Why Is Russia's Economy Growing?

Brief Summary

The video analyzes the Russian economy since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, highlighting the discrepancy between reported GDP growth and the actual economic health. It explains how wartime spending inflates GDP without adding real value, leading to high inflation and an unbalanced economy. The video also discusses the impact of sanctions, labor shortages, and the long-term consequences of transitioning to a war economy, including decreased productivity and a potential post-war economic shock.

  • Wartime spending boosts GDP but doesn't add real value.
  • High inflation and labor shortages are significant issues.
  • Sanctions hinder long-term economic development.
  • Transitioning back to a normal economy post-war will be challenging.

Introduction: Russia's Wartime Economy

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, its economy has shown unexpected growth, surpassing the United States and Europe in the last year, with record-low unemployment. This has been touted by Vladimir Putin and his supporters as evidence that Western sanctions have failed. However, Ukraine's economy has also grown significantly, though this is not seen as a sign of economic prosperity due to the ongoing conflict. The apparent growth in the Russian economy is largely due to wartime spending, which requires a different analysis compared to peacetime economies.

GDP and Wartime Spending

GDP, or Gross Domestic Product, is the total monetary value of finished goods and services produced within a country in a specific period. In wartime, government spending on items like tanks is added to the GDP at the price the government paid. However, if these tanks are destroyed, the waste is not reflected in the GDP calculation, making much of the growth illusory. Sergei Guriev of London Business School equates this wartime spending to printing money and giving it to the tank factory without producing anything of lasting value.

The Real Costs of War

Russian defense spending has increased significantly since the start of the war, rising from 3% to almost 7% of GDP. War costs extend beyond military spending to include healthcare for the injured and infrastructure repair, which are categorized under different sections of the budget. The shift from trading with Europe and the United States to trading with China and India has also incurred substantial costs, including building new transportation infrastructure and reorienting supply chains. Compared to 2021, Russian budget expenditures have increased by 20%, with the state's share in the economy reaching 50-70%.

Inflation and Economic Imbalances

While inflation has cooled globally, it remains high in Russia, with consumer prices rising 10.3% year-on-year in March, exceeding the central bank's target of 4%. Prices for fruits and vegetables have increased by over 20%, and butter prices rose 26% last year. The official inflation rate may not reflect the reality on the ground, as the quality of replacement goods has often decreased. The Russian Central Bank has kept interest rates high at 21% to combat inflation.

Factors Contributing to High Inflation

Several factors contribute to Russia's high inflation, including tightened sanctions, ruble depreciation, and labor shortages due to conscription and casualties. High wages in munitions factories have crowded out non-wartime production, increasing operating costs for civilian businesses. Unemployment has fallen to a record low of around 2%, and nominal pay rose by 18% last year. The government's fiscal stimulus, particularly the "mortgages for everyone" program, has further fueled demand and driven record sales.

Wartime Economic Stresses

Wartime economies often experience increased central planning and competition between the military and civilian sectors for resources. Russia's low unemployment rate signals a labor shortage in the civilian sector. The government has increased pay for volunteer soldiers, with soldiers' families receiving increased compensation for losses. This economic boom is driven by government spending rather than market forces, making it difficult for private non-defense companies to operate due to high interest rates.

Corporate Debt and Banking System

Corporate bankruptcies in Russia surged 20% last year, and this trend is expected to continue. Russian corporate debt has soared by 71% since 2022. Putin has commandeered the Russian banking system, forcing banks to lend to chosen companies at preferential terms, resulting in a flood of below-market-rate credit. This is seen as a way to conceal a growing budget deficit, but may eventually require bailing out the banks.

Economic Struggles and Future Outlook

The Russian economy is struggling more than it appears, with lower growth in military spending and high interest rates likely to impact GDP growth. A decline in oil prices and a slowdown in China, Russia's biggest export destination, pose significant problems. Oil-and-gas tax revenue fell by around 17% year-on-year in March, and the budget-deficit estimate for 2025 has increased. Russia has been paying for the war through oil and gas revenues, spending down the sovereign wealth fund, and allowing government liabilities to decline in real terms.

Impact of Sanctions and Frozen Reserves

Approximately half of Russia's foreign currency and gold reserves were frozen by Western countries after the invasion of Ukraine. Losing access to these reserves has been a significant blow, limiting Russia's ability to fund the war. While Russia's budget deficit is under 3%, energy exports are crucial to the Russian economy, making it vulnerable to a fall in oil prices.

