CapitaLand China Trust FY 2025

0:06 Thank you very much. Thank you, EOBKHM for organizing this. Thank you for all the trading reps for attending this evening presentation. I'm Jari, I'm the CEO of Capital Land China Trust, CLCT in short. I'll be making my presentation based on our two year 2025 results. And after that, we can take some Q&A. First, CLCT is the first and largest China focused ass street We have diversified exposure to China's domestic growth sectors and we uniquely offer connectivity to both S-REIT and S-REIT markets. I will explain a little bit more why is that so. Our total assets, $4.5 billion. We have eight retail malls, five business parks and four

0:56 logistics assets. The assets are predominantly in Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities. Our distribution yield On the slide now is 6.2%, but if you look at today's trading price, we are probably about 7%. That yield basically trading has gone up due to the broad market winners from due to the Iran war. In terms of our asset class, if you look at our asset class breakdown, retail is our largest and most resilient asset class. That's at 69% of gross rental income. Our retail malls are bread and butter malls. They are relatively defensive, they serve non-discretionary community type of customers

1:43 and they are mostly domestic. So they benefit from government initiatives to boost domestic consumption. We also have new economy assets, that's about 30% of GRI. New economy assets to us is business parks and logistics parks. They are a smaller component of our portfolio. They provide us exposure to China's efforts to grow technology and innovation, including key sectors like semiconductors, electronics and infocom technology. In 2025, one of the highlights for us was our establishment and listing of our CREIC platform, which is called CLCR on the Shanghai Stock Exchange together with our sponsor. So we

2:31 co-sponsored this listed REIT platform in China. We met, together with the sponsor, we each injected an asset into this CREIT. For us, we injected our mature asset CapitalMall Qinhua Ting, which is an asset in a tier two city Changsha at premium to our valuation. CLCR after listing, this is the CRIG, has done well and traded up almost 20% post IPO. Now the successful story of us investing in Yuhua Ting maybe about five years ago in 2009, extracting value out of Yuhua Ting through various AIA and then now in 2025 injecting it

3:20 into the CRIG at premium devaluation give us a strong validation that our retail assets have value and they have liquidity. And it also demonstrates that CLCT can extract value from our assets beyond what we first acquired it at. So we will continue to seek opportunities to utilize this unique S-REIT and C-REIT connection to benefit our unit holders. We also have greater confidence to actively source for New assets for investment where we can repeat what we have done in Yu Hua Ting's case. That is we buy well, add value with our operational and AEI expertise and recycle at a good price

4:06 at a later time. Now with the divestment of Yu Hua Ting in 2025, some of the effects is felt in our full year 2025 financial results due to the loss of that income of which we are in 2026 trying to patch up by looking for a new asset. to invest in. For 2025, if you look at our results, the overall business conditions have been solved. Among the three sectors that we are in, retail which I mentioned before, have relative resilience. Our logistics sector have stabilized with some brand resets, but for business part, we are still seeing a weak demand. On the whole, portfolio gross revenue and NPI dropped

4:51 about 9% year on year. If we exclude the divested Uva Ting, so on same store basis, portfolio gross revenue and NPI, the drop narrows to about 6% year on year. For our retail malls, which is our biggest component, revenue declined by about 9%, but that narrows to about 5% on the same store basis due to the Uva Ting divestment impact. For our retail sector, we have also embarked on a number of AEIs with 2.025, that is about four across four more, Si Zimen, Rock Square, Wang Jing and Shue Fu. And they involve upgrading our anchor and mini anchor spaces. The AEIs had some downtime in 2025,

5:38 but that would start to benefit us when they are completed and fully contributing by year end of 2025. So in 2026, we are now already seeing the results of those AEI. We had positive reversions for those AEIs and good results. Some of the other weakness in the results also came from our repositioning of one of our weaker malls, which is one of the smallest malls called Singlan. And there was also some weaker overall rents and occupancy drops in Grand Canyon Mall and Wan Singh. For our business part, The whole sector declined in terms of revenue, declined by 9% year on year, predominantly

