists will typically prefer the linear model to a more complicated model that zigs and zags to hit every data point. The latter theory might achieve an even better fit with the data, but it has extra parameters that make it more complex, and this complexity makes it less probable. Return also to our examples of spatial uniformity and anomalous patch. We saw that spatial uniformity, the hypothesis that the same physical equations hold throughout the universe, has a higher intrinsic probability than the theory that those equations hold everywhere except for one small anomalous patch. Plausibly, that's because the uniform hypothesis is simpler in some sense. The relevant kind of simplicity has to do with how succinctly one can completely describe the fundamental elements of the

41:07 theory. And again, by the way, like the fundamental elements of a theory are those taken as given by the theory rather than explained by other elements of it. Describing physics on the uniform theory requires just one set of physical equations. But describing physics on the anomalous patch theory requires describing the set of laws posited by the uniform theory plus another set of laws describing the patterns in the special patch plus a specification of which laws govern which parts of space. This kind of simplicity might be called compressibility. Now the anomalous patch world is harder to compactly describe without information loss. Notice also that the spatial uniformity hypothesis is far less modest than the anomalous patch hypothesis since there are many many many more ways that the

41:54 latter could be true than that the former could be true. Right? Like there's only one way that the spatial uniformity hypothesis can be true. Namely, the relevant set of equations hold everywhere. Whereas there's an infinite number of ways the anomalous patch hypothesis could be true. One for every candidate location of the anomalous region. And this shows that an advantage with respect to simplicity can overcome a disadvantage with respect to modesty. And the same is true of temporal uniformity and induction failure. Right? There's only one way for the laws of physics to hold at all times. But infinitely many ways for the laws of physics to randomly stop at some time in 2050. Like they could conceivably stop 1 second past New Year's or 1.1 seconds past New Year's or 1.11 seconds past New Year's and so on. Add infinitum. Yet the

42:41 temporal uniformity hypothesis is overwhelmingly more probable than the induction failure hypothesis. Hypothesis which posit fundamental uniformities just massively mog hypotheses which posit limits or breaks in those uniformities. Another related factor that may account for spatial uniformities higher intrinsic probability is that it does a better job of minimizing unexplained arbitrariness. If there were a small patch where the usual physical equations break down, we would naturally expect some kind of explanation for the anomaly. If instead they just arbitrarily failed to hold under a hypothesis, that detracts from the intrinsic plausibility of the hypothesis. And this point is illustrated in science with inverse square laws. Right? Like for hundreds of years, scientists justifiably held that

43:27 the gravitational attraction between two bodies was inversely proportional to the square of their distance rather than their distance to the power of say 2.0000. 00000000000000000000129. Even though both of those hypotheses, you know, with enough zeros, both of those hypotheses fit the observational data equally well. Both two exactly and 2.00129 are equally precise and equally modest. And yet an inverse square law is plausibly much more intrinsically probable because much less arbitrary than an inverse 2.0000129 law. Similar points apply to the speed of light. Before we had any empirical evidence about its speed, scientists assumed that it was infinite, which is distinctly non-arbitrary in a way that

44:12 finite cutoffs aren't leading to a bias in the priors for the infinite value. A final factor affecting the intrinsic probability of a hypothesis is coherence which is which is roughly how well the various parts or entailments of hypothesis fit together. A hypothesis is more coherent to the extent that the propositions that follow from it support each other. And a hypothesis is less coherent to the extent that the propositions that follow from it disisconfirm or count against each other. All else being equal, more coherent hypotheses are more probable than less coherent hypotheses. Note that coherence comes in degrees. A maximally incoherent hypothesis is one that's you know like logically inconsistent or contradicts other things we can know a priori from the armchair independently of sense experience. But

44:58 other hypotheses suffer from a degree of incoherence even though they're not maximally incoherent. For example, a theory which says that Jones is generally very honest and reputable and stole $1,000 worth of veggie burgers from the local eery suffers from some incoherence and is therefore quite intrinsically improbable. After all, the fact that Jones is very honest and reputable makes it very unlikely that he would commit such a heinous unforgivable crime. And you know, it's not just a crime. And you know, it's not just and you know, the unforgivable crime here is is not just stealing $1,000 worth of veggie burgers, but it's also, you know, like the wrong of like visiating my beloved vegan community. But again, like the hypothesis that Jones is generally very honest and reputable and also stole

45:43 $1,000 worth of veggie burgers. Like that's going to suffer some incoherence and it's it's going to be quite intrinsically improbable as a result, you know, like because the fact that Jones is very honest and reputable makes it very unlikely that he would commit that crime. But even still, right, like the two components of this theory are compatible since occasionally, you know, honest and reputable people do heinous things. And when we apply these various criteria affecting the intrinsic probability of hypothesis to theism, we see that premise one in my master argument is spoton. Theism does not have a super low intrinsic probability. We can formulate theism roughly as the claim that there exists a fundamental mind that is unlimited in power, knowledge, and goodness. In other words, a fundamental mind characterized by the three traditional omni attributes.