The Dutch Disease and War Economy Transition

Before the war, Russia suffered from the "Dutch Disease," where its wealth in natural resources hindered the development of other economic sectors. The transition to a war economy was easier for Russia due to its focus on oil and gas production. Russia has been able to continue producing and selling oil, working around sanctions by using a shadow fleet of oil tankers and increasing sales to China and India.

Long-Term Economic Consequences

The sanctions have hurt Russia by discouraging investment and cutting it off from new technology and ideas. Russian businesses have had little competition, reducing their incentive to improve. As time goes on, the quality of Russian businesses decays, productivity worsens, and the economy hollows out. The longer the war continues, the more Russia stagnates while the rest of the world moves forward.

Post-War Economic Challenges

The GDP generated in recent years has been driven by military spending, which will stop when the war ends. Unlike typical post-war scenarios, there is little infrastructure to rebuild in Russia. Normalizing the Russian economy after the lending boom will be difficult, with the prospect of a post-war wave of defaults. The Russian economy has already started slowing and is expected to struggle if energy prices fall further.

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Transcript

Full transcript of “Why Is Russia's Economy Growing?”. Click a timestamp to open the video at that moment. Need another video? Use the YouTube transcript generator.

0:00 Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, its economy has surpassed most expectations. Last year, Russia’s economy grew more than the United States and Europe and on top of that Russian unemployment is at a record low. Vladimir Putin – and Russian supporters have hailed this as a great success and as of evidence that western sanctions didn’t work. It is worth noting that the Ukrainian economy also outgrew the United States and Europe over the last two years having grown 2.9% last year and 5.5% the year before – but – of course - no one is trying to claim that business is booming in Ukraine. With some carefully chosen numbers you can put

0:47 a very positive spin on the growth of the Russian economy, and the reason for this is that wartime economies are very different to peacetime economies – and so we have to analyze them differently. While wars are destructive of physical and human capital – which don’t show up in national income accounting – spending on weapons production and the vast spending required to reorient Russia’s economy - which used to face towards the west and now faces towards the east - boosts GDP. As impressive as the GDP growth rates in Ukraine over the last two years might (at first) sound – they come in the wake of a thirty percent decline in GDP in 2022 when the country was invaded. A huge amount of Ukrainian infrastructure has been

1:37 destroyed by Russia – all of which will need to be rebuilt at great expense. According to an analysis by the European Parliament, if Ukraine was able to maintain its recent growth rates, it’s real GDP would only return to its pre-war level by 2030. GDP – or Gross Domestic Product - is defined as the total monetary value of all of the finished goods and services produced within a country’s borders in a specific time period – usually a year – and it’s often used as a scorecard of a country’s broad economic health. In wartime – when Russia spends – let’s say – a billion dollars on tanks – economists would measure their value at the price the government

2:25 paid for them. So, that - one billion dollars’ worth of tanks – would add a billion dollars to Russian GDP. If those tanks were destroyed the next day in Ukraine (as many of them have been) – this spending won’t have added any real value to the Russian Economy – but the waste never shows up in the GDP calculation. For this reason, a lot of the GDP growth is illusory. As Sergei Guriev of London Business school described it in the FT earlier this year – This type of wartime spending – on quickly destroyed tanks - is equivalent to just printing a billion dollars and handing it over to the people who work in the tank factory – or to its shareholders – without anything being produced. So, on paper it might look like

3:15 Russia is producing a lot of GDP – but a lot of that GDP is destroyed weapons systems and payments made to either wounded Russian soldiers or the families of dead soldiers. He points out that all of Russia’s growth since the start of the war is concentrated in the military sector. Russian defense spending went from 3% of GDP to almost 7% after the start of the war – a massive increase in spending. But that is only the start… War costs are not limited to just paying soldiers and spending on weapons. Expenses for treating the injured show up as health care expenses, expenses for debris removal and repair of infrastructure fall under housing and utilities. None of these

