China's Strategic Role in Operation Sindoor : Influence, Interests, & Regional Implications

0:00 [Music] Welcome to the Claus YouTube channel. Together we strive for a safer, secure, and more stable world. Hello and welcome to Strategic Front Lines, the YouTube channel of Center for Land Warfare Studies. Today we are going to discuss the role of China in Operation Synindur. how it actually factored in into the entire conflict. And to discuss this we have with us two prominent uh eminent experts who are sitting to my left starting professor Kundapali from the JNU and we have ambassador Ka who has had tremendous experience in China. So without wasting

0:47 any further time I would like to straight away throw the first question to the two experts of ours. both can give their initial comments and then thereafter I'll have certain additional comments to you. So a very warm welcome to you for this podcast. Uh the my first question is how exactly has China helped during offsind? We are aware that China has been helping Pakistan right from 194748. If you go over the history only the the the the nature of help has been slightly different but this time around I found that it is more actively collaborated with uh with the with Pakistanis to the extent that there was some movements done along the northern front as well in terms of not really

1:34 troops but in terms of other activities which fall into the gray zone category. So over to you professor Gundapali and then Ambassador Kanta speaking on it sir. Delighted to be part of this podcast the clause. Um on the issue of Chinese uh support to Pakistan what we see is uh unlike in 1965 conflict between India and Pakistan or 71 or 1999 Cargill we see today more explicit support from China. uh and in three domains to my mind. One is in the uh diplomatic sphere, second in the military sphere, third is in terms of disinformation campaign. Uh and uh in

2:20 the first uh diplomatic spear, the uh Chinese foreign minister Wangi called up his Pakistani counterpart Mr. Ishakdar on April 25th, 3 days after the Palong terror attacks and uh reiterated the ironclad uh friendship between the two countries as well as suggesting that uh Pakistan security, sovereignty, territo integrity issues uh should be protected. So that is a huge diplomatic uh support for Pakistan. Uh and then there is also the 1267 sanctions committee in the United Nations. uh uh and in that when a draft was uh moved with uh the resistance front which took initially

3:08 the responsibility for the palang terror attacks uh Lee Chang the Chinese uh official he removed the resistant front uh and included the Baluch liberation army in those drafts. So that is a huge uh again uh global support that China provided not at just at the bilateral level but also at the global level. Uh I think uh that created uh some emboldening kind of movement for the Pakistani side uh and in terms of its narrative build upon terrorism and other things. Uh third second area the where the Chinese have supported Pakistan is in the crucial sphere of military area. Uh and uh here

3:57 the uh cumulatively Pakistan procured about $21 billion of arms from China including about 81% of its uh arms uh traced back to China. These include the J10 fighter aircraft J10C fighter aircraft. 22 of them out of 36 have been in the Pakistani inventory. There is also the JF17 which are licensed manufactured in Camra aeronautical uh factory and uh there is the um um in the navy in the uh other sectors. We have also seen very active Chinese support in terms of technical backup on

4:42 the enhanced range of missile systems both tactical as well as strategic. uh strategic at the uh fat gun factory close to Rahul Pindi. The Chinese are been they have been uh assisting the Pakistani scientists. Uh at the tactical level there is the uh the Python based uh PL15E which is the Israeli uh kind of uh support that was given since the '90s. Uh and here ironically they've been mentioning about Chinese developed uh J10C. This is a Lavi project, Israeli aircraft industries developed lavi project which went to uh China. That's interesting. Uh and uh it is interesting

5:28 also the Islamic Republic of uh Pakistan using Jewish technologies uh extensively. Uh I think I think the world should know about that you know that there are no clearcut hard ideological divides when it comes to fighting. Indeed as far as the weapon systems is concerned anyway from anywhere. Uh President Xiinping has been criticizing Israel but much of the uh Chinese technologies came from Israel. Uh the drones, the uh air-to-air missile systems, the u aircrafts, the uh various others. uh uh so the uh military related one was which emboldened the Pakistanis uh of course they also received the