6:26 due to lower rents and occupancy in Hangzhou and Siang. The main factors were that in Hangzhou, Hangzhou phase 2 in particular, we had the pre-termination of a service office master tenant. And in Siang, we had an asset called AIIT, which had some delays in backfilling the vacancy that was created one year ago by a large tenant relocation. We are happy to share that for AIT, that's the asset in Xi'an, we have made good progress. We have now managed to lease up some of the vacant spaces and now we are back at about 85% occupancy, which is a good level. But we mostly have done them in 4th year. So the

7:12 flow through of revenue will come on board really in 2026. For Hangzhou phase two, we managed to backfill the ex-service office master tenant spaces to about 70%. And again, you know, many of those backfields were done in property. So again, the results really start to kick in in first Q2026. In terms of logistics, we have positive revenue variance. If we look at versus a year ago, we are in better shape our occupancy by year-end which is higher than a year ago of 97.6% for occupancy. The main reason is

8:03 one year ago we had a big asset, our biggest logistics asset Shanghai Fengxian which was vacant one year ago. We managed to tie down a lease for eight years, which effectively mean that in 2025 the whole logistics portfolio was deris and had an improvement in occupancy than 2024. Now with those sector background, the end result was that our DPU for second half 2025 is 2.33 cents and for the full year, our 2025 DPU is 4.2 cents. This includes a one-time top-up distribution second half of 0.33 cents and the

8:51 top-up distribution is really for the loss DI from the Huateng divestment. Now management have decided to top up the loss DI into the distribution for second half because we feel that this is temporal. In 2026 our priority is to look for a new asset to invest it so that we do not need to top up the distribution into in the future. Also to note that this top-up is drawn down from past divestment gains that CLCD has made from divesting asset and the top-up will only have a marginal 0.1% guarantee effect. This will ensure that in 2025, our unit holders will

9:37 have some income stability even though we have divested the hua ting. Now next I will give a little bit of colour of the operational results. For retail asset, there's been improvement in shopper traffic and tenant sales. Traffic grew 2.7% year on year, tenant sales to about 2.1%. Forkview was a strong quarter, which outperformed nine months of 2025 for both traffic and sales by about 4 to 5%. Overall, tenant sales now are above pre-COVID levels, slightly above pre-COVID levels, which is compared to 2019. while traffic is about 5-6% below pre-COVID levels. Overall, occupancy costs at a healthy level at 17.5%,

10:24 below pre-COVID range of about 20%. There are trade caps, some of the trade caps have done well. These are the trade caps that we have highlighted. FMB plus 5.8%, and that's our biggest trade cap for our retail sector. We see strong acceleration in 3Q and 4Q, and that's aided by our introduction of new high performing trending F&B concepts. And we also see broad based growth. We have all local favorites like Haity Lao and also new ones, new rice like Khao Jiang and Japanese sushi chains like Sushi Row and Genken Sushi that continue to do well and even Starbucks have started to deliver growth. For the IT segment we have 9% growth year on year. IT is a segment that

11:14 traditionally enjoys strong sales for the Chinese consumer because the Chinese are very digitally aligned in terms of catching up to new products. And in the last two years, we also see IT sales being boosted by consumption vouchers that has been given up by the government. So we have also taken the opportunity when we do our AEI for Shuefu and Wang Xin to expand more of these digital brands into our spaces to cater to such consumer demand. Among the brands, we have examples like Apple, DJI, Xiaomi that has seen group growth in 2025. Another category is jewelry and watches, they

12:00 are plus 18%. That's driven by the increasing demand for investing in gold which is a safe haven. all over the world including in China. For toys and hobbies, that's exceptional growth that we've seen last year plus 52%. That really points to the continued popularity of the collectibles toys market. We have the strong tenant, Port Mart, which has 100% sales growth year on year. And the adjacent brand, Mini-Soul, which is also now very much into IP merchandising, had also a strong year, plus 30% and growing strong. Other categories that are not listed, which I'll mention here. One year ago, we had some issues with supermarkets, when