46:29 Omnipotence or being all powerful, omniscience or being all knowing, and omni benevolence or being all good. Granted, this claim is immodest because it rules out many possibilities. But recall the spatial uniformity versus anomalous patch example. The simplicity and nonarbitrariness of spatial uniformity is more than enough to far outweigh its relative immodesty. Crucially, theism is simple and non-arbit in a similar way. Right? Like it posits a single being with a few basic attributes, power, knowledge, and goodness had to an unlimited and therefore distinctly non-arbitrary extent. We can imagine instead a foundational mind with like arbitrary gaps in its knowledge or power. for example, a being that knows every truth except the number of blades of grass on some particular lawn or arbitrary finite

47:16 limits in other respects. But these theories would be far less intrinsically probable in much the same way as the anomalous patch scenario is far less intrinsically probable than the spatial uniformity scenario. And this point bears emphasis like I want to bang my gongs very very loud here so that you get it right. Part of what makes spatial uniformity and a temporal uniformity so attractive is that their fundamental posit is a simple, elegant, compactly describable universal generalization. Right? Like the basic laws of physics hold everywhere or at all times. Likewise, part of what makes theism attractive is that it characterizes fundamental reality with a small number of simple, elegant, and compactly describable universal generalizations.

48:02 Right? Right? Like to say that God is omnisient is to say roughly that God knows everything. To say that God is omnipotent is to say roughly that he can bring about any possible state of affairs and whatever he wills comes to pass. To say that God is omnibent is to say roughly that God is wholly good and always acts for the sake of the good, including the good of any creatures he creates. Theism is also coherent in much the same way that spatial uniformity is. Right? Like in the case of spatial uniformity, the very fact that the basic laws hold everywhere apart from a spatial patch gives us reason to expect that they hold everywhere. Positing a limit or break in the universal applicability of the laws would introduce some incoherence into one's hypothesis. The same holds true for theism. Positing a divine being with

48:47 great but limited power or expansive but limited knowledge or significant but limited goodness introduces incoherence into one's hypothesis. The very fact that a being has large quantities of power, knowledge, and goodness gives us reason to expect that it has all power, knowledge, and goodness. In fact, theism is not only highly coherent with respect to individual divine attributes, but also with respect to the collection of divine attributes. That's because all of God's attributes are or follow from perfections, right? That is valuable attributes that it would be better to have than lack, at least other things being equal. For instance, quite plausibly, it's good to be knowledgeable, powerful, and benevolent. Theism, therefore, exhibits a striking uniformity across the various divine attributes, which further strengthens its coherence. Now, so far, I've

49:35 formulated theism in terms of the three traditional omni attributes. But this actually understates theism's simplicity coherence and non-arbitiness. Since these specific attributes aren't a miscellaneous hodgepodge, they can likely be subsumed under a unifying principle or derived from a more basic attribute. Indeed, even if the omni attributes can't be logically deduced from a more basic attribute or principle, the possession of the omni properties might be probable or at least not very improbable conditional on that more basic principle or the possession of that more basic attribute. If so, then theism will not be super intrinsically improbable so long as it is not super unlikely that the more basic principle holds or the more basic attribute is possessed. And this

50:20 condition is very plausibly met in the case of theism since candidates for the basic principle or attribute from which God's other attributes are derived or rendered probable are compactly describable in reasonably elegant and coherent terms. Swinburn, for example, takes omnipotence or pure limitless intentional power as theoretically basic and aims to derive or at least probabilify or make probable other attributes there from. A second approach formulates theism as the view that the fundamental reality is a being that possesses all perfections to an unlimited extent and from there derives the various specific perfections of omnipotence, omniscience and so forth. As Alexander Pruce highlights in one of my interviews with him, this is a highly simple fundamental posit. My my preferred take is that uh there is an X such that for all P if P

51:06 is a perfection X says P. >> How do you define perfection? >> Oh, I don't that's a that's an undefined primitive. >> Oh, you could say it's like a great making property. Something that necessarily makes it possessor greater. >> What about this? Um it entails value but doesn't entail this value. >> That's going that's probably a necessary condition. Yeah, it may not be sufficient but then it could have all those properties all the properties that entail value >> that any property that entails this value. >> Yeah, but I mean then which still comes down to what the value is, >> right? Which can be liked for its own sake. >> Okay, so we've got this perfect theory according to which there's this perfect being with all the perfections. That's a rough gloss at least. Um why should we accept this view? Because Alexander

51:53 Pruce >> relatedly some conrue theism as positing a being with a single essential attribute perfection or supreme value from which the various specific attributes follow. You know this is the route that you know Josh Rasmmanson takes in his book how reason wait no god to lead can reason out. No no no how reason can lead to god. Okay. Another approach constru theism as the claim that the fundamental reality is a mind without limits or an unlimited mind. The omni attributes arguably fall out from this simple postulate. Like philosophical tradition, yes indeed regards mind or spirit as a coin with two sides, intellect and will. That by which the mind apprehends reality and that by which it affects reality. On the side of intellect, an unlimited mind would not apprehend a limited portion of reality, but all of reality and would