6:15 drones from Turkey the Sunar and others. Mhm. Uh but nevertheless this is a very crucial factor. I just want to interrupt there about Shunga. I believe there were no evidence as such of this missile being there before the ops synindu. So do you think this got transported to them during after the Pelgam attack? Uh between April 22nd and May 6th when the strikes happened, Operation Synindur has been commenced. We did see a Turkish uh destroyer landing in Karachi. Okay. We also saw heavy transports landing in Pakistan from Turkey. So that is um possibility and uh Turkish president Eduhan has mentioned about the

7:01 solidarity with Pakistan in all spheres including in the military sphere. So that is a circumstantial evidence. Uh and in in terms of the destruction of the drones that Indian military had uh we do see the Sunaru as part of the evidence in this. Okay. Including PL15E which landed as duts. Uh so the Chinese uh third aspect is disinformation campaign. Um if you look at the Chinese press media, millions of videos are floating around with one specific obsession which is that J10C is superior than Rafal uh and JTC should be uh sold to potential customers from abroad. They

7:48 have not spoken about terrorism. They have not spoken about any other including the uh the airfields strikes by the Indian air force uh in Pakistan. None of these were mentioned. They did not mention the HQ9 uh all of them destroyed in the air strikes. Uh and this suggests that it is a one-sided. So it is basically how to test the weapon systems and how to sell these weapon systems to other uh customers. So this third aspect of disinformation campaign was very uh uh intense uh in China and even today despite overwhelming evidence they still stick to this position that u Indian

8:34 armed forces were not really well equipped uh and there is also the superiority of the Chinese weapon systems. So it's a one-sided um they have not provided any satellite imageries unlike the DGMO who provided yes the satellite imageries of specific um airfield striking or the PL5E photographs of landing uh in the Indian site. Uh so it's all one-sided and heavily biased Chinese approach. Yeah. So there were two three issues which professor Kundapali has raised. So while whatever he has covered I think by and large now everybody is aware of it. So I would like you to comment on two

9:19 three issues. Firstly is the compulsion of Turkey. Turkey was having a I won't say a a brilliant relationship but if you look at the trade we had a a good trade going on. it was around $8 billion and suddenly uh during this particular campaign I would say uh it would be as good as putting the boots on ground in the sense they gave their uh all the drones and there are I believe reports that you know initially it was difficult for these guys to operate them. So probably there was a technical help also available from Turkey to ensure that these drones are used by them effectively which ultimately failed miserably. Uh so uh your comment on the role of Turkey here a little bit and

10:05 also uh the uh role of Quad is now being questioned by many although we know that quad was more of a economic kind of a initiative but we were doing a lot of exercises in Malaba joint exercises off the coast of Australia etc etc. So uh now internally I'm talking of within the country there are some elements which are questioning whether these multilateral forums are really going to be of any help to India. So these two aspects you could also um cover in your comments besides what he has already uh spoken about. Now before I come to these two questions uh if I could add something on role of China because that's very important. Prussapali has already given yeah fairly

10:53 detailed response to earlier question. I think what we need to bear in mind that uh there is very strong uh strategic nexus between China and Pakistan uh which has remained durable right since early 1960s and uh China's policy is essentially to build up Pakistan's strategic and conventional capabilities. so that it can keep India off balance. But China avoids getting directly involved in military conflicts and that that has been know the history

11:41 of conflicts in 1965, 1971 and Cargill in 1999. uh but diplomatically it has given strong support earlier also uh compared to earlier support cargle was little different they were little they were little neutral I believe little ambivalent uh this time there was a marked proakistan tilt uh no doubt about it but uh my own assessment is that Chinese remain cautious in the diplomatic stance uh you know telephonic conversations between Wangi and his counterpart

12:28 Shakar you know these signals uh that we support sovereignty and territorial integrity that's fairly routine in China Pakistan relationship uh interaction when it comes to the comment by spokesperson of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 7th May after we had struck nine terrorist targets in China. It was quite moderate. They described India's action as regrettable uh which is you know compared terminology they use elsewhere condemnation etc was relatively moderate and then they came to that they expect

13:14 no broad scient restraint etc and that language restraint continued it was only on 10th May that foreign minister Wangi had a telephonic conversation with the INSA And the readout from Chinese foreign office again on that was quite moderate. In fact, they applauded certain comments made by uh NSA in in that conversation. Of course, when it comes to UN Security Council, our understanding is that they supported Pakistan without going out to the way to you know push the Chinese Pakistani uh narrative. Okay. So diplomatic stance was pro Pakistan without being uh strongly anti-India