4:05 are counted under the narrowly defined military spending section of the Russian budget – but a huge amount of this “other” spending wouldn’t have happened without the war. There have been huge costs associated with the switch from trading with Europe and the United States – to trading with China and India – which Russia has been forced to do since western sanctions were imposed – this has required building transportation infrastructure and reorienting supply chains – all of this spending shows up in GDP too – but without the invasion of Ukraine it would have been unnecessary. According to the FT - compared with 2021, (which was the last prewar year), Russian budget expenditures have increased by 20 percent, and the

4:54 state’s share in the Russian economy has reached an estimated fifty to seventy percent. Russia’s central bank identifies government spending as the main driver of GDP growth. War-related spending in Russia rose from around 23 per cent of the budget pre-invasion to almost 40 per cent by last year. Sergei Guriev argues that most of Russia’s war spending has the same effect as helicopter money – as huge amounts of money were pumped into the economy – while nothing of lasting value was produced. When there is more cash in the economy for the same output – this causes inflation – and Russian inflation has been so extreme that thieves have even been breaking into stores to steal butter.

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7:19 While inflation has cooled almost everywhere else in the world, it has been roaring hot in Russia. Consumer prices rose 10.3% year-on-year in March - well above the central bank’s target of 4%. The prices of fruit and vegetables have risen by more than 20% on average in the past year. Potatoes have almost doubled in price and butter prices rose 26 per cent last year, prompting some stores to keep it in plastic boxes under lock and key. Russians on the ground don’t appear believe the official inflation rate – and while this can be the case everywhere in the world – there is maybe more reason to believe that people are right in Russia than elsewhere.

8:05 Inflation is calculated using the prices of a fixed basket of goods and services – the basket is adjusted over time to adjust for changing consumer tastes – and when an item is no longer available, a similar replacement item is substituted – but often the replacement item is of different quality which can affect the calculation. Statistics agencies attempt to adjust for these quality differences – but that task becomes near impossible in a wartime economy like Russia’s – where so many items previously imported from western nations are now being imported from either China and India – or being made at home. It can be extremely difficult to compare quality differences

8:51 like this – but a lot of reporting out of Russia indicates that the replacement goods are often of lower quality – meaning that people are spending more money and getting lower quality goods. The Russian Central Bank announced after their March meeting that while inflationary pressures are easing, they would still keep interest rates at 21%. There are a few factors that explain Russia’s high inflation. Firstly, with the West having tightened sanctions over time and with the ruble depreciating – imported goods were getting both more expensive and more difficult to acquire. Secondly, conscription, Russians fleeing the country to avoid conscription, and soldiers dying on the battlefield have caused severe

9:39 labor shortages - which pushed up wages in all sectors of the economy. The high wages being paid – to keep munitions factories running round the clock – which produce goods that the average Russian citizen has no need for has crowded out non wartime production. Civilian businesses had to pay higher and higher wages to attract workers – which increases their operating costs and gets passed on as more expensive goods and services in Russia. All of this means that unemployment, fell to around 2%, which is the lowest on record in Russia and last year, nominal pay rose by 18%. While the central bank was hiking interest rates to

10:24 slow an overheating economy - the government was implementing massive fiscal stimulus - spending on defense, welfare and infrastructure. Russian business owners – in particular those selling to the government – who were making a lot of money from government procurement – found it difficult to travel abroad and began spending more money in Russia. This strong demand, according to the Russian central bank, “still exceeds companies’ capacities to expand supply”. So, with more money chasing fewer goods – prices go up and up. The government stimulated other parts of the Russian economy too. When war broke out in early 2022 the central bank hiked interest rates above 20% and put capital controls in place – so that

11:14 people couldn’t get their money out of Russia. In order to keep the people happy, the Kremlin introduced a “mortgages for everyone” program, which offered cheap loans for new construction that charged half the going interest rate. The FT says that the authorities had to demonstrate that, despite all the shocks and sanctions, people would be able to buy an apartment.” This massive interest rate differential – put in place a huge incentive to borrow and build new homes - which drove record sales. The total value of mortgages held in Russia grew 35 percent in 2023 alone – before the government finally listened to the central bank and shut the program down. This mix of huge fiscal stimulus – which

12:04 is unevenly applied throughout the economy - combined with a tight labor market – and then offset with extremely high interest rates brought about a spending boom – The mix of contrasting policies left Russia with a turbocharged but extremely unbalanced economy. These economic stresses are not that unusual in wartime economies where you see increased central planning and the military competing with the civilian sector for both workers and resources. The "guns versus butter" economic concept is often used to describe this trade-off between military spending (guns) and social welfare spending (butter). It illustrates the dilemma