12:51 some of our supermarkets have been outdated and we have taken the opportunity when the least aspire to do AEIs on them. Some of the AEIs that I mentioned, the four AEIs that we have done in 2025 were exactly supermarkets operating related. So that's in Wang Jing, Shuefu and Sitzeman. So after we have completed AER in 2025 in fourth queue, we see strong sales growth. Indeed fourth queue from the supermarket category had about 40% sales growth. So that effectively helped us reverse the negative trend of supermarkets from one year ago. Other These are the strong kick-takes, but of course there are other categories that are weaker,

13:37 right? And what we see is that fashion and beauty and a half has over the last few years had dropped in sales. 205 was no different. We had about a single digit drop in sales from these two categories. And the strong categories offset the weaker categories such that, you know, in summary, you get about a plus 2% retail sales growth. These are our occupancy across our moors. You can typically see that our moors have very strong occupancy, 97, 98%. And the only one that I think is weaker is C9, which is below 90%. This is a moor that we have been trying to do repositioning of the moor to strengthen it. In terms of rental

14:24 reversion, we are at minus 2.4%. One of the things to take note for 2025 is we have been doing a lot of EV EV consolidation and pivoting away from EV. What I mean by that is one of these cycles ago, there were a lot of EV tenants who took up prime spaces on our ground floor of our malls and EV car brands have sort of consolidated in China. So we had to basically take back some of the spaces and lease it out again to, you know, more normal tenants on the first floor. and usually EV tenants pay higher rent. So that sort of remixing of trade meets did

15:09 have an impact on our rental reversion. Without the EV impact, our rental reversion would have been minus 0.6 instead of minus 2.4. For our business parks, this sector generally face weaker demand and ample supply. But if you look at our overall occupancy, we are at year end 86.7 and actually there's an improvement from third queue of 85.2% in terms of occupancy and sort of close to 87 mark of about a year ago. Our BP assets generally outperform their sub-markets

15:58 despite the general soft leasing environment for business part, if you can see most of our sub markets, the business part occupancy is actually weak if you look at the white bar, whereas our own assets occupancies tend to be higher. That's the orange bar in this slide. And you can see, you can notice also that SingSue is our strongest business park asset, again a very strong year at 95% occupancy. Xing Su is an asset in Suzhou Industrial Park that is very popular with local as well as MNC tenants and very strong in manufacturing. In China, a manufacturing resurgence is

16:45 happening again, which is why it continues to be quite a strong asset for us. For our Xi'an sector, We have made good progress, especially with electronics and ICT tenants. As mentioned before, the backfueling for AIT is growing well. Now occupancy is at 85.2%. One of the success story for AIT in Sian is we had one big anchor that joined us that took out about 6,000 square meters. This is a trancing memory, which is one of the largest DRAM manufacturers in China for those who are very much following the AI and chip sector. This is a very big name in China and it is a domestic equivalent alternative to

17:33 Samsung, SK Hinex and Microsoft. So we are looking to bring more of this sort of tenants, which are actually being very well supported by the government, local government in China now, to our business parks. For Hangzhou, it has a more challenging environment. This cluster has lots lots of supply, which is why you see, you know, the in the overall sub market occupancy is actually quite low, even though we outperform the occupancy. And we are working very hard to try to list it up. Last year, we were proactive to basically reduce the credit risk of some of our vehicle service office master tenants. And we took back about 50, 55 k square meters in 2025 to directly

18:23 you know, release them to new tenants. The sub-tenants, because they take such a big space, you know, they tend to be at a lower rent. So when we release it to new smaller tenants, we do get a positive reversion. But you will take some time to lease out the whole space. So now we are about 70% of, we have listed out 70% of the 55k square meters and we are working to list out the rest of that space. Overall, I would say that BP reversions are still weak and minus 8%. Of course, a lot of it driven by the troubles we have in Hangzhou and