14:01 because they don't they don't want to send those signals to India at this point of time. Okay. Uh when our relations are going through a period of rebuilding okay which is important for them also. uh but we should uh pay greater attention to their military support uh which was very substantial very substantial and uh there are certain you know I think lessons we need to derive from that uh there's no doubt about the fact that Indian air force came out trumps on the whole uh but uh you know the narrative profali referred to about you know jnc see you know action involving Rafal aircraft on our side it's not limited to

14:48 China in fact it's a very strong narrative in west as well internationally internationally so we should not you know discount it only as Chinese narrative there are no two three aspects of this we should pay close attention to one it was not just a question of military hardware being deployed and China in fact sort of almost bloating in the social media about so-called success of their equipment equipment against frontline western equipment for the first time they were pitted against each other uh so combat experience was very important for them

15:35 uh but equally important I feel that the fact that China and Pakistan had been working very closely together including you know Xai Shahin since 2011 uh China was sharing military doctrine and tactics with Pakistan and this was I'm told I'm this something new people understand better but people don't know they tell me that this was evident the latency was positioned on 7th morning you know drones netcentric warfare so the language you know uh tactics being used so this is something uh going ahead we'll have to keep in mind third aspect

16:22 is that absolutely no doubt about the fact that uh data uh coming out of 4 days of military operations will be fully shared with China okay and uh they will take steps to plug the gaps in Pakistan's uh you know defense infrastructure especially the air defense system there's no doubt about the fact that HQ9 you know didn't perform well so did you know the American air defense system which you also used by Pakistan although they were slightly legacy yeah but you know point is that uh our air force could penetrate Pakistani air force some of this they will try to to improve so we have a situation that as

17:09 we talk about new normal in our dealings with Pakistan, we have carved out much greater space for conventional operation. Yeah. Under nuclear overhang. Likewise, there will be a new normal in China Pakistan military collusion. We'll have to bear that in mind. And also the fact that we have deal with two live borders western frontier and northern frontier has its own implications you know much better than I do. So in some ways our deterrence rather China and Pakistan has been further complicated. Okay. And we'll have to we'll have to work on that. Now coming to to quad.

17:54 uh well quad uh there's no expectation that quad will get involved and we wouldn't have liked that to happen either in fact even in case of uh you know a standoff with China in eastern Ladak there was no expectation or no desire in fact in India that Americans should get involved I think best for was you know getting some intelligence etc uh incidentally the reports that Chinese were sharing intelligence with with Pakistan right that's deploy Yes. So, so, so that's also another important aspect. So what we are worried about is not really non-involvement of God which is not really expected but you know certain

18:40 position President Trump took yes those were you know he crossed several red lines which we have absolutely including the way they claimed the mediator role for for USA comments on Kashmir you know equating India and Pakistan linking our position hostilities with trade issue. I think that was little disturbing. Uh which should make us think about you know the whole salary and so external balancing with the B China. Correct. Uh coming to Turkey. Mhm. Frankly I doubt that uh this hardware was supplied after you know it's not just a question of hardware. Hardware also need comes with some training you know. It's not that

19:26 you can just uh it's not plug and play kind of things. So I suspect Turkey had already provided those drones to to Pakistan. Uh Turkey and Pakistan have that that of course is no background of of relations. uh we have responded quite strongly which should uh convey certain signals to Turkey but as a former diplomat my suggestion will be we should not write off Turkey okay Turkey is an important player Mhm. And you know there have been problems earlier with some other countries which are very close to us now. You know I'm referring to some Gulf countries for

20:12 instance. So things change. So we should not write off Turkey. Of course. So having discussed both a little bit of diplomacy a little bit of what the China did as far as opendur is concerned. Of course there is much more to uncover as far as China's role is concerned. But uh you will also find that China is operating on other multiple fronts to ensure that India gets hemmed in into South Asia and remains hyphenated to Pakistan, Bangladesh which we are trying to dehyenate from and emerge as a as some kind of a major say in the global world order. uh also that uh recently the planning commission announced that we are now the fourth largest economy formally as per the IMF and the world