12:50 faced by governments when allocating limited resources between military and domestic needs. While Russia’s low unemployment rate can be spun as a positive – it is really a signal that the civilian sector is short on labor. The Russian government has boosted the pay for volunteer soldiers to avoid conscription – which caused problems at the start of the war - when young Russian men fled to neighboring countries to avoid the draft. The most recent pay increase means Russian volunteer soldiers now earn five times the average nominal income in Russia. Russian soldiers have never earned as much before – and on top of this – soldiers’

13:35 families have seen a boost in the compensation received for losing their sons - such that 6% of Russia’s budget is estimated as being spent to pay families of the dead and wounded. Russia may have all of the appearances of being in an economic boom – but it’s not driven by the market – it’s instead driven by government spending. The high inflation means that the central bank has to keep monetary policy very tight – but with an interest rate of 21% - it is extremely difficult for private non-defense companies to do business. Even Russia’s largest weapons manufacturer Rostec (which is benefitting from government contracts) is complaining about the high interest rates – which make export contracts unprofitable for

14:25 them. According to the Moscow Times – Corporate bankruptcies surged 20% in Russia last year and this trend is expected to continue. A recent report by Russia analyst Craig Kennedy highlights the huge growth in Russian corporate debt - which has soared by 71 per cent since 2022 and dwarf’s new household and government borrowing. According to the FT - Putin has commandeered the Russian banking system, forcing banks to lend to chosen companies at preferential terms – and the result has been a flood of below-market-rate credit to favored businesses. They describe this as massive money printing – hidden on the balance sheets of state-controlled banks – which may eventually need to be bailed out.

15:15 This is all being done – they say - in an effort to conceal a growing budget deficit. The Russian economy is struggling much more than it might at first appear to be and the Economist reported earlier this week that it is rapidly getting worse. They highlight lower growth in military spending and high interest rates – as likely to ding GDP growth - but say that the biggest problem for Russia is the recent decline in oil prices – combined with a slowdown in China – Russia’s biggest export destination. in March - Russian oil-and-gas tax revenue fell by around 17% year on year. On April 30th the Russian finance ministry increased the budget-deficit

16:01 estimate for 2025 to 1.7% of GDP from 0.5% after reducing its forecast for energy revenues by 24%. There are a few ways that Russia has been paying for the war – using oil and gas revenues, spending down the sovereign wealth fund, allowing government liabilities like pension costs and government worker wages to decline in real terms – while keeping military and police wages high- to keep the leadership safe. Last year Russia announced large tax hikes – and significant spending cuts on support for small businesses, education and other social spending. As soon as Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, approximately half of Russia’s foreign

16:52 currency and gold reserves (which amounted to over three hundred billion dollars) were frozen by Western countries. It is hard to know what will happen with those reserves in the long run. No interest is accumulating on the frozen reserves for Russia – which amounts to billions of dollars that they have lost out on – and it’s unclear as to how, when and under what conditions the reserves will be returned to Russia. Losing access to these reserves was a big hit for Russia – and if they had access to that 300 billion dollars, they could have spent it on soldiers and weapons – and would have likely been more successful in attacking Ukraine. Russian spending shown here in the orange bars hasn't led to much debt as government spending

17:40 has mostly been offset by federal revenue shown here with the blue bars. This means that Russia’s budget deficit is under 3%. When we look at how much oil and gas has brought in, you can see how important energy exports are to the Russian economy – and also how harmful a fall in the price of oil would be. Russia is the third largest oil producer in the world - just behind The United States and Saudi Arabia. My friend Manoj – at Talking Heads Macro - argues that before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia suffered from what economists call “The Dutch Disease.” This term originated from the economic impact of the discovery of vast natural gas reserves in the Netherlands in the 1960s.