19:09 with a lesser extent in Xi'an, where we are pursuing tenant occupancy in a very soft market. Next, the logistics part. The smallest part of our portfolio, I mentioned the logistic portfolio has been stabilized. You can see the occupancy has really been on a high level of 98.1%, very much driven by the fact that number one, Shan and Feng Hsieh is now fully list out our biggest asset and it has started to become rent paying in 2025. We also had our Chen Tu asset making improvements and that asset has also seen higher occupancy than a year ago. And

19:56 we feel that going forward, rents would have almost bottomed in this category and we are able to maintain the poor occupancy at these rent levels. In terms of portfolio valuation last, the valuation is 2.025. We had a small drop of 0.8%. Cap rates have largely been unchanged. Most of the impairments came in asset with weaker performance, that is Xing Nan, Ai Teng Mento and Shaan Yai Feng Xian. Shaan Yai Feng Xian, as I mentioned earlier, we signed an eight-year lease at the lower end, right? So that lower end basically got reflected in the valuation. We did a trade-off to make sure that even though we got a keep from the valuation, we will be able to receive a full

20:46 income contribution from the asset which was you know, really vacant from one year ago. Next, I'll go into Capital Management. I'll let Ling Tong maybe talk a little bit more about it. Okay, hi everyone. I'm Ling Tong. I'm the CFO, the designate of this trust. I will briefly introduce our Capital Management effort. So for CLCT manager, we are very much focused on maintaining a healthy financial position for the trust as well as the continue to lower the cost of borrowing for the trust. Total debt last year in 2025 has reduced by about 150 million Singapore dollars year on year. This is after our Yuhua Ting divestment as well as some PERC

21:36 replacement in September 2025. Aggregate leverage which is the gearing in short is 40.7%, which also has significantly reduced by 1.2% year on year. This is attributable to stabilizing renminbi as well as yuhua ting divestment proceeds coming in. So we last year in 2025 have also achieved 8% interest expense savings as compared to 2024. Average cost of debt has gradually decreasing. Now we are pleased to report that our cost of debt in 2025 is 3.32%,

22:23 which is almost 20 basis point year on year improvement. CLCT has benefited from interest rate decrease in both China and in Singapore. In particular, renminbi rate has been moderating as People's Bank of China, PBOC, cut their policy rates to ease the monetary policies in 2024 and 2025. So CLCT now has more exposure to renminbi borrowing and renminbi interest rate, which should give us more interest savings if renminbi rate continue to ease. Our interest coverage ratio has also has actually registered a 2.8 times as the end of 2025. This interest

23:12 coverage ratio is much higher than MAS 1.5 times limit. Under required stress test scenario of 100 basis point increase in cost of debt or 10% decrease in EBITDA, our ICR level is still very comfortable. For FX hedging of our distribution, we hedge 72% of our distribution income stabilizing the distribution cash flow and reduce its risk from FX movements so I will also introduce our debt profile next page okay okay so our debt maturity profile is very well staggered that

24:02 actually means that we are able to manage our refinancing risk better right we keep our debt refinancing each year to not more than 25% of our total debt to avoid any liquidity event. For 2026, we only have one offshore bond of RMB 600 million that is due in the last quarter of 2026. This was the Free Trade Zoom bond issued two years ago. The coupon rate of this bond was 3.8. 3.8%, which for now we should be able to refinance these with substantial savings. So notwithstanding we have significant

24:52 unused bank facility to refinance this bond, we are still evaluating options to continue our capital sourcing diversification as well as to lower the cost of borrowing for the trust. And from this chart, you can also see that the chart is actually very colorful. Each color means the one main source of fund for us. So for CLCT, our source of fund is very diversified. We can raise that from various sources with good mix of renminbi and Singapore dollar funding. Being a capital land read, we enjoy great connectivity, with capital markets and banks in both greater China and in