20:58 bank. So uh given this kind of a reality what do you think should be the the I would say three-front strategy as far as India is concerned both in terms of kinetic and non-kinetic measures in the future because this is not going to stop here at opsindu that there is going to be more of such actions taking place whether through the proxy of Pakistan or whether through grrey zone activities in in China. So do you see the possibility of India opening some additional fronts for China to you know dehem ourselves from this South Asia pressure and first you and then we'll have professor Kundapali speaking on this you know you're absolutely right that you know

21:44 China would like us to remain bogged down in South Asia and China would also like to make us remain bogged down on land waters. Absolutely. Because you know this is one area correct where you know where uh we are devoting a lot of resources since uh you know events of summer of 2020 and uh what has happened during operations in Dur though it was mainly air force that play an active role but need to mind both you know western borders with Pakistan and northern borders with China clearly has gone up. So we are in a in a in two live

22:32 border situation. Yes. Uh so this we'll have to we'll have to prepare for that. Number one. Number two, we have called Pakistan's nuclear blackmail. That despite your nuclear capability, we have space and ample space for conventional operations to punish you for your you know uh subconventional uh you know operations their support to terrorism etc. Now this message I'm sure will be studied very carefully by Pakistan and China. We should look at that is a collusive threat. Yeah. A collusive threat doesn't mean that they'll be

23:18 attacking simultaneously on two borders. There are so many other ways of collusion. Like I said, you know, there could be gray zone activity. So there are so many other ways of collusion. So that's a given that this collusive threat has become more pronounced today. Mhm. And as we have carved out space for more conventional operations, corally is that we need to build up our conventional capabilities. That's that's very important. Okay, this should not be ignored. Uh you know if you look at the data I look at data coming out of PRS legislative search they give fairly detailed analysis of defense budget. Defense budget as percentage of government expenditure has fallen from

24:05 about 17.1%. It's about 13. Yeah. To 13% in B25 26. Absolutely. This situation is not terrible. That's right. When you have heightened uh concerns about uh two of your uh potential adversaries which are acting in collusion. I think this requires a different level of allocation of defense resources. Uh so we have to we have to to some way go back to drawing board how to deal with this coliseum threat how to deal with this two line border situation. Okay. Including you know revising some of our earlier policies

24:50 including on me for instance. Yeah. Uh so thank you sir professor kondapoli uh this this you know deheming as we are call I'm calling it it may be a new term possibly today in this podcast is that we need to you know price out China from this dynamics of uh India Pakistan conflict. So uh I was talking about the two-front strategy being presented to China and simultaneously ensuring that Pakistan also gets a a two-front uh look so that our eastern that is our western border and his eastern border uh become that much more vulnerable and we are that much more stronger so that we can focus on our primary adversary. So with this in view, do you think it would be what

25:37 would be our approach to a Taiwan contingency of China as opening a front for uh China and also something on the western borders for Pakistan? Uh there is a Chinese ancient uh strategy called Hashia. Okay. Which basically means uh cooperate with the small to counter the big. Mhm. Uh so they apply this to South Asian region. Mhm. Out of these 36 ancient strategys, they have this uh and we have seen uh the Chinese help to many smaller South Asian countries uh in this regard. Absolutely. Uh and uh so that fits into the uh scheme of things that China had. The Communist Party of China

26:24 had uh uh the balancing strategy towards India and it also fits into this uh issue of hyphenation. uh then there is the um uh community of shared destiny as they used to call and Pakistan is a member of that community of shared destiny between China and Pakistan. So at the political level there is this um at the military level the PLA has three positions on South Asia. one is that they think India wants to dominate South Asia and so the concept of uh cooperating with the small to counter the big comes in. The PLA annual reports also mention a second aspect that he's u uh India wants to be

27:09 a global power and uh so the policy option they suggest is to confine India to South Asian region uh by the military sales and other things. Uh and thirdly they also say India wants to dominate the Indian Ocean region. Uh and for this they have the u uh Jibouti naval base, the God naval base, Godar base part but for 45 years, Hanto for 99 years lease uh and other preparations that they have in Rian base in Cambodia the other you know initiatives. So PLA in its annual report suggests these uh things to counter India. Uh so