18:30 This discovery caused a surge in the Dutch economy's income, leading to a rise in the value of its currency and a decline in the competitiveness of other economic sectors. Countries rich in natural resources – like Russia - often struggle to translate this wealth into widespread economic prosperity. The Dutch disease can worsen this problem by concentrating wealth in the resource sector while weakening other parts of the economy. Because a lot of goods can be manufactured anywhere in the world – a strong currency which was brought about by factors other than high productivity makes all other production within that country internationally uncompetitive. When a country has a natural resources windfall –

19:20 the best thing to do is to invest that wealth into productivity enhancing goods so that all sectors of their economy can grow. The goal is to focus on economic activity that can lead to even greater economic activity. Russia has instead mostly focused on oil and gas production – or on energy intensive industries that take advantage of the availability of cheap energy within the country. Although Russia has an educated workforce – there has been very little focus on making the most of those workers – by let’s say making high tech products - as it is simply easier to focus on oil and gas production which doesn’t really require a lot of innovation as the

20:05 underlying technology for commodity extraction hasn’t changed very much over the years. Because of the Dutch Disease - Russian productivity was never great – and the economy wasn’t very impressive before the war – but Manoj points out that the transition of Russia’s production resources to wartime use was much easier than the transition to a services driven economy would have been. In a country that needed to produce high tech – or more complex products - to bring in money to pay for tanks and soldiers – it would have been more difficult to finance a war when cut off by the international community. It would also be more economically harmful to shut down those types of businesses and send highly

20:52 productive workers to the front line to fight. Russia was able to continue producing oil and selling it – working around sanctions with a shadow fleet of oil tankers – and selling more to China and India than they did in the past. Before the war, India bought 1% of its oil imports from Russia – today they source between 35 and 45 percent of their oil imports from Russia. While the transition to a war economy may have been easy for Russia, the question we are left with is how quickly can Russia return to normal economy when the war ends? The place where the sanctions have been hurting Russia the most is that no one really wants to invest in Russia anymore or is able to invest in Russia. The country has been cut off from the

21:44 inflow of new technology, capital products, new investment and new ideas and should a peace deal be struck, all of that will need to be restarted. Having been cut off from the rest of the world – Russian businesses have had next to no competition – and thus have had no incentive to produce cheaper or better goods. During that timeframe, foreign businesses have had to compete and have been forced to improve. While Putin can quite likely use Russia’s natural resources wealth to sustain his war for a very long time - as time goes by - a slow decay occurs in the quality of Russian businesses – productivity gets worse and worse over time and the economy hollows out as the country just sells oil to pay for the war and the standard

22:35 of living declines. The longer this war goes on the more Russia stands still while the rest of the world moves forward – with real growth – rather than growth driven by government spending and where new technologies are developed that boost productivity. While Russian oil and gas might be needed, buyers who used to source other goods from Russia before the war have now found new suppliers – and have no reason to start buying from Russian firms again. As Russia stagnates, its smartest and most productive workers – who haven’t yet left - will leave for opportunities in the rest of the world. The type of GDP that Russia has generated in recent years has been entirely driven by military spending and in peacetime Russia can’t grow its

23:26 way out of its problems – as that spending will stop when the war ends and there are no sustainably profitable businesses left. Often when wars end you see a reconstruction boom – but very little Russian infrastructure has been destroyed so not much needs to be rebuilt. While Russia isn’t as militarized as the Soviet Union was during the cold war– the demilitarization that occurred when the cold war ended brought about a huge economic shock as nothing replaced the military economic activity when it abruptly ended. It took years for munitions factory workers to retrain to work in other businesses. Putin will struggle to normalize the Russian economy after the multi-year lending boom

24:14 where state-controlled banks were forced to finance defense companies at subsidized rates. Preferential loans to defense companies, agricultural businesses, construction companies and mortgage borrowers now make up about 16% of banks’ total portfolios, according to the Bank of Russia. This raises the prospect of a post-war wave of defaults if defense spending falls and the economy slows. The Russian economy has already started slowing – and can be expected to struggle if energy prices fall any further. The IMF expects growth of 1.3% this year and 1.2% next year. While the U.S. government has discussed lifting

25:00 sanctions on Russia’s energy sector, the European Union and the United Kingdom don’t appear to be planning to follow suit, at least not until Russia is no longer seen as a security threat. It’s been a while since I’ve made any videos on Russia’s – but hopefully all of the Russian bots are still there to comment and downvote the video – so make sure you go down to the comments section to say hi. If you found this interesting – you should watch my video on Americas spending addiction next. Don’t forget to check out our sponsor Shokz using the link in the description. Have a great day and talk to you in the next video – bye.

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