HIKAYAT SUKARNO

Brief Summary

This video explores the complex interplay of international politics, personal ambitions, and economic interests that led to the downfall of Indonesia's first president, Sukarno. It examines the alleged involvement of the CIA and Allen Dulles in undermining Sukarno's power, the discovery of gold mines in Papua, and the power struggles that ensued after the G30S PKI incident. The video also touches on Sukarno's final days, his isolation, and the controversies surrounding his death and burial.

  • The discovery of gold mines in Papua sparked a power struggle between Sukarno, Kennedy, Allen Dulles, and the Rockefeller family.
  • The CIA allegedly used various tactics, including propaganda and sending female agents, to destabilize Sukarno's government.
  • The G30S PKI incident served as a catalyst for Sukarno's downfall, leading to Soeharto's rise to power.
  • Sukarno's final days were marked by isolation, neglect, and the denial of his wishes for his burial.

CIA MENANG, SUKARNO TUMBANG

The video begins by suggesting a connection between the death of John F. Kennedy and the fall of Sukarno, linking these events to the control of gold mines in Papua. Allen Dulles, the CIA director, is portrayed as a key figure who orchestrated a sophisticated intelligence strategy to undermine Sukarno's power. After Sukarno's fall, Soeharto granted a work contract to Freeport, leading to the exploitation of Indonesia's natural resources by American interests. The conflict is framed as a battle between Sukarno and Kennedy against Allen Dulles and the CIA, with Dulles ultimately emerging as the victor.

CARA KOTOR CIA TUMBANGKAN SUKARNO

The CIA's attempts to remove Sukarno from power began as early as 1953, driven by concerns that Sukarno was allowing the Communist Party (PKI) to grow too strong and aligning with the Eastern Bloc. Despite Sukarno's assurances to President Eisenhower and Richard Nixon that he was not a communist, the CIA continued its efforts to undermine his regime. These efforts included considering Sukarno's assassination and supporting rebellions such as the PRRI and Permesta. The CIA also employed tactics such as sending a female agent, Pet Price, to infiltrate the Merdeka Palace and producing a pornographic film, codenamed "Happy Days," to discredit Sukarno.

PERLAWANAN TERAKHIR SUKARNO

After Soeharto dissolved the PKI, Sukarno viewed this as a political decision that exceeded Soeharto's authority. Sukarno drafted an order on March 13, 1966, to correct the implementation of Supersemar, reminding Soeharto that it was an order, not a transfer of power, and that all actions must be consulted with the President. However, Soeharto responded coldly, stating that all actions he took were under his own responsibility. Soeharto then issued an arrest warrant for 15 ministers, further undermining Sukarno's power. Despite these challenges, Sukarno maintained that he still held full power and that Soeharto had not taken over his power.

NASIB SUKARNO SETELAH PERISTIWA G-30S

Following the G30S PKI incident, Sukarno's political position weakened. Despite his attempts to maintain control, protests and demonstrations erupted, and rumors spread about his involvement in the incident. Sukarno's calm demeanor at a cabinet meeting after the kidnapping and murder of army generals was misinterpreted, leading to further erosion of his support. The situation culminated in the March 11, 1966, order, which marked a significant defeat for Sukarno and indirectly led to the end of his power.

:5 - PERANG DINGIN MARINIR VS AD PASCA SUKARNO TUMBANG

After Sukarno's fall, a mysterious military operation was planned to rescue him from house arrest in Wismayaso. The KKO, a naval force loyal to Sukarno, intended to take him away from Wismayaso. However, when KKO troops reached Sukarno, he refused to be saved, preventing a potential civil war. During the transition of power from Sukarno to Soeharto, there was a cold war between the KKO and the Army, with the Army supporting Soeharto and the KKO remaining loyal to Sukarno. This friction led to incidents such as the KKO taunting the Brawijaya Military Commander. Eventually, the cold war ended after a mutual understanding was reached, and Soeharto consolidated his power.

SUKARNO DIBUNUH PELAN-PELAN

Sukarno's final days were marked by isolation and neglect. He was kept away from friends and family, and his health declined. Forensic expert Dr. Munim Idris attributed Sukarno's death to the state's neglect of the proclaimer. Despite his declining health, Sukarno remained resilient in spirit, emphasizing that his ideas and ideology could not be killed. In his final moments, Sukarno was able to meet his son for the first and last time. Even in death, Sukarno's wishes for his burial were not fully honored, highlighting the tragic end of a founding father.

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Transcript

Full transcript of “HIKAYAT SUKARNO”. Click a timestamp to open the video at that moment. Need another video? Use the YouTube transcript generator.

0:00 [Music] [Applause] [Music] [Music] The death of John F. Kennedy, the 35th president of the United States,

0:46 still leaves a mystery that has not been revealed. Conspiracy theories abound regarding his death. [Music] But have you ever heard that Kennedy's death was connected to the fall of Sukarno and the control of gold mines in Papua? [Music] is Allen Duls, the CIA director who

1:32 designed the most sophisticated intelligence strategy ever seen in the modern century . Kennedy died, Sukarno fell, the communists were finished, and the gold was taken over. 3 weeks after being inaugurated as acting president of the Republic of Indonesia, Soeharto gave a work contract to Freeport. Not only gold, even many of this country's natural resources were drained and controlled by America after Sukarno fell. Indonesia at that time became a battleground between Soekarno and Kennedy on one side against Island Duls and CA on the other side.

2:18 And the winner is Allen Duls, Gk Paul Grain, an Indonesianist who is also a history teacher from Australia, in his book JFK versus Allen Dules Battleground Indonesia tells the story about it. This most complicated and confusing conflict began with the discovery of the world's largest gold and copper resources in the Ersberg and Gresburg areas in Papua in 1936. Jenquest Dozi, a researcher from the Netherland New Guinea Potrellium Company or NNGPM, a Dutch mining company that discovered the mine with two other colleagues.