27:57 uh in order to counter these aspects India has begun in 2009. I remember General Kapoor mentioning about the two-front war under nuclear threshold uh in 2009 and quite a long period of time 16 years we have been preparing for this contingency. uh we deployed the S400 between Pakistan and China and worked wonders in the current operation Synindor uh campaign. Uh there is also the other preparations that India had taken in terms of um uh leaprogging into uh central Asia and uh the Quad and other things. uh in addition to neighborhood first policy that India had uh assiduously built up in the last 11

28:44 years. So um so India is also trying to counter these uh and Sagur Mala uh Indian Ocean diplomacy also helps in this process. U how do the Indian side um uh counter uh these aspects uh of China in terms of Taiwan? Now in 1950 we had a one China policy uh what is called India model was cobbled up in April 1950 and then subsequently so it says there is only one China and Taiwan is an in inelen portion of China. Um so that has not changed for over a long period of time and in 2018 when Dr. Kumman Singh

29:31 visited uh China. we mentioned about uh two oppositions um uh that he's opposing uh Taiwan independence and opposing I don't remember the other things but it's basically uh uh the uh the independence related um but of course there has been some change recently after Nancy Pelos's visit the MBA made a statement uh suggesting we want stability in the Taiwan straits because of our own trade with this region getting affected in any militarization of the Taiwan straits. So there has been some momentum forward. Um we have had uh exchanges, parliamentarians, the u um the former chiefs have gone to attend a big

30:18 conference in Taiwan a couple of years ago. The uh uh army chief, former army chief, the naval chief and the air force chief. So it's an indicator that things are now moving forward and uh the Taiwanese have something like $8.2 billion of trade but most important the PSMC had concluded a semiconductor u packed with u uh the u tata electronics in doer in Gujarat. We have also five more projects on semiconductors mainly with Taiwanese but also with micron from United States and others. Uh this is a new dimension uh

31:04 for the safety of the semiconductor industry. uh we also require to uh to uh expand and uh provide protection for that kind of uh industry in the Taiwan trade crisis in any crisis in future. Uh as we are a major beneficiary in terms of the semiconductor industry, we are now moving in terms of the chips production by this year. So there is a requirement for revising our policy. Uh in the light of what China had also done in the Pakistan related matters. Uh it's not just Pakistan. We also hear from Chinese scholars like Hushuang, Luongi uh and uh others uh that Bangladesh Nepal, Afghanistan. Uh it's

31:53 interesting that foreign minister Wangi organized a trilateral meeting with Afghanistan and Pakistan recently after the uh operation Sindur uh and this indicates to the strengthening of what they call as transimalan quad uh and the China Indian Ocean initiative um uh they want to be part of the Indian Ocean. They are sending a lot of submarines and uh uh during the operation Synindor we had 246 fishing vessels from China observing the Indian naval operations in Bengal and Arabian Sea. Okay. So this is a new thing that we witnessed during the operation Synindur in the maritime domain. uh that suggests we need to

32:39 revise our policies regarding Taiwan, South China Sea uh and also explore the opportunities for sale of Brahmos. Okay. Uh in the region, we did sell uh to Philippines uh Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia. Uh what about Taiwan uh in terms of sales? So even though Taiwan has better equipment like the Shiong Fang uh cruise missiles uh nevertheless one also should explore the possibility of arms transfer. Yeah, especially the new generation uh remode which is coming up. I think that would attract a lot of attention and uh with that uh my last question to both of you and also a concluding remark. So because we are running out of time the first

33:25 thing is uh this seemed to be like a Chinese test laboratory of its equipment. 80% all of you have said that 80% of the equipment was Chinese. uh has China been able to succeed in this uh experiment or it has to go back to the drawing boards and look at its equipment very seriously. And the second thing is your final comments on how do we see this entire uh uh region moving ahead both uh all three India, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh also could be added into your comments. A quick uh two two minutes from both of you sir. So start with you sir. uh no on um to what extent Chinese military hardware

34:12 performed well you know at this point of time it's very difficult to make a definitive assessment okay we still in the period of fog of war you know there are operational reasons why details cannot be shared even by our side and there is a definite you know exaggeration coming from China and Pakistan so which needs must be discounted. Uh but personally I I I feel that you know we need to take you know this possibility that uh China and Pakistan will jointly learn lessons from Pakistan Air Force's performance with the VR air force and take remedial actions or plat