25:39 Singapore. So through 2025, we have actually stepped up our balance sheet natural hedging by borrowing more debt in renminbi so that to make our gearing less sensitive to FX movement. In early 2025, we issued 600 million renminbi bond at 2.88%. So in Q4 2025, we also refinanced some Singapore dollar loan with renminbi term loan to further boost our natural hedge. So at the end of 2025, our renminbi denominated debt, which has increased to 60% of our total debt portfolio. This is a significant increase

26:30 from 35% one year ago. that has exceeded our earlier communicated target of 50% of total debt being in renminbi by end of 2025. We have actually successfully exceeded that target. And we have also forward contract to further improve our natural hedge. So for interest rate hedging, right, so we are happy to report that our interest rate hedging ratio is 68%. which means majority of our loan are either in fixed rate or swap into a fixed interest rate. The floating rate loan are mostly in renminbi, which like I say, China is actually having a monetary easing. So we hope to

27:20 actually benefit from lower interest rate going forward. Okay. Thanks. So looking forward in 2026, You can see that in 2025 that we have done a number of AEIs and we have successfully completed them and they are all open mostly in October of 2025. All these AEIs I mentioned earlier produce good results. We have returns and rental increase of more than 10% on the AEIs in Shuefu, Wangjing and Si Zemeng. So with these successful AEIs we have proven again that CLCT is able to extract value from our overmores and again demonstrate our track record. In the future, when we look for new investment, we want to utilize this AI ability, not just

28:10 to buy mores at good prices, but also to actively identify opportunities to add value. In terms of our strategy, our summary of our strategies as follows. We want to unlock value. So in 2025, we have done that. We have established a long-term capital recycling vehicle by the CREIT platform. This will support our ongoing portfolio reconstitution when we are looking to expand our presence in tier one and tier two cities by looking for good assets. We are also looking to create value. We have demonstrated it in 2025. by our AEIs.

28:58 In 2026, we continue to want to identify assets that are available to be recycled potentially in the series, as well as source for new assets so that we can replenish before things are lost income. We also want to continue to execute on our AEIs, extract value. As I mentioned, we have done a number in 2025 of AEI's. In 2006, we will continue to evaluate potential new opportunities for AEI's as well as we look at new acquisition targets to identify value add opportunities in those targets. Proactive Capital Management, which Lingtong have basically introduced,

29:45 and I'll summarize that our intent is to continue to drive down interest cost savings through our very proactive capital management efforts that would include expanding our remain p debt access, as well as reducing FX risk where it is appropriate. Now with that, that's the end of my presentation. I will welcome some questions so that I can answer them. Hi everyone, I'm Sui from the IR team. So I will be going through your questions on the question tab. So feel free to submit any questions you have. We have one first question. Can you touch a bit on reversion expectations for 2026 and 2027? Okay, he

30:36 also said that he can see that 44% of the retail revenue are up for renewal this year and 34% of business part portfolio I also out for renewals. So given an oversupplied market in some pockets, what is your expectations of renewal percentages as well as the rates? Okay, thank you for the question. So I think the first question is reversion outlook. Okay, it would be difficult for me to give an outlook more than a year, I think. I mean, in most markets, that is true. So maybe for 2026, If you look at our three sectors, retail, currently we are about, I think 2025 reported about minus 2, 2.4, right? We had some

31:25 EV consolidation that was a factor. In 2026, there will be less issues from EV. But having said that, we feel that generally the consumption patterns are still about the same. we will probably have a slightly better reversion because there will be less EV impact, but reversion will probably still come slightly negative about the minus 2% range. For BP, as you can see, we are still in an environment where there's soft demand, ample supply. We feel that the reversion will probably be the same as

32:12 For our log assets in 2026, I mentioned that rents have probably bottom up. So we feel that reversions will probably be flat to just about slightly negative. So that's basically our outlook for 2026. The other question pertains to the renewal, the renewal percentage. If you look, if you have been following us, I think every year this is about the amount of renewal that we do in a year for retail and business parts. I mentioned earlier our view of retail, which we feel is