3:06 Of course this will be tempting for global mining companies. However, at that time the Netherlands downplayed the news so that the public would not know much about it. Of course the Dutch were worried. Papua will become a cake to be fought over and targeted by many nations. When the Netherlands and Indonesia fought over sovereignty in Papua, there was actually an invisible conflict between the Dutch authorities and the company owned by the Rockeaveller family, the legendary American conglomerate family. In fact, 60% of the shares of NNGPM, the Dutch mining company where Dozi worked, were controlled by Standard Vacuum Oil and Standard Oil of California. The

3:52 two oil companies are closely linked to the Rockefeller family. [Music] NNG GPM projects Freeport sulfur to control access to the gold mine in Eartsburg in Papua. This is where Duls plays a role on two stages. [Music] First, as CIA director, he wanted Sukarno to fall so that America could freely mine gold in Papua. In addition, he also played the role of an advocate working for the Rockefeller family. Dules, is known to be an important figure

4:38 who controls Rockaveller's share dominance in NNGPN. When the Dutch finally handed over Papua to Indonesia in 1962, Freeport was very concerned about securing access to the gold mine. [Music] Unfortunate for Rockaveller. President Sukarno's government was very nationalistic. He has fortified the expansion of global capitalist interests through the Oil, Gas and Mining Law which requires all foreign companies in Indonesia to be nationalized.

5:26 When Kennedy came to power, he adopted an embracing strategy to tame Sukarno. This is in stark contrast to Duls' scheme, which better represents and safeguards Rockefeller's corporate interests in Indonesia. For a long time, Dul had planned to have Soekarno overthrown or perhaps even killed in various ways. Many of the CIA's dirty practices in overthrowing Sukarno were finally exposed. Since 1958, it is no longer a secret that the United States has begun to implement a policy of subversion against Indonesia. The PKI's landslide victory in the 1955 general election and Sukarno's increasing leaning towards the Eastern Bloc were seen as a threat to

6:12 American interests in the Southeast Asian region at that time. Before Kennedy came to power, namely during the administration of President Aen How Allen Dules, it was reported that he had been involved in efforts to remove Sukarno. America and the CIA began to support the PRRI rebellion and the party. Dules also kept Soekarno busy after confronting the Dutch over West Irian. He created a confrontation against Malaysia. [Music] One of the dirty tricks that Ca did to trap Soekarno happened in mid-1965. CIA sent a very beautiful agent who had an attractive appearance. Pet Price is the name.

6:59 Pet Price managed to enter the Merdeka Palace and disguised himself as an American student who was conducting research on Javanese culture. [Music] In short, Pet Price managed to get along well with Soekarno and his children. Even according to Guntur Soekarno Putra in the book Bung Karno, My Father, My Friend, and My Teacher, his father almost fell into the arms of that strange woman. Fortunately, before the situation got any worse, Soekarno was informed by the President of Pakistan, Ayub Khan, that the beautiful woman in his palace was a CIA agent. Information from one of his close friends made Soekarno furious. Pet was then expelled from Indonesia.

7:47 Not only that, they also made dirty propaganda to bring down Sukarno. One of them was producing a pornographic film with the code Happy Days to corner Soekarno. This short film shows someone who looks like Soekarno having lewd sex with a Caucasian woman. It was previously reported that Soekarno had a special relationship with a Russian flight attendant who was said to be a KGB agent. This CIA propaganda film wanted to show that Sukarno was a maniac and had fallen into the grip of the Soviets. But all the CIA's black propaganda and dirty tricks failed and

8:33 failed to bring down the big man. Even Soekarno became stronger and was able to hold John F. Kennedy as his friend. For Kennedy, Sukarno was a nationalist. He did not believe that the Indonesian proclaimer was a communist. Of course Alendus and his CIA were worried beyond belief. He then devised a number of strategies. One of them was to hinder Kennedy's intention to provide aid to Indonesia. In 1963, Kennedy accepted an invitation from Bung Karno to come to Indonesia in 1964. One of the agendas they would discuss was an economic program to help the Papuan people. [Music] But unfortunately Kennedy never

9:20 made it to Indonesia because he was killed. Kennedy was shot dead while visiting Dallas in an open motorcade on Friday, November 22, 1963. In 2016, the Daily Mail interviewed Oliver Stone, the director who made the film Kennedy. He revealed the confession of a former member of Kennedy's security team that the assassination of the young, nationalist president was carried out by his team. The former Kennedy bodyguard who suffered from cancer said, "Someone from our team has shot the President. The shooter's nickname was Ron. [Music]

10:06 Until now, official sources say that Lee Harvard Hos was accused of being the shooter of John F. Kennedy. [Music] Two days after Kennedy's shooting, Oswald was reportedly shot dead by a nightclub owner. [Music] After Kennedy's death, at the same time, Duls continued to devise a strategy to remove Sukarno from the presidential seat. Dules skillfully devised a strategy to make Sukarno's government unstable. The CIA under DU always created political events that made Sukarno unable to consolidate his power and manage the economy

10:52 well. So why did Sukarno have to be removed? The answer is if Sukarno remained in power, it would be very difficult for Dules to obtain or control the gold mountains in Papua which already belonged to Indonesia. Dul was very aware that if Sukarno became president for life, his plan to control the gold mines in Papua would fail. 2 years after Kennedy's death, the G30S PKI incident occurred. This was the starting point for the fall of Sukarno's power. After Kennedy died and Sukarno's power fell, Dules' path to control the gold mines in Papua was smooth. Two years later, the Freeport contract was signed under

11:38 the rule of Suharto, who was leaning towards America. Dules, who had built a long career in intelligence since President Kennedy was born, finally emerged victorious. [Music]

12:57 Yeah. [Music] [Music] [ Applause] [Music]