35:01 loopholes. I think we should take that very seriously. Uh coming to you know the the problem you know context first on Tavan my own feeling is that uh we have to focus more on what we do in the taban in terms of our uh economic technological investment links uh military domain is something that's to be you know I don't think we are going to rush into that that will be even it's not really our responsibility this is something and others Japan they have to take care of that role we can play in

35:47 any Indo-acific conflict uh would be on Tavan street will be very limited so let's be clear about it we should raise expectations because that will lead to major problems down the road Final point I would like to make that uh we are in fact uh perhaps in a more difficult situation today because the fact of China Pakistan collusive action has come to the four and I have no doubt that China will double down and they will provide their more advanced platforms. JTC uh was not only to Pakistan it was not supplied to others

36:33 but there are you know platforms like TSL fighters they have not given to anyone so let's see I think we'll have to watch that space very carefully uh in terms of the Chinese military equipment um most of them have not really performed well uh in the uh operation Synindur related campaign we have seen the HQ9's uh winglong drones uh um PL15E uh JF17 the Pakistani side had admitted to two JF-17 okay crashes uh I mean destructions uh and so we uh at the moment it is not clear but we can say definitely that the Chinese equipment did not perform well in terms of the u battlefield experience

37:21 and battlefield performance um uh does uh one of the key areas is China still lacks the uh engines for the aircraft. Uh the uh J10C had uh the RD93 Russian supplied. The JF17 had RD93 uh uh J10C had WS88 um uh Kuning engine and other variants. Mhm. Uh the the thrust levels for these are lower than compared with the Sneakma of uh Rafal or the AL41F for the SU30s. Uh so definitely there is an advantage in terms of performance indicators for Indian Air

38:07 Force and Army in terms of the uh combat related matters. Uh this of course we need to re uh revisit the uh performance of the equipment. Um so it provides uh the uh opportunity for India to highlight even though China had stated um their focus or hijacking of the air combat J10 versus Rafal uh and no mention about terrorism, no mention about uh any one of those nuclear related matters. uh even though China had increased its nuclear supplies to Pakistan. Uh if you remember the uh IAEA NSG um uh 200 uh 9 around that time um so they

38:57 have asked for the clean waiver for Pakistan as well uh and blocked the Indian trading in technology and uranium from these bodies. Uh there is also the uh cahoota plant and uh file material enhancement by Pakistan uh and more long range missile systems that China is supplying to Pakistan. So those are clear indicators of u uh the cooperation between China and Pakistan. So um uh so there is uh that danger that India still has uh on the sign of Pakistan all weather friendship and uh others. So India actively needs to u

39:44 counter this u by uh strengthening the two-front war under nuclear threshold related issue. uh and prime minister Modi mentioned in his televised speech about those three red lines uh on u um state non-state differentiation cannot be uh accepted uh nor the nuclear blackmail or the discussion can only be on PB uh and uh here the uh Chinese role is also important because China had invested in the CPEC projects uh and also has been um sending so-called security guards some 36,000 of these uh in the uh PO Gilit Baltistan in

40:29 hydroxity projects and others. I think India needs to take it up in an active manner on these uh PO related uh aspects. Okay. So I think uh we have come to the end of our podcast. We've also overshot our time. Uh before I let you all go uh just in one word uh it's kind of a rapid fire uh kirana your views. Uh the uh evidence is still not clear but the and DGMO air mentioned that uh we did not hit the u base air base there. So uh so officially we have no role in terms of the nuclear fallout radiation which the IAEA had rejected. Uh but nevertheless

41:17 there is some smoke uh if not there is some smoke in the fire bolar uh the extent of damage which has now been projected by New York Times it kind of validates our stand. So uh your views final on the uh the the the kind of operations which India launched on you know even western media finally they're acknowledging both Washington Post and New York Times had detailed stories based on satellite imagery that extent of damage done by Indian air force to Pakistan's military installation much more than what Pakistan could inflict. on our facilities. So I think uh clearly

42:05 our air force has come well ahead in that domain. Uh thank you sir for this wonderful podcast. We hope to continue our associations in the future as well both online and also offline as we are doing it today which will be broadcasted in a day or so. Thank you very much Jahansson. Heat. Heat.