52:40 therefore be omnisient. On the side of will, an unlimited mind would have no limits and no limits on what it can affect aside from being unable to do the impossible and would therefore be omnipotent. It's also plausible, or at least not highly implausible, to suppose that being free of internal limitations, its will would be unconstrained by any irrational or irrational preferences that would prevent it from simply desiring and willing, that which its intellect perceives as worthy to be desired and willed, that which it sees by its omniscience to be good. It would therefore be omni benevolent. Moreover, the simplest and least arbitrary proposal about what the foundational mind values, or at least a highly simple and non-arbitrary proposal, is that it values value itself. Its basic

53:27 teological orientation is toward the good. It wants what is good to the extent that it's good. It does all that it does for the sake of the good. In other words, it's omni benevolent. All right. So let's take stuck because things have gotten a little bit abstract as indeed a substance as properties that is to say. So stepping back theism is the view that there's a fundamental omnipotent omnisient and omni benevolent mind. Theism therefore posits a single fundamental being with a small number of attributes that are compactly stable in elegant coherent non-arbitrary terms. Moreover, there are several reasonable approaches to theism on which these attributes are not probabilistically

54:12 independent from one another, but instead follow from a simple unifying principle or attribute such as omnipotence or perfection or limitless mentality. The upshot is that theism is a simple, coherent, and non-arbitrary view in ways that very plausibly outweigh its relative immodesty. Its intrinsic probability is therefore not super low, giving us the first premise of my master argument. And there are other paths to the first premise too. So for instance, even if you're skeptical of the various accounts I gave for why theism is a relatively simple and elegant hypothesis, as long as you think there's like some non-negligible chance, maybe like a 5% chance that one of those accounts is right according to which theism is a simple and elegant hypothesis. And as long as you also think that conditional ontheism being a simple and elegant hypothesis, theism is

54:58 not very improbable before looking at the evidence, then you should simply multiply that not very low probability by 5% to get a not very low and minimal bound for how probable you should think theism is before taking into account any evidence. And that alone suffices to motivate the first premise of my argument. So notice that even if you're pretty confident that all the accounts I gave on which theism is a relatively simple hypothesis are false and that theism is instead a hopelessly complicated hypothesis that we shouldn't take seriously so long as it's not super unlikely that you're mistaken and theism is simple as lots of professional philosophers think and argue that suffices for the purposes of my argument. Another path to the first premise of my argument is that there's at least some pretty small but not prohibitively low chance that some

55:45 present or even future a priori argument for God's existence succeeds. For example, some Gordelian ontological argument defended by very capable philosophers like Puce and Rasmusen, Cesar Bernstein, Gustafson and others. This too should arguably lead to a non-negligible prior in God's existence. And just more generally, it seems bizarre to start out inquiry with a grotesqually prohibitively low probability in something that the vast majority of humanity has believed in and finds pre theoretically plausible, including absolute towering intellects of the past and present. So I think everyone should accept the first premise of my master argument. Now before turning to the second premise, I want to address an objection. One of theism's main competitors is

56:30 naturalism. the view roughly that you know the natural world is all that exists and is fundamentally purposeless. The objection is that naturalism is bound to be simpler than theism because naturalism posits only the natural universe together with a specification of its basic laws, initial conditions and stock of fundamental natural features. Whereas theism posits both that natural universe and God. And so theism is going to include all the stuff that naturalism accepts plus more. And so isn't then naturalism bound to explain the character of the natural world at least as well as theism while being simpler than theism and if so isn't naturalism bound to be more probable than theism in light of the total evidence. Uh no. Uh so this objection firstly we know it goes wrong somewhere because it implies that we

57:16 should favor naturalism over theism no matter what the natural world turns out to be like at the physically fundamental level. Even if say we discovered that the initial conditions of the universe spelled out in some atomic soup made by God with love as you can see on screen here in every human language. After all, naturalism takes those initial conditions as fundamental or unexplained and uses them to explain subsequent states of the universe. And theism posits the exact same initial conditions and a natural universe plus God. But that objection would rightly fall on deaf ears if we had observed this datim. So we know that the objection must go wrong somewhere. And here's where in neglects that the simplicity of a theory's fundamental posits matters most in comparing theories.

58:01 To see this, consider two hypotheses. Solopsism says that I alone exist. There is nothing but my mind and my conscious experiences. There's no external world, no other people or anything like that. Just me, myself and I. The short past hypothesis says that the universe sprang into existence uncaused a 100 years ago. Everything simply, you know, popped into existence fully formed in the 1920s with a misleading appearance of age. Fully formed human beings sprang into existence with brain structures encoding false memories of

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