13:44 Only 8 years after the proclamation of Indonesian independence, the superpower United States through its intelligence agency, the CIA, had attempted to oust Sukarno from the presidential seat. In 1953, the CIA's intention to remove Sukarno emerged after the National Security Council of the Intelligence Agency issued a report dated September 9, 1953. In the report, it was revealed that the situation in Indonesia was very frightening for the United States. According to Tim Weiner in his book, Exposing the Failure of the CIA,

14:31 President Sukarno was considered to have given too much wind to the Communist Party to develop in Indonesia and this was beneficial for the Eastern Bloc, which was then led by the Soviet Union. But the CIA's accusation was denied by Sukarno. when meeting with President Een Howard and his Vice President Richard Nixon. Richard Nixon himself stated that Sukarno tried to convince President Howard that he was not a communist. Sukarno also emphasized that he would arrest communists if they dared to mess around in Indonesia. Nevertheless, the CIA continued its plan to remove Sukarno

15:16 from the presidency of the Republic of Indonesia. The Director of the CIA's Joint Security Service, Harold Station, advised Richard Nixon and CIA Director Allen Duls to consider regime change in Indonesia. Sukarno's regime, according to the CIA, was very bad. The CIA seriously considered assassinating Sukarno in the spring of 1955, as Tim Winer wrote in his book . Sukarno's wife, Ratna Sari Dewi, in a 2008 interview with the Japan Times, stated that Sukarno had tried to assassinate Sukarno five times. She also

16:03 revealed several documents indicating Sukarno's downfall due to CIA interference. The documents were recorded on 10 folios. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union for world domination indeed left developing countries in a state of panic and confused about which side to take. Thus, the Non-Aligned Movement emerged, namely the movement Countries that did not side with either the American-led Western bloc or the Soviet-led Eastern bloc. The Non-Aligned Movement itself began with the 1955 Asian Summit held in Bandung. It was attended by leaders

16:48 from 29 developing countries in Asia and Africa. Five world leaders were the founders of this movement, one of whom was President Sukarno. Sukarno, who had opposed imperialism from his youth, naturally spearheaded this movement. Sukarno's resignation dashed America's hopes of establishing a military base in Indonesia to control the Pacific. Meanwhile, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand all received American military bases. Nineteen days after the Asian-African Conference

17:33 , the CIA received a covert action order from the White House. This order authorized the CIA to use any means necessary, including bribing and paying Indonesian politicians. Winner's notes also mention that the CIA supported funding for the Masumi Party, Sukarno's most powerful political enemy at the time. The CIA reportedly provided approximately US$1 million in funding. However, the CIA's operation in the 1955 election failed. Sukarno's PNI party won while Masumi came in second. And surprisingly, the PKI managed to

18:20 come in fourth, which made America even more anxious. America feared that Sukarno would lean further to the left, and in the end, it was proven true. Australian Indonesianist Greg Paul Gren also said that the PRRI rebellion in Sumatra and Permesta in Sulawesi were part of a CIA tactic. With CIA assistance, the rebellion could be prolonged for two years or more. However, the army, which at that time showed solid support for Sukarno, was able to defeat the rebels in Sumatra and Sulawesi . The army then grew stronger and became a sworn enemy of the PKI later on.

19:07 One of the CIA's dirtiest ways to bring down Sukarno was a pornographic film project codenamed Happy Days. This film was projected to corner Sukarno. This short film shows someone who looks like Sukarno in a lewd manner with a Russian flight attendant who is actually an agent of the Russian KGB Intelligence Service. Previously, rumors had circulated that Sukarno had a special relationship with a Russian flight attendant who was said to be a Soviet intelligence agent. This film was not only intended to This not only undermined Sukarno's morale in the eyes of the world and his people, but also incited discord

19:54 between Indonesia and the Soviet Union, which were at the height of their affection at the time. This CIA propaganda also aimed to portray Sukarno as a maniac who had fallen into the grip of the Soviets. Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent tasked with producing this fake film, admitted to making the film. He was asked by CIA Security Chief Colonel Sevil Edward to make the film appear to depict an intimate relationship between Sukarno and the flight attendant in one of the Kremlin guest rooms . After completion, the plan was for the film and the photographs, which appeared to be taken by surveillance cameras, to be sent

20:40 anonymously to news stations in various countries, with the narrative that Sukarno was already under Soviet influence. Maheu admitted that the film he made was not intended to be pornographic. All they wanted was surveillance camera footage that would appear to depict Sukarno being caught red-handed with the Russian woman. He also stated that the film only took five minutes to shoot. Filming took place in a Hollywood studio in the middle of the night. Ultimately, this CIA propaganda was not successful. was released. Only a few snippets of the image reportedly spread to Indonesia,

21:26 Asia, and Europe. Not only that, in mid- 1965, the CIA again attempted to overthrow Sukarno by sending a female agent with an attractive appearance and a very beautiful face. Pet Price, the CIA's Intel name, entered the Merdeka Palace disguised as an American student conducting research on Javanese culture. In short, Pet Price managed to enter and blend into the main palace environment. She even got along well with Sukarno's children. According to Guntur Soekarno Putra in the book Bung Karno, My Father, My Friend, My Teacher, His Father,

22:14 he was looking to fall into the arms of the American woman. Fortunately, before the situation escalated further, Sukarno was informed by the President of Pakistan, Ayub Khan, that the beautiful woman in his palace was a CIA agent. Of course, this information from one of his close friends made Sukarno furious. Pet Price was then expelled from Indonesia. [Music]

23:14 Destruction of Scarno has been restrained by General Suharto. A premature move mighty and a civil war. For all his faults, Bung Karnoed by millions of amid, viewed his bankrupt army and addressed his officers. October 5, I as president issued a decree of asylum,

23:59 especially in the world of anerial and anti-no one country can stand tall, the army must We must maintain a united power so that it will not split apart . [Music] Soekarno's anger exploded. The day after the issuance of the March 11th order , he heard the news that Soeharto had dissolved the PKI. For Soekarno,

24:46 Super Semar was not an order delegating power so that Soeharto could not make political decisions. Soekarno considered the decision to dissolve the PKI a political decision and political decisions were his authority as the legitimate president. Soeharto is not the vice president and I am not incapacitated. I am not afraid to dissolve the PKI if the PKI has rebelled. That's what President Soekarno said as quoted in AM Hanafi's book, suing General Soeharto's coup from Gestapu to Supersar. There should be no reason for Soeharto not to

25:33 ask for approval and signature from President Soekarno considering that the President was at the Bogor Palace and only a 1-hour drive from Jakarta. [Music] Sunday On March 13, 1966, the atmosphere at the Bogor Palace was tense. That evening, President Soekarno summoned his three deputy prime ministers, Suban Rio, Jemena, and Khairul Saleh, to the Bogor Palace. Also present were the commander of the Indonesian Navy Commando Corps (KKO), Major General Hartono, and AM Hanafi himself. The Indonesian Ambassador to Cuba was also present. Soekarno considered Soeharto's actions to have

26:20 exceeded the authority granted to him. That same evening, President Soekarno drafted the March 13, 1966, order to correct the implementation of Supersemar. Through the March 13, order, the President reminded General Soeharto that Supersemar was an order, not a transfer of power. Every implementation must be consulted with the President. Soekarno also requested that General Soeharto appear to account for it. The dissolution of the PKI itself was issued by Lieutenant General Soeharto through Presidential Decree No. 1/3/1966. The Presidential Decree was signed by Soeharto in the name of President

27:06 Soekarno without providing any notification and asked Sukarno for permission first. Essentially, the contents of the March 13th order were to remind Suharto, as the holder of Supersemar, to carry out the President's orders technically and not to make decisions outside the technical military realm. Sukarno then sent Deputy Prime Minister I Dr. Jelemena to deliver the order to Suharto, who then responded coldly . " Tell the President that all actions I take are under my own responsibility," Suharto said. This was later acknowledged by Suharto himself . Suharto explained

27:54 that President Sukarno already knew that he would dissolve the PKI. So this is something from our experience in dealing with the dangers of communism . After we dissolved it, everything was finally resolved. Then, at one point, he showed all the B Perdam and was scolded for participating in drafting the order. Even though there was no order to dissolve the PKI, why did I dissolve it? Then, then, Mr. Lemena was scolded and then ordered to do something. came

28:41 to me in Alim asked if calling me Mas Harto was wrong, what was wrong with that? The PKI was disbanded, yes, I said that, what was it called? Bung Kar already knew that I would be very barbaric, very angry with me, never mind, I'm the one who took responsibility, unfortunately, the one who dissolved it. Soeharto's decision to disband the PKI was confirmed by one of Soekarno's favorite generals, Major General Ibrahim Aji. When meeting with Leena who

29:26 delivered the follow-up order, the Siliwangi Military Commander heard the Deputy Prime Minister's story that Bung Karno was very angry because the PKI was disbanded. However, Ibrahim Aji considered that there was nothing wrong with Soeharto disbanding the PKI because Soeharto held on to the Suersmar which contained the authority to take any action deemed necessary to restore security and order. also guaranteed the safety of the President. After delivering the March 13 order , that same night Dr. Leimena returned to the Bogor Palace and reported to President Soekarno that the letter had been given directly to General Soeharto.

30:12 Leimena recounted the cold and sufficient response. Soeharto also said that he did not could come to meet the President because tomorrow there would be a full meeting of the armed forces commanders at the Merdeka Palace. [Music] AM Hanafi said that at that time everyone was silent. The President was silent. General Hartono was also silent. Meanwhile, Leimana was seen looking down at the floor. It seemed everyone was thinking about what would happen next. What happened next was that on March 18, 1966, Soeharto issued an arrest warrant for 15 ministers.

30:59 Armed with Supersemar, Soeharto ordered Colonel Sarwo Edi to arrest the ministers. RPKAD troops were tasked with surrounding the state palace to arrest Soekarno's ministers . The arrest of these 15 ministers was a severe blow to President Soekarno. Then on March 27, Soekarno was very reluctant to announce a new cabinet formed by Soeharto. Purges of Soekarno loyalists also took place in the military and bureaucracy. [Music] Soeharto himself said that Supersemar was only used once and

31:45 only to dissolve the PKI in the name of President Soekarno. Just like the March 11 warrant, the March 13 warrant This is also very mysterious. To this day, the whereabouts of the Super Semar are unknown. However, what is certain is that Sukarno's efforts to withdraw Super Semar were fruitless. Slowly, his power began to be dismantled. Sukarno was approaching his final moments as president, the great leader of the revolution, and the MPRS mandate. Even so, Sukarno seemed very confident that he still held the power of the president and the armed forces.

32:31 This is evident from his interview with Cindy Adams, an American journalist who asked him if he was forced to hand over power to Suharto. He replied that he still had full power and Suharto had not taken over his power. [Music] takeover, the enforced takeover of power by General Suharto in this country. What? Well, we've been led to believe that you were forced to surrender your power. [Music ] Crazy. I know, I know, I know.

33:19 Abroad, some people say that I've been outed, that I'm not the active president anymore, and that General Suharto has taken over power. Not true. I 'm still in power. What I gave to General Suharto the March 11 months that was just an order to

34:06 look after the security. in Indonesia that nothing happen which can disturb and quiet which can disturb the security of the revolution which can disturb the smooth of government which can endure my physical and

34:53 eh wibawa wibawa what is the mental no wibawa is the authority ah of the president [Music] Yesterday Soeharto himself made the statement. Where is the English? The English. Yes, I will do it.