33:01 still quite defensive. Reversions will probably be the same. of 2025, we don't feel that it will be much more difficult to basically renew our expired visas. So occupancy should be quite stable. Business parks is more challenging, right? That's why I say that we probably need to have more negative reversions in similar fashion as 2025 in order to continue to push for higher occupancy. Okay, thanks Jerry. We have a second question, which is on the unit price. So our unit price continues to trade below NAB for many years now. So what are the strategies to address this issue? Does

33:50 spinning off your assets into seaweed help? Thank you for that question. I think you hit the knee on the head. In fact, when we decided on this in this series strategy, one of the intent, strategic intent is to demonstrate really the value of our assets and demonstrate to investors as well market players that indeed, you know, our assets should be trading at least at book value, right? Because now of course, it's quite noticeable that our trading price is at a discount to NAV or discount to book value, right? What we have achieved through the Yohua Ting sale in

34:40 securitizing it into as a seed asset into, you know, the series is that we managed to sell the asset at a premium to our book valuation. So what that means is that mathematically, what that means is that we should, you know, in terms of our NAV, be quite, quite quite clear that, you know, we should be trading closer to our NAV rather than the discount that we are seeing right now in terms of our trading price. So that is a signal that we're trying to put to the market. So that's one important thing that we are doing. Of course, you know, the other factor for it very much is the market, right? Over the last few years, you know,

35:30 There's been challenges for China. So, you know, there's inevitably, you know, some of the China plays get affected. And then recently, of course, we have the Iran war. So some of these factors have been macro in nature. We work to make sure that, you know, we communicate that, you know, some of those issues that come from these macro factors, you know, has less impact on our portfolio and we'll continue to do so. For example, the Iran war, one of the questions that frequently is asked is whether Iran war is directly affecting our business operations. We often we happy to tell, you know, all the trading reps here that actually the Iran war has very little impact on China and our business.

36:16 One of the key things is, for example, electricity in China, electricity prices based on coal prices. China is very self-sufficient in coal as well as renewables, right? So actually the oil price pressures do not actually affect any of our electricity suppliers that are supplying electricity to us. And so we don't really see cost pressures from that point of view. So we will continue to communicate the business realities to our unit holders and hopefully that will cause re-rating of our unit price. Okay. We have another question also from Annan, which is on the leveraging of China domestic push. Are there

37:04 pockets or segments which are seeing strong demand and consumption? And if so, which area and what is our strategy to target those? Strong domestic consumption within our retail. Okay, okay. The trade categories. Okay. Earlier on, I think I had a slide that talks about that. You can see here the strong trade cats, F&B, IT, Jewelry and toys and hobbies. Indeed, when we do our AEIs and when we reconfig big spaces, that's always in our mind of how to introduce more of these strong categories into our mall. For example, when we did the

37:49 supermarket AEI in Wangjing, which is in Beijing and Shuefu, which is in Harping. And those were basically a supermarket AI where we took back the old supermarkets and recalve the spaces such that we probably make a smaller supermarket and use the remaining freed up space to introduce some of this concept, which include the toys and hobbies trade. In fact, in Shuefu, we deliberately curated one whole street which we call animation, comics and game street to cater to this new enthusiasm for IP merchandise and toys and hobbies. So the whole street is there and it was fully

38:35 list, very popular, bringing in a young consumer demographic. In Wangjing, we took back the whole supermarket, put in a very small supermarket called by JD and then we managed to use a big area to basically put in a lot of IT tenants, a lot of toys and hobbies tenants, such that the whole mix in that basement area will be more exciting. Okay, company don't have any more questions, so feel free to send in your questions through the tab.

39:47 We have one question on DPU. So DPU had been declining for the last five years. So how are you to arrest this decline? Okay. If you look at the DPU, you know, over the five years and this analysis that we have done, the decline, basically there are three parts. One is FX. Five years ago FX is for our sync to RemiP was about 4.8. Today is 5.3, 5.4. But at one point, of course, last year it got to almost 5.6. So the volatility of RemiP was quite a big factor

40:36 during that period. It's depreciation and that definitely has hurt our DPU. We have over the last two years attempted to do more hedging, both natural and synthetic to make sure that we can give unit holders a more stable DPU. But as you will note that most of our hedging for DPU is actually short term, meaning that it's within a year, right? So we do have to take basically the the FX rate during that year and try to pick the best rate to lock in. But of course, in 2025, we see FX rates of 5.3

41:28 to 5.6, but it's not 4.8, for example, of five years ago. So that is a challenge, but we can see today, actually, there's some good news. We can see that actually Remempy have been strengthening. One year ago, people would have been predicting that Renminbi will continue to depreciate against the US dollars. But today, because of the various actions in US, including the expenditure that it is currently doing through the war, and also a little bit less trust in the US dollars, there is more confidence in Renminbi, as well as the efforts of the Chinese government to internationalise the RMB currency. So

42:15 we feel that RMB strengthening is a good sign and hopefully you continue to strengthen and hopefully we get closer to the five mark and maybe below five mark over time. So that's maybe one third of the reason why the DPU have fallen over five years. The other reason is interest rates. you may recall maybe five years ago, actually interest rates were very low. Indeed, for our rate, five years ago, the average cost of debt was maybe about 2.6. Today, Lingtong just introduced our average cost of debt about 3.3, right? We are working very hard. And you know that although you read in the

43:02 news that the interest rate has been coming down, right, we have been locked in over the last few years because we don't do short-term debt. Right, we often lock in some amount, you know, some more fixed debt over usually about three years. Right. So it will take some time for us to reduce our cost of debt. Every year we are reducing anything between 20 to 30 bits. Right. So in a few years time, hopefully we'll be able to drive the average cost of debt down so that we are closer to what we were five years ago, which is about 2% levels. Right. So with that, we then can take care of that one third portion of the fall in DPU. Lastly, I would say the remaining one third is really about asset performance, MPI performance, which

43:53 of course, you can see that retail has been stronger than the new economy sectors. We have tried to stabilize for the new economy sectors by stabilizing our logistics portfolio, right, which we have done. And for Business Park, we continue to work hard to try to deal with the vacancies. So that is one part that we're trying our best to prop it up. But for retail, I feel that it's actually quite a stable portfolio for us. Some of our trade categories, as you can see, actually doing quite well. We have positive sales growth and high occupancies. So what we are just lacking is maybe the recovery of a few sectors in order for our rental reversions start to become positive. Right now is negative, right? Particularly, I would

44:42 mention that fashion is one category that we are watching intently. Fashion is a big category for us. I think it's the second biggest category after FMB. Over the last few years, it has been dropping in terms of sales productivity, but we feel that the the first few months of this year, right, we had seen some good results, right? We feel that that could be because last year, online sales, you know, have been specially targeted by the government to for tax enforcement. What I mean by that is that, you know, a lot of e-commerce sellers actually don't pay tax, right? The Chinese government has become stricter and

45:34 put in stronger guidelines to basically ask e-commerce sellers to declare their sales so that they can charge appropriate taxes. So that is something that may drive pure online sellers offline. As online sellers actually also face a high commission rates from the e-commerce platform. you know, for the e-commerce platform like Taobao, right, they actually charge a very high commission rate of, you know, 25% and up, right. So, so we can see that, you know, if the tax situation is normalized, that could be a plus point for

46:19 our offline fashion trade. So I don't want to call the turn yet, but some positive sign, you will take some time, right. But once that fashion trade basically turn around, that will be one good clear signal that perhaps our retail organic growth can come back. Okay, thanks. The next question is on acquisitions. So are there any distressed assets in China which you can acquire below NAV and also help to have our overall NAV growth and is M&A part of our strategy? Okay. I would say generally true distressed assets are harder to find

47:04 now right maybe about two three years ago maybe you read in the news some of the issues relating to Wanta and Wanker but at those junctures yes you know where where the uncertainty and the real estate issues were the highest and the real estate debt issues especially offshore debt were at the highest, that was where some of the distress sales really happened. Now, I would say generally speaking, you can get good pricing, maybe better than the past, but it may not be what

47:51 one would characterize as truly distress, like I would say maybe half price. So that's for the retail sector because generally speaking retail has been a generally more defensive portfolio. But having said that, there are many developers and many investors in China. They have different reasons for getting out of the market. So we are in close contact with the brokers and our ground team in China. And if there are any such opportunity, of course, we will be willing to explore them. On the business part and logistics parts, they have been maybe less

48:41 resilient than retail. But there may be some opportunities to pick up some of those assets at a deeper discount. But I have to say that we are also trying to balance the pricing as well as the stability of the asset, right? When we come to picking acquisition, right? Some assets, for example, if we buy a very poor business part, I said even poorer than the ones that we have right now at a discounted price, it's actually quite difficult to evaluate if the slight for those assets continue to go down because the general environment has been quite poor for business part in terms of both leasing,

49:33 both occupancy and rentals. There are actually a few questions on DPU acquisitions, which I think Jerry has more or less covered in the previous responses. The next one is, you know, are there plans to actually issue rights non-inunciable or unenunciable as a capital raising exercise for 2026 and 2027? I would answer this in conjunction with the earlier question maybe I missed out about M&A, right? I presume M&A many acquisitions, yeah. because I mean, there are actually not many estates that are looking at China assets nowadays. So

50:21 in terms of acquisition, of course, I've already mentioned that we are actively in the market to look for one to replace the loss-rewarding asset, right? And because the rewarding asset, to be honest, it does give good distributions, right, but it's not a very big asset. When we saw it's about 800 million RMB, right, 800 million RMB. So in our current plan, based on what we are planning to do anyway, is that we want to look for an asset in and around the same sizing, right? So by doing that, that sort of you know, same size replacement, we don't

51:07 feel that we need to do very big equity fundraising, particularly if you're talking about a rights issuance, which probably means a big offering that would probably not be what I've communicated previously, right? Of course, you know, if there was a like, you know, what the earlier question that was asked if there was a very truly distressed retail mall that offers great, very compelling, compelling yield, right? And we can demonstrate that to unit holders and we can still make the deal very creative by doing a rights issue. We will go to unit holders to discuss it, right? But

51:58 our current plans right, is basically to acquire based on our own balance sheet rather than trying to raise too much money. Okay, I think one of the last questions so far is this year, will management consider expanding retail malls in other China cities, for example, like tier two cities? We are open, right? The asset that we sold was actually in the tier two city Changsha. So if one thing is in Changsha, it's a tier two city. we are open to tier one or tier two cities and we have good experience with them as well. Right. So indeed, that's one of the areas that we're looking at. Okay. I think so far, that's all the questions we had. Jerry, do you have any closing remarks?

52:49 Yes. Thank you so much everyone for attending. And this year, As I explained earlier, we look to build on what we have done last year, which is really strategically setting us up to be a unique platform, which has basically a leak in Singapore and leak in China, capital markets by having the CREIT connection. Last year, after the listing of CREIT, right, and the injection of Yuhua Ting, we sort of set up step one of that, of the basically that flywheel that that, you know, we are doing, which is, which is the securitization part. Step two, now

53:36 that we should be doing 2026 is to find an asset where we can continue to add value, and eventually, hopefully do the same action to reinject into a series. And with this action, we organically, you know, try to sell try to buy at a higher yield and then sell at a lower yield and inorganically try to increase our DPU. If we can do this repeatedly, we have a very sustainable DPU flywheel where we can continue to improve our DPU for our unit holders. Okay, thank you Jerry. If anyone has any more questions, feel free to reach out the leader UB or the RN team at CLCT. So with this, thank you everyone for your time and we will hand the time

54:23 back over to the Tigers.