35:39 Here, here it's authority. Is that it? Here it is even the daily mail yesterday. General Soeharto no coup Lutana General Soeharto [Music] to report interpose today strongly denied reports about today strongly denied reports about the coup in Indonesia as broadcast by Nicol President Soekarno is still in function as president supreme armed forces

36:25 commander great leader of the revolution MPRS supreme Congress mandatory he said on the anniversary of the proclamation of independence August 17, 1966 Soekarno delivered a speech entitled Never Leave History or known as Jas Merah. He emphasized that the issuance of the superar was nothing other than an order to maintain security stability. He thought the March 11 order was is a transfer of authority. In fact, it is not. So said Soekarno in his speech.

37:14 General Soeharto has carried out the order well and I thank General Soeharto for this. But surely, General Soeharto is becoming more popular and his power is growing. [Music] In contrast to Bung Karno's popularity which is increasingly eroded, Soeharto's influence is getting stronger and he succeeded in changing the status of Supersemar into MPRS decree number 9 Roman 1966. That means Soekarno can no longer

38:01 annul Supersemar. Soekarno's last resistance was the Nawaksara speech. Nawaksara is the title of Soekarno's accountability speech which was delivered before the MPRS general session on June 22, 1966. However, Soekarno's accountability speech was rejected by the MPRS because it did not explain the accountability regarding the G30S PKI issue. Yes, because I wrote it, I want to name it Aksara. Nawa Aksara. In response to the MPRS's rejection of Nawaksara on January 10, 1967, Soekarno delivered a report written.

38:51 Finally, President Soekarno's power was revoked through MPRS Decree No. 33 of 1967 dated March 12, 1967. The Soekarno era was over and the two letters of command remain a mystery to this day . [Music] As a result of the counter-revolutionary adventure that called itself the September 30th Movement with the Revolutionary Council that dismissed the Wikora cabinet, the President, the Supreme Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, the

39:38 great leader of the revolution, Bung Karno, who was protected by God's wisdom and guidance, on October 6, 1965, called a Wikora cabinet meeting at the Bogor Palace. The plenary session of the Wikora cabinet, led directly by the President, the Supreme Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, the great leader of the revolution, Bung Karno, discussed in depth the development of the country's situation since the Gestapu incident, from the Prologue to the facts themselves and its aftermath. Basically, the September 30th movement was a political movement and therefore had to be resolved politically as well. For that reason, the President was entrusted with all

40:24 the policies for resolving it. In order for the resolution to be implemented as well as possible, he asked that all members of society create an atmosphere orderly and calm. The task of restoring security following the adventure was handed over to the Commander of Kostrat, Major General Suharto. Ratnaari Dewi, Bung Karno's Japanese wife, was visibly upset while watching a TVRI broadcast covering the Dwikora cabinet meeting at Bogor Palace on October 6, 1965, six days after the kidnapping and murder of the army generals. The

41:11 cabinet meeting discussed the murder of six top army generals that had occurred a week earlier. In the session, the PKI, accused of being the mastermind behind the incident, was represented by Nyoto and Lukman. Meanwhile, Aidit, the chairman, was nowhere to be found. What made Dewi upset Soekarno's expression was so calm and he smiled a lot as if nothing had happened. Her husband looked relaxed, joking with journalists and was seen smoking. Seeing this, Dewi was disappointed and then wrote a letter to warn Soekarno.

41:56 In the midst of an uncertain situation like that at that time, Soekarno's attitude was clearly vulnerable to being misinterpreted. Moreover, Soekarno was not present at the funeral of the generals the day before. [Music] Williamman, a journalist and friend of Soekarno, in his book tells about Dewi's letter to her husband. In Oldsman's book, it is said that Soekarno asked Dewi not to misunderstand him. At that cabinet meeting, I smiled to show the world that I was safe and that I had the situation under control. "

42:41 I also laughed to give confidence and strength to my people." So said Soekarno confidently. But in fact Soekarno miscalculated and Dewi's fears were indeed true. Then rumors spread wildly that the President might be involved or at least knew in advance about the G30S incident. And since then, the bells of Soekarno's downfall slowly began to ring and his politics and power slowly but surely began to slip away from him. [Music] After the kidnapping of the army generals , Soekarno began to lose

43:27 control of the situation. Protests and demonstrations involving tens of thousands of people began to get out of control and even turned brutal. The PKI headquarters were burned. The increasingly blazing anti-communist and anti-Chinese sentiments were followed by acts of burning houses and the destruction of property and lives. No mercy was shown. The peak occurred on February 24, 1966 when a demonstration was held in front of the State Palace. The masses were involved in a clash with the Cakra Birawa regiment which resulted in casualties. One of them was Arif Rahman Hakim, a demonstrator from the University of Indonesia. Although it is not known

44:14 which unit's bullet ended his life. The next day, February 25th, our organization was disbanded by Sukarno. The students then complained to Suharto, the Minister Commander of the Army, who had allowed the disbandment. They were disappointed. Suharto did nothing to prevent our disbandment. In fact, Suharto seemed very curt in responding to the student leaders' requests at the time. " If you want me to lead, follow my way. If you can't follow me, go bang your heads against the wall." Soeharto said, as recounted by

45:00 1966 activist Yusuf Wanadi in his memoir, " Revealing the New Order." Suharto's response clearly shows that he was very cautious in his approach to Sukarno. After all, Sukarno was still very powerful. At that time, Suharto could easily crush the PKI and its underground organizations. But facing Sukarno directly was a different story. He needed a sharp strategy to face this great man. The military power behind Sukarno at that time was still far stronger than the forces supporting him. Suharto. Even within the Army itself, there were many factions. They were not

45:46 united with Suharto. There were territorial commanders who were loyal supporters of Sukarno, even though they were anti-communist, such as the Commander of West Java, Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Aji, and the Commander of Central Java, Maj. Gen. Suryo Sumpeno. Not to mention the generals loyal to Sukarno at Army Headquarters, such as Maj. Gen. Mursyid. Furthermore, support for Sukarno also came from the Air Force. This 36,000-strong force was under the control of Omar Dani, who was very loyal to Sukarno. The police force, led by Sucipto Judo Diharjo, was also pro-Sukarno. But the most prominent was of course the KKO commander, Major General Hartono.

46:35 However, in the end, a series of demonstrations supported by Prof. Suharto's army, which advocated Tritura, finally defeated Sukarno. This culminated in demonstrations and news of the siege of the palace by unknown troops on March 11, 1966. At that time, Sukarno led a cabinet meeting at the Merdeka Palace. All ministers and heads of institutions were ordered to attend the meeting. The first plenary session of the 100-minister cabinet, the result of the reshuffled Dwikora cabinet, which was protested by students. Suharto, who was then serving as Minister of Army Commander, was absent due to illness. Ten minutes into the meeting, Cakra

47:22 Birawa Commander Brigadier General Sabur sent a memo to the Commander of the Jaya Military Command, Brigadier General Amir Mahmud, stating that there were rogue troops outside the palace. These troops were apparently targeting Subano. After the presence of the rogue troops disguised among the students was discovered, President Sukarno then left Jakarta for the Bogor Palace by helicopter. Three army generals, Brigadier General Amir Mahmud, Brigadier General M. Yusuf, and Maijen Basuki Rahmat, then met with Suharto at his residence and explained the latest situation. Suharto also told the three generals that he was willing to

48:08 resolve the situation if there was an official order from Sukarno. Then the three generals followed Sukarno to the Bogor Palace, and then the March 11th order was born, the existence of which remains controversial to this day. This order was the gong of Sukarno's greatest defeat. He signed the order, which indirectly meant He signed the end of his own power. [Music] The next day, Suharto immediately dissolved the PKI armed with Supersemar. Sukarno was angry and summoned all Perdam to the Bogor Palace. He considered Suharto to have exceeded his authority.

48:55 Sukarno then issued a follow-up order on March 13th, essentially reminding Suharto that Supersemar was a technical administrative order, not a political authority. Sukarno then sent Dr. Leena and KKO commander Meijen Hartono to deliver the order to Suharto, who then responded coldly by Suharto. Tell the President that all actions I take are under my own responsibility. That's what Suharto said. This was later admitted by Suharto himself . So this ee is something from

49:42 our experience in dealing with the dangers of ee communism. After we disbanded it, finally everything could be resolved. Yes. Then ee at one point he showed all B Perdam and was scolded for participating in drafting the order. That was even though there was no order to disband PKI. I spread that. Then Mr. Lemena was scolded and then ordered to come to me at Salim to ask if calling me Mas Mas Harto is not wrong or what is wrong, the

50:28 PKI was disbanded, yes, I am indeed what is his name, Bung Kar already knew that I would be very barbaric and angry with me, never mind, I am the one responsible, unfortunately, the one who what, disbanded it. On March 18, 1966, armed with Supersemar, Soeharto issued an arrest warrant for 15 of Soekarno's ministers. Soeharto ordered Colonel Sarwo Edi to arrest them. Meanwhile, troops from the army commando regiment were tasked with surrounding the state palace. The arrest of these 15 ministers was a heavy blow for

51:14 Soekarno. Then on March 27, Soekarno was very reluctant to announce a new cabinet formed by Soeharto. Purges of Soekarno loyalists also took place in the military and bureaucracy. Even so, Soekarno seemed very confident that he still held the power of the presidency and the armed forces. This is evident from his interviews with Cindy Adams, an American journalist who asked whether she was forced to hand over power to Suharto. Sukarno answered that he still had full power and Suharto had not taken over his power.

52:00 Mr President, would you care to comment for the press about the takeover, the enforced takeover of power by General Soarto in this country? What? Well, we've been led to believe that you were forced to surrender your power. [Music] Crazy. I know. I know. I know. Abroad. [Music] Some people say that I've been out that I'm not the active president anymore and that General Soeharto has taken over

52:50 power. That's not true. I'm still in good power. What I gave to General Soharto the March 11 months. That was just an order to look after the security. in Indonesia that nothing happens which can disturb

53:38 and quiet which can disturb the security of the fusion revolution which can disturb the smoothness of government which can endure my physical and eh wibawa wibawa what is the mental no wibawa is the authority ah of the president [Musik] Yesterday

54:24 Soeharto himself made this statement. Where is the English? The English. Yes, I will do [Music] here. Here it's authority. Is that it? [Music ] Even arm's daily mail yesterday. General Soharto no coup Lutana General Soharto [Music]

55:10 to report what is this interpose today strongly denied reports about us today strongly denied reports about the coup in Indonesia as broadcast by Nicolem. President Soekarno is still in function as president supreme armed forces commander, great leader of the revolution MPRS Supreme Congress mandatory he said. However, Soekarno himself indirectly actually acknowledged the fact that his power was stripped. This is evident from the speech he delivered

55:55 at the commemoration of the proclamation of independence on August 17, 1966. [Music] In the speech entitled Never Leave History or known as Jas Merah, Soekarno emphasized that the issuance of the supermar was nothing other than an order to maintain security stability. He thought the March 11 order was a transfer of authority. In fact, it was not," said Soekarno. Sukarno's last resistance was the Nawaksara speech. Nawaksara is the title of Soekarno's accountability speech which

56:40 he delivered before the fourth general session of the MPRS on June 22, 1966. However, Soekarno's accountability speech was rejected by the MPRS because it did not explain the accountability regarding the G30S. 9 nawa 10. So I want to give the first name with the word nawa. What is Nawa? Yes, because I wrote it, I want to name it Aksara.

57:25 Aksara [Music] in response to the MPRS's rejection of Nawaksara on January 10, 1967, Soekarno submitted a written report. The report is referred to as a supplement to Nawaksara. However, the contents of this report did not alleviate the situation, instead it made the situation even more critical. The reason is, President Soekarno refused to give an account of the G30S. And finally President Soekarno's power was revoked through MPRS Decree number 33 of

58:12 1967 dated March 12, 1967. and Soekarno was defeated. [Music]

59:02 One day after Soekarno fell, there was a mysterious military operation. This story is about the military operation to rescue Bung Karno who was being held in Wismayaso. At that time, the proclaimer was under house arrest by the New Order government led by Soeharto. Sukarno's final days after the issuance of the March 11th order were truly tragic. The proclaimer's reputation began to fade. Soeharto slowly began to strengthen and strengthen the foundations of the New Order. Since May 1967,

59:47 Sukarno was no longer allowed to use the title of head of state or the status of president. At that time, Soekarno was also being intensively questioned as an object of interrogation by officers from the central inspection team and he was isolated in Wismayaso. During his exile, Soekarno was alone and lonely. Soekarno's life became more difficult. He was not allowed to leave Wismayaso and was not allowed to receive guests. There is only one of his daughters, Rahmawati, and the presidential doctor, Prof. Dr. Mahar Marjono was allowed to accompany and visit Wismayaso.

1:00:35 Soekarno also no longer received any salary or facilities from the state. he had to support himself in that condition. This apparently made the KKO troops, the special naval forces who at that time positioned themselves as Sukarno's foremost supporters, intend to take the proclaimer away from house arrest in Wismayaso . As reported by suara.com in the book Intai Amphibi Marinir Senyap menjaga Indonesia, a mysterious story is recorded about the attempt to free Soekarno from Wismooo by the amphibious reconnaissance commando troops or Kipam

1:01:20 from KKO. A number of KKO Kipam soldiers were ordered to enter Wismayaso where Soekarno was being held. His mission was to ask for a command from Soekarno to save him. It is said that the commander of KKO Legend Hartono sent these tough troops like ghosts to Wismayaso. Kipam troops managed to enter Wismayaso which was heavily guarded by military police. At that time, Soekarno was lying weak and helpless. It is said that the Kipam KKO troops paralyzed the guards who were closely guarding Wismayaso. The

1:02:05 first officer of Kipam then woke up the proclaimer. He conveyed his commander's orders to take away and save Bung Karno. But Soekarno's answer was beyond their expectations. Soekarno refused to be saved. Soekarno instead ordered the first officer to take his team out of Wismayaso. Not many words were spoken. Soekarno did not want to talk anymore. It seems that Big Brother doesn't want a civil war to happen. As a result, Kipam returned home empty-handed.

1:02:51 This rescue mission was never confirmed and disappeared like the wind. It's just a story that remains believed even though no one can testify. including the kipam who just come and go from Wismayaso. This incident has not been confirmed, but what is certain is that during the transition period of power from Soekarno to Soeharto, there was often a cold war and competition between the KKO and the Army. At that time, the Army was more inclined to be in Soeharto's position, who was actively eroding Soekarno's influence in the military. Meanwhile, the Navy KKO was in

1:03:38 Soekarno's position. KKO Commander Lejen Hartono remained the most loyal general to Sukarno. In November 1965, after the G30S PKI incident, he boldly and loudly said, "White is what Bung Karno said, white is what KKO said. Black is what Bung Karno said, black is what KKO said." In order to defend Soekarno, the KKO once showed off its strength in Surabaya on Soekarno's 65th birthday on June 6, 1966 to intimidate Soekarno's political opponents. With full force and deploying tanks and other heavy weaponry,

1:04:25 they paraded around the city of heroes. They shouted slogans of long live Bung Karno. Long live Bung Karno, they shouted, especially when passing in front of their opponent's headquarters. Indeed, since the 1960s, the strength of the Indonesian Navy's Marine Corps (KKO) has been greatly increased by Soekarno. For Sukarno's political enemies, the KKO's loyalty was clearly considered dangerous. Because KKO has 12,500 personnel. This unit is also strong in terms of organization and weaponry. KKO was one of the strongest units within the TNI at that time.

1:05:14 The difference in stance between the army on Soeharto's side and the KKO on Soekarno's side made friction unavoidable. The heated atmosphere between these two troops often occurs, especially in East Java. The peak occurred in mid-1967 when several KKO troop trucks escorting the body of PNI member Ali Surahman passed in front of the official residence of the Brawijaya Military Commander on Jalan Darmo Surabaya. At that time, the Commander of Brawijaya Military Region was held by Major General M. Yasin. They mocked Yasin by chanting and calling the commander-in-chief's name dirty words.

1:06:00 Yasin, who heard Yelyel, came out, including the guard troops and Korem commander Akub Zainal. When his men were about to act, Jasin stopped them. He said he would invite all the naval commanders and KKO commanders in Surabaya. The next day at the meeting, Yasin said that he did not accept the insult. Yasin warned that if this happened again, the matter would be handed over to his subordinates to act and it would definitely lead to civil war. [Music] Yasin claims the navy officials apologized and promised not to

1:06:47 repeat it again. Not only was he taunted when he played golf at Gunung Sari, which is located not far from the Kakao dormitory, Yasin admitted that he was always intimidated with shots in the air. But he remained calm. In his golf bag he always has an automatic standgun. He was sure the shots were just to scare him. Yasin then reported the incidents to the naval headquarters in Jakarta. He also met with General KKO Hartono. Yasin threatened Hartono that if the KKO continued to adhere to their beliefs, there would be a civil war.

1:07:36 Finally, as Yasin said, the cold war between the Army and the KKO began to end after a mutual understanding agreement was reached with the Commander of Maritime Region 5 to win the New Order. And slowly Soeharto began to grow stronger. Suharto's rise to the presidency naturally put KKO commander Lieutenant General Hartono in a difficult position. This Sukarno loyalist was then politely dismissed and appointed ambassador to North Korea. This practice was commonly carried out by Suharto to reduce the influence of his rivals. However, what was strange was that after he was called

1:08:24 home from North Korea, news was heard that the former general had committed suicide. At dawn on January 6, 1971, Lieutenant General KKO Hartono was found dead in his home. Before the incident, Hartono was visited by two mysterious guests. Without any suspicion at all, Hartono accepted the arrival of the uninvited guest . Even the general's mother had time to make drinks in the kitchen for the guests. Suddenly a gunshot was heard which broke the silence of the morning. The mother immediately rushed to the living room to see what was really happening.

1:09:10 How shocked the mother was when she saw Hartono lying in a pool of blood. The general's head was riddled with bullets. Meanwhile, near his body lies a pistol. The general's body was immediately taken to the Gatot Subroto Army Central Hospital . After the autopsy, official sources from the Soeharto government at that time said that Hartono died due to a brain hemorrhage due to self-inflicted injuries. This story is said to have happened at Hartono's residence, Jalan Prof. Dr. Supomo Menteng, Central Jakarta in the morning at 5.30. That's what the official statement from the New Order regime said

1:09:55 . Vice Admiral Sudomo mentioned Hartonoiri because he was allegedly desperate over his failure to carry out his duties as ambassador in Pionyang, North Korea. This official statement was strongly denied by several naval officials such as Lieutenant General Aliadikin and Vice Admiral Rahmat Sungkar. According to them, Hartono is not the type of person who easily gives up and commits suicide just because he failed in his duties as an ambassador. They doubted Hartono was alive. It is strongly suspected that Hartono was a murder victim. In addition, Ali Sadikin and Rahmat

1:10:42 Sungkar admitted to being surprised why Hartono's body was not autopsied by doctors from the Navy Hospital or Ciptomun Kusumo Hospital, but instead was autopsied at the Gatot Subroto Army Hospital. Hartono was buried at the Kalibata Heroes Cemetery on January 7, 1971 without the presence of his wife and children who were still in Piongang, North Korea. [Music]

1:11:58 June 21, 1970, President Soekarno died at the age of 69 . The proclaimer died in loneliness. A tragic thing for a funding father of a great country. Since his power was revoked by a special session of the MPRS less than 3 years earlier, Bung Besar had been kept away from various things. He was ostracized and could be said to live like a political prisoner. His friends and those closest to him were unable to meet him because permission from the New Order government was difficult to obtain. Even his friend and former deputy, Bung Hatta, was only able to meet him in the

1:12:46 final moments of his life. When he wanted to visit Soekarno at RSPAD, Hatta had to ask permission first from Soeharto through General Cokro Pranoto, the President's Military Secretary. Ratnasari Dewi, Bung Karno's Japanese wife, also really wanted to meet him in his final moments. But he had to be detained in Singapore because he had not received permission from Soeharto. It was only the next day, June 20th to be precise , that Dewi received permission. Dewi came bringing her child with Soekarno, Kartika Sari Dewi. At that time, Kartika was only 3 years old. Because he was born in Japan, Soekarno had

1:13:32 never seen his son. Just a day before his death, he was able to meet his son for the first and last time. [Music] Forensic expert from the University of Indonesia, Dr. Munim Idris has his

1:14:20 own analysis regarding the death of Indonesia's first President. In his book entitled X Files, he reveals the facts about the deaths of Bung Karno and Munir. Moun explained that the main cause of Soekarno's death was the state's neglect of the proclaimer. A very active Soekarno was suddenly imprisoned in the pavilion of the Bogor Palace and then moved to Wismo. Sukarno's declining health. Bung Karno was indeed sick at that time, but that was only a minor cause. The main reason was because he was isolated from his own people. Thus wrote Mun Imim. 5 days before his death, news

1:15:06 about Bung Karno being treated at RSPAD and in critical condition really shocked the public. Because previously it could be said that there was no news whatsoever about Bung Karno reported in the mass media. The public only knows that he was placed in Wismayaso for quite a long time. In the early days of his exile in Wismayaso, Soekarno still seemed strong. To Sidarto Danu Subroto, the adjutant who remained loyal to accompany him during his time under house arrest. Soekarno emphasized that he could be ostracized, separated from his family, even detained and eventually die alone. But the soul, ideas, ideology and spirit cannot be

1:15:53 killed. That's what he said to the adjutant. Once a week, Soekarno was interrogated by a koptip officer. He was interrogated all day. Security has also been tightened, making movement even more limited. This situation certainly made Soekarno even more depressed. Senior journalist Alwi Sahab said that before Soekarno's death, President General Ali Murtopo's personal assistant reported to Soeharto at Benagraha. Then he answered the press, for some reason Ali Murtopo stated that he had no regrets if Bung Karno died. However, he himself denied the statement

1:16:38 . Then he even blamed the palace journalist for misquoting the news about Bung Karno. Even though Alwi and dozens of other journalists clearly heard his statement. Even an RRI reporter admitted to still having a tap recording containing Ali Murtopo's statement. The final moments of Bung Karno's life left behind many tragic stories about the father of the nation. One of them was the neglect of his will regarding the burial he wanted when death called him. Long before he died, Bung Karno had conveyed his wishes or a kind of will regarding his death and burial.

1:17:24 To the American journalist, Cindy Adam, Soekarno once said that when he died he wanted to be buried in the Periangan area, precisely under a shady tree with the sound of flowing water underneath. It is possible that the place Soekarno meant was the Bogor slate palace. To Cindy, he also expressed his wish that his coffin be wrapped in the Muhammadiyah flag. He also didn't want a big monument made . He just wanted his tombstone to be written, "Here lies Bung Karno," the mouthpiece of the Indonesian people.

1:18:09 The people still adore him. When the body was released from Wismayaso to Halim Perdana Kusuma Airport, the road, which was approximately 10 km long, was crowded with people. Many of them shed tears and sobbed when they released Bung Karno's body. Oh. [Music